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
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ПОДОБИЕ И РАЗЛИЧИЕ. ПРОБЛЕМА ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ
RESEMBLANCE AND DIFFERENCE. THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

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И РАЗЛИЧИЕ
ПРОБЛЕМА
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OF IDENTITY

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ИНСТИТУТ
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POLSKIEJ AKADEMII NAUK

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Editors

Teresa Dobrzyńska, Raya Kuncheva



2015

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TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

FOREWORD

Comparing objects in order to establish their similarity or difference, identifying people, things, and phenomena – these basic mental operations take part in the attainment and ordering of knowledge. In human beings' functioning in the world and in the cultural space that they are surrounded by, such actions and the categories they are connected with – similarity, difference, identicalness, identity – possess an elementary significance. They are the basis for numerous kinds of human activity.

The processes of recognizing similarity or difference, and of identification are present in a number of complex cognitive operations, as well as in communication and art practices. This key role is confirmed in the writings of philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists and specialists in other fields of the humanities.¹ The process of discovering similarity – despite existing differences – lies at the base of categorization, it determines the limits of linguistic

¹ Polish studies on the subject include articles in the volume *Podobieństwo*, ed. H. Kardela, Z. Muszyński, M. Rajewski, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS 2006 – particularly: R. Poczobut, *O samej relacji podobieństwa. Na marginesie sporu o uniwersalia*; K. Sobczuk, *Podobieństwo jako kategoria filozoficzna i antropologiczna*; P. Francuz, *Koncepcje podobieństwa strukturalnego i funkcjonalnego w psychologii*.

paradigms, it governs the identification of synonyms, it enables the creation of metaphors and similes, it is expressed in various types of parallelisms, it allows the grasping of intertextual allusions in irony, parody and all forms of stylistic imitation. It is present in all those linguistic and textual phenomena that can be characterized as iconic signs (this includes onomatopoeia, parables, quotations and structural imitations); and *topoi*, too, operate on the principle of similarity. This recognizing of similarity is the precondition of the identifiability of conventions in text and communication and a precondition for their functioning. Similarity underpins the analogies and prefigurations that are important in synesthesia and the “correspondence” of arts. It enables the identification of analogies in narrative structures. The paradoxical coexistence of difference and identicalness is present in the idea of the double, it also lies at the base of the motif of metamorphosis. Etc., etc.

In the discourse of the modern humanities, the terms similarity, difference, and identity play a key role in important areas of reflection. An especially wide and intensely explored domain of research is connected with the problem of identity in its various aspects: ethnic, cultural, social, religious or biological. One of the significant factors differentiating between various methodologies in the humanities is the type of relations that are given prominence in a theory and the mental operations that form the bases of these relations. In structuralism, this prominence was given to the notion of opposition, which was rooted in a sharply conceived concept of difference. In consequence, structuralist linguistic analyses developed the category of the “distinctive feature”. For cognitive linguistics, the formulation of the notion of “family resemblance”² had a similar key significance.

² This idea, outlined by Ludwig Wittgenstein, was taken up by Eleanor Rosch, who developed the basis for new rules of typology. See L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1973; E. Rosch, *Natural categories*, „Cognitive Psychology” 1973, 4.

Both the pervasive presence of the categories listed above in basic mental operations and communication practices, as well as their role in the forming of theory, encourage a closer scrutiny of these problems and an elaboration on some of the issues they comprise. The cognitive processes mentioned are at once simple and mysterious, they are intriguing, they have philosophical implications. The identification of objects, as well as the detection of their similarity or dissimilarity – these are problematic issues.

These matters became the topic of interest for two groups of Bulgarian and Polish literary scholars cooperating in the international project *Concepts and their contexts*. The analyses prepared within the scope of this program concentrate on questions connected with literature, taking always into account its links with language and culture.

The studies collected in the present book sum up another stage in the coordinated efforts of both groups. The results of the previous stages of cooperation were published in the following volumes: *Память и текст. Когнитивные и культурологические аспекты – Memory and Text. Cognitive and Cultural Aspects* (Sofia 2005); *Words and Images. Iconicity of the Text – Слова и образы. Иконичность текста* (Sofia 2008); *Vision and Cognition. Literary, Linguistic and Cultural Aspects – Взгляд и познание. Литературные, лингвистические и культурологические аспекты* (Sofia 2011).³

The last stage of cooperation is focused on the categories of similarity, identity, and difference. We discuss a few groups of issues connected with the conceptual content and diversified functioning of these categories, which are reflected in this volume. General reflection on the presence of the notions of identity and similarity in

³ All three volumes, edited by Teresa Dobrzyńska and Raya Kuncheva, were published as part of the collaboration between the Institute for Literature of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

some relevant scientific theories (I: *Discussing theories*) is followed up by the analysis of semantic adequacy of words in natural language and the identity of sign and text in traditional and digital communication (II: *Identity and similarity in language and communication*). A series of papers discuss various aspects of identity and similarity as applied to the literature in general or to some structural elements of the literary work in particular (III: *Identity and similarity in literature*). The following studies concern the problem of identity as applied to various artistic compositions (IV: *Identity or similarity in photography, music, and theatre*). Several papers are devoted to the problem of personal or national identity and the search of it, as testified in literary texts and in public discourse (V: *Personal and national identity*). The last section debates some practical implications of similarity in academic writings: the problem of plagiarism and how to reveal it (VI: *An abuse of similarity*).

The area we have chosen for our present investigation is highly extensive so it is obvious that several problems have been left untouched. And as it happens often in the science, the discussion is rather opened than concluded. Our aim in this volume is to reveal some new aspects of the issue, and encourage further reflection on it.

I.

DISCUSSING THEORIES

GRZEGORZ GROCHOWSKI

AFTER IDENTITY.
RESEMBLANCE AND REPETITION

1.

Since long ago the category of identity has been one of the major reference points for reflection in modern humanities, as the subject of analysis, a descriptive tool or an ethical premise. It has gained importance mainly in studies on subjectivity, where it usually defines the major form of individual or collective self-knowledge¹. Sometimes, however, a broader interpretation emerges – one that transcends the dimension of subjective identifications. It may be assumed that every specific way of thinking about human subjectivity is connected with a related mode of conceiving outside phenomena, based on an identical pattern. The principle of identity thus becomes a general formula that is effective in various frames of reference, organizing the entire order of discourse. In this perspective, thinking is equated with identification; consequently, perception turns into a process of

¹ Such interpretation can be found for example in classic sociological works: Ch. Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*, Harvard University Press 1989; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1991.

discerning any peculiarity as a specimen that represents an abstract idea. All cognitive processes result in subsuming particular cases under a selected category. Gilles Deleuze makes this especially clear when he claims that “The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation”².

It should be also acknowledged that the above profiling of reflection has determined the general framework of modern science. The authority enjoyed by systemic procedures of identification is reinforced by the almost entire research *praxis*, in which the method has become synonymous with legitimate investigation, with definition constituting the main form of objective knowledge. The precedence of this kind of perspective also played a significant part in the humanities, where identity functioned as the category that thematized specific problem areas (primarily studies focused on patterns of personal, social, sexual, ethnic or national identity; however, research has been also done in the identity of species, aesthetics, ideology, as well as identity narrations and discourse, or even, say, conditions of object identity in particular disciplines), at the same time being a practical operational directive (which is confirmed by structuralist research involving search for invariants, deep structures and “genotypes”).

Within this paradigm relations of resemblance turn out to be secondary, accidental or temporary. A clear correspondence between elements could be considered, for example, as a random coincidence of their characteristic features – one that is worth noting in descriptions of textual forms, but is irrelevant in their categorical classification. It seems that more frequently resemblance is understood as an iconic parallelism that stems from arbitrary semiotic arrangement, and thus does not belong to the permanent specificity of codes. On the other hand, in analyses of conventions we can discern an aspiration to reduce or neutralize such partial, indirect

² G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (1968), transl. P. Patton, Columbia University Press, New York 1994, p. XIX

resemblances. To illustrate this tendency we can recall the narratological models developed by Vladimir Propp, who compared similar semiotic systems (characters of similar status, or actions having similar effects), “filtering” the local peculiarities and extracting from particular realizations ever more general schemata until they reached states of abstract identity (as *actants* or *functions*)³.

The destabilization of the above order is usually associated with the onset of a new phase in the development of Western culture – i.e. postmodernity, or late modernity – when modernization processes lost their previous momentum, and the public’s attention generally shifted to their side effects, often unsettling and troublesome. The privileging of this problematic was sometimes deemed a manifestation of the ideological imprint on the humanities. The most spectacular version of such criticism can be probably found in French “philosophy of difference,” which was responsible for the dismantling of central figures of identity, now conceived as objectified hypostases (it suffices to recall some of the concepts that used to be famous: “death of the author,” “the ends of man,” “crisis of signification” or “the breakdown of great narratives”).

Such judgments are not free from rhetorical exaggeration; however, it is difficult to deny that “thinking based on identification” has really found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, the category of identity has become anathema on the level of speculative generalization, but on the other it remains an important tool in empirical research, where its use is sometimes enforced by the gathered material itself. Fatigue with postmodern scepticism and a nostalgic turn towards the abandoned traditions intertwine today with the conviction that a simple return to old solutions is impossible. In the face of piling ambiguities it becomes attractive to explore those positions that involve an attempt to redefine the mean-

³ V. Propp, *Morphology of the Folktale* (1928), transl. L. Scott, University of Texas Press, Austin 1968.

ing of the discussed category, freeing it from automatic associations and capturing its problematic character outside the dichotomy of deconstructive criticism and rigid dogmatism. First of all, some tried to overcome this difficulty by modifying the term and supplementing it with epithets meant to lend it greater openness and dynamism. Among such attempts it is worthwhile to recall “identities in flux” (introduced by Zygmunt Bauman) and “narrative identity” (championed by Paul Ricoeur).

An alternative solution is to seek peculiar pseudonyms, possible synonyms or functional equivalents to the expelled term. In the main part of this essay I focus on the categories of “resemblance” and “repetition,” which successfully aspire to the above role, partially filling the space left vacant after identity’s departure. Their popularity was secured mainly by two influential currents that have distinguished themselves within postmodern humanities: cognitivism and poststructuralism. Since the two movements are continuations of two competing positions in philosophy (empiricism and rationalism, respectively), they have differently arranged the space left “after identity” and have distinctly diagnosed the consequences of cultural transformations. To simply juxtapose them, however, would be a gross oversimplification, for both approaches transcend the boundaries of traditionally identified schools or disciplines, retaining an ambiguous stance towards many crucial epistemological dilemmas. Each of those directions questions in an original way the definitive opposition between the rational and the empirical, the intellectual and the sensual. At the same time, both orientations remain deeply indebted to their predecessors, who frequently presented some of their ideas more clearly or suggestively. Hence, the following discussions will begin with summaries of relevant philosophical inspirations.

2.

One of the more important concepts opposing the regime of strong identity was developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* as the idea of “family resemblance.”⁴ Earlier on, the philosopher’s name was associated with the search for a permanent essence of language. However, in this book he rejects the claim that the discussed object is unified (PI §65) and offers an alternative way of problematizing it. In the well-known description of “games” he attempts to prove that it is possible to categorically group phenomena deprived of common definitional properties. The basis for their collective affiliation turns out to be an irregular constellation of references, “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small” (PI §66)⁵.

From this perspective, resemblances do not constitute permanent attributes of an entire category, because we deal only with partial coincidences linking selected features of certain elements. Those relations do not guarantee clear identification due to the gradation of similarity; moreover, they are affected by context and are prone to subjective distortion. Describing “games” using analogy can be adapted to other phenomena, but it primarily becomes a handy model of verbal forms of behaviour. According to

⁴ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and J. Schulte, Blackwell, Oxford 2009. Hereafter referred to in abbreviated form as PI with paragraph number.

⁵ For a broader discussion on family resemblances see for example: N. Griffin, *Wittgenstein, Universals and Family Resemblance*, “Canadian Journal of Philosophy” 1974, no. 4; – R. W. Beardsmore, *The Theory of Family Resemblance*, “Philosophical Investigations” 1992, no. 15; – C. Ginzburg, *Family Resemblances and Family Trees: Two Cognitive Metaphors*, “Critical Inquiry”, 2004, no. 3; – S. Bangu, *Later Wittgenstein on Essentialism, Family Resemblance and Philosophical Method*, “Metaphysica” 2005, no. 6.

this view, language does not constitute a coherent system: it cannot be embraced with a comprehensive definition or exhausted with a methodical analysis. The term referring to language is composed according to the principle of “family resemblance” and assumes the form of a flexible network spread over a plethora of references, with the space of speech seeming to be the sphere where disproportionate “language games” coexist. Their extent cannot be unambiguously identified – it is determined by an open-ended catalogue of examples: orders, descriptions, made-up stories, riddles, jokes, translations, requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying (PI §23).

The main type of relationship found in this subset of the universe is represented by similarities between individual practices; the former facilitate approximate ordering of the latter. The range of “games” identified in communication covers a wide array of phenomena (from simple phrases, through institutionalized performative utterances and causal interaction, to comprehensive definitions of all symbolic activity), which allows for flexibility when searching for their particular equivalents. Similarities between games can be translated, for example, into similarities between textual constructions (thematic, stylistic, compositional, etc.), which facilitate grouping of particular utterances in larger blocks. Due to its lack of specificity, the formula of “language games” is sometimes used in the context of such disparate categories as styles, genres, sociolects or institutional discourses. Thus, the ordering of elements in accordance with resemblance has a dynamic character, and – depending on the perspective assumed in each case – isolates different sets that are deprived of a stable position (PI §17).

Given this background, it clearly transpires that the discussed approach represents a negative attitude to the regime of identity, which is accused of objectifying meanings, making definition patterns rigid and reinforcing cognitive automatisms. Wittgenstein’s

resemblances facilitate grouping of objects, but they cannot serve to systematize them because they do not establish clear relationships of subordination as well as do not form stable conceptual systems. They are not structures of objective order, but just local effects produced by the ordering of phenomena, dynamically adapted to changing assumptions and goals. This idea's critical potential clearly emerged in later elaborations, undertaken primarily in the field of Anglo-American aesthetics in the middle of the 20th century⁶. Representatives of the so-called anti-essentialism, who refer to Wittgenstein, negated at that time the possibility to define the concept of art; instead of referring to a clearly defined aesthetic object they postulated openness to the changeability of artistic practices, which continually extend their scope through relations based on "family resemblance" (Jean-Francois Lyotard similarly interprets Wittgenstein's model when he reads the plurality of language games as a limitation on the claims of all-embracing metanarratives⁷).

However, such anti-definitional radicalism is not an inevitable consequence of Wittgenstein's argumentation. The ambiguous argument of the *Investigations* can be variously interpreted, making it difficult to decide on a final settlement. However, it can be assumed that the radically sceptical position on how art is conceived does

⁶ For exploration of this topic see for example: P. Ziff, *The Task of Defining a Work of Art*, "Philosophical Review" 1953, no. 62; – M. Weitz, *The Role of Theory in Aesthetics*, "Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism", 1956, no. 1; – M. Mandelbaum, *Family Resemblances and Generalizations Concerning the Arts*, "American Philosophical Quarterly" 1965, no. 2; – T. Diffey, *Wittgenstein, Anti-essentialism and the Definition of Art*, in: *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy*, ed. P. B. Lewis, Aldershot, Ashgate 2004; – D. Kaufman, *Family Resemblances, Relationism and the Meaning of "Art"*, "British Journal of Aesthetics" 2007, no. 3.

⁷ J.-F. Lyotard, *The Method: Language Games*, in: *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, (1979), transl. G. Bennington and B. Massumi, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1984.

not emerge directly from the theory of family resemblance, but remains its possible development. One significant example of a different use of this concept is the more balanced approach adopted in cognitivism.

3.

I understand cognitivism here as a broad direction in contemporary humanities, which found its fullest expression in the project of cognitive science, but left its mark on particular disciplines too. First of all, I take into consideration the output of those scholars who study linguistic messages as indicators of how cognitive structures function, and as records that capture human experience (including M. Johnson, G. Lakoff, M. Sinding, P. Stockwell, M. Turner, R. Tsur)⁸.

The main area in which cognitivism applies the theory of family resemblance is the problematic of conceptual categorization. *Philosophical Investigations* has already become canonical reading in cognitive linguistics, while prototype theory (formulated by Eleanor Rosch and developed by George Lakoff, now enjoying the status of the official doctrine⁹) is usually presented as a development of Wittgenstein's ideas. The change of context does not seem, however, to be without influence on how the transferred concept

⁸ Hence, I focus rather on "interpretative" wing of this movement, leaving aside examples of dogmatic scientism, which had become harshly criticised in: V. Descombes, *The Mind's Provisions: A Critique of Cognitivism*, transl. S. A. Schwartz, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2010.

⁹ E. Rosch, *Prototype Classification and Logical Classification: The Two Systems*, in: *New Trends in Conceptual Representation*, ed. E. K. Scholnick, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale 1983; – G. Lakoff, *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1987; J. R. Taylor, *Prototype Categories*, in: *Linguistic Categorization. Prototypes in Linguistic Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1989.

functions. Basically, Wittgenstein's idea has features that indicate compliance with the kind of philosophical discourse that does not aim to accumulate positive findings, but renews itself by constantly returning to fundamental questions and reinterpreting successive descriptions. The principle of family resemblance lives up to such expectations despite a certain lack of specificity, or perhaps even owing to this, since it does entail a possible way of perceiving phenomena and opens up space for investigating the consequences of adopting such a perspective.

The situation changes when the same concept is transferred into the domain of linguistics, a discipline supposed to extend the body of standardized knowledge. In a new context it should become an effective tool for cataloguing signs, establishing where they belong, or codifying the procedures of their usage. Thus, the category of resemblance is sometimes criticized on the basis of the criteria it originally opposed. It was indicated that the category in question allows for gaining some insight into the variety of linguistic phenomena, but does not explain how they function, contenting itself with juxtaposing examples instead of modelling a general matrix. If the stage of passing value judgments were to be omitted, the said diagnosis would comply with Wittgenstein's declarations; he did not design methodological directives, but sought a formula that would be free from the compulsion to explain¹⁰. More examples of similar debates could be quoted, but they all share the similar reflex of adopting measures of scientific correctness to a project of a programmatically anti-scientific character.

In this context the prototypes theory can be deemed as a compromise struck between the pluralism of the philosophical project

¹⁰ The most radical interpretation of this anti-methodological attitude has been developed in the works of so-called "New Wittgensteinians" (*The New Wittgenstein*, ed. R. Read and A. Crary, Routledge, London – New York 2000).

and the requirements of scientific discourse, which gravitates towards regularity and homogeneity. For Wittgenstein resemblances develop in many directions and form temporary constellations that are deprived of a fixed core. Basing on the “family” metaphor, resemblances recall relationships of seniority, but spread by cross-breeding; therefore, they lack a source reference that would serve as a foundation for hierarchization. Tracing equally mutable relations may stir an anxiety close to philosophical wonder, but it becomes difficult to erect an edifice of academic knowledge on such shifting grounds (Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson explicitly admit that: “Resemblance is notoriously not a well-defined term. Anything may resemble anything in at least some respect”)¹¹. It is only the figure of prototype (conceptually closer to *Gestalt* theories than to *Investigations*) that stabilizes play of similarities by attracting dispersed attributes and foregrounding their selected aspects. The introduced idealization facilitates identification of object areas, ensuring their relative coherence and internal structuration. Resemblance still remains a relation that unites areas of categories, but changes its character since it ceases to rely on the weave of manifold, reversible analogies, and begins to define the elements’ closeness to the central model. Thus, it becomes a substitute for classical identity – its “weak” or “blurred” counterpart.

The concept of prototype-based categorization could be considered as doctrinal legitimization of a solution that has been in use for a long time. It consists in defining an object through its characteristic features – not through the strictly definitional ones (on the level of enunciation this finds counterpart in *hedges*, i.e. modifiers that facilitate the gradation of both categorical judgments and claims regarding the universality of characteristics, e.g. *typical, true, of some kind, to a certain degree, predominantly, usually, generally*

¹¹ D. Sperber and D. Wilson, *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*, Blackwell, Oxford 1995, p. 232.

speaking)¹². Therefore, cognitivists inherit Wittgenstein's caution against adopting classical definition as the main form of capturing phenomena, although they avoid radical solutions known from the area of aesthetics. They do not reject the possibility of creating positive formulas, but try to give them a different shape, one that would be free from analytical restrictions. Lakoff and Johnson propose, for example, a compromise model of "experiential definition", which departs from objective presentation of the object's inherent properties in order to show its "interactive features" and the functions it performs as part of everyday practice¹³.

A similar state of wobbly balance between multiplicity and unity, identification and blurring, seems to characterize in cognitivism the entire sphere of language. On the higher level of general theory this corresponds to the choice of an inferential model of communication – one that would be more plastic than an envisioned homogenous system (dominant in the structuralist tradition), but less chaotic than a set of incommensurable practices (a view that emerges, for example, from Lyotard's interpretation). This model assumes that analysis of linguistic effects is to be made using the category of gradable approximations. It ceases to accent the dependence of any message on the rules of some code (i.e. one that enables to decipher meanings by referring to the identity of sign structures), and draws attention to the filter of cognitive schemas, which mediates all stimuli (this filter would allow to achieve only a certain degree of similarity between interpretations offered by individual people)¹⁴.

¹² G. Lakoff, *Hedges: A Study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy Concepts*, "Journal of Philosophical Logic" 1973, no. 2; – *Hedging and Discourse*, ed. R. Markkanen and H. Schröder, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1997.

¹³ G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Definition and Understanding*, in: *Metaphors We Live By*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1980 (p. 115–125).

¹⁴ According to D. Sperber and D. Wilson the main relationship in

Among others, one natural consequence of this shift seems to be a change of attitude towards the question of iconicity. As it is easy to recall, at the foundation of modern linguistics there rests the firm conviction about the arbitrariness and conventional nature of signs. Since de Saussure it has been emphasized that language has a non-pictorial character, while the linearity of speech has been contrasted with the simultaneity of seeing, thus underscoring the gulf between pictorial continuity and the analytic character of spoken utterances. Roman Jakobson, who was fascinated by the symbolism of sounds and poetic parallelism, seems to be an isolated case, whereas Jonathan Culler considers the passion for demystifying alleged linguistic motivation as one of the crucial features of 20th-century studies on language¹⁵.

Cognitivism programmatically opposes this approach and attempts to trace analogies between the form of enunciation and its object. Iconicity ceases to be an effect of authorial invention and becomes one of the general aspects of communication – in some cases it is even considered as an indicator of a neutral manner of speaking (*ordo naturalis*)¹⁶. The proposed change does not ignore the obvious compulsions of articulation and can be partially aligned with

communication “is one of resemblance rather than identity between propositional forms” what makes them treat “literalness, or identity of propositional forms, as a limiting case rather than a norm” (*Relevance*, p. 231–232).

¹⁵ J. Culler, *The Sign: Saussure and Derrida on Arbitrariness*, in: *The Literary in Theory*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2007.

¹⁶ For exploration of this topic see e.g.: *Iconicity in Language*, ed. R. Simone, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1995; – *The Motivated Sign. Iconicity in Language and Literature*, ed. O. Fischer and M. Nänny, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2001; – *Naturalness and Iconicity in Language*, ed. K. Willems and L. De Cuypere, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2008; – E. Tabakowska, *Iconicity*, in: *Grammar, Meaning and Pragmatics*, ed. J. Verschueren, J.O. Östman, J. Blommaert and Ch. Bulcaen, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 2009.

the findings of semiotics because it pushes into the background the “pictorial” qualities of enunciation, exposing instead the ubiquity of diagrammatic iconicity. For cognitivists, therefore, the vehicle of resemblance is not the sensual correlate of reference, but an abstracted framework of relations, a schema showing links between components.

Thus, emphasis is put on the selectiveness of the acts of perceiving and establishing resemblances, which is possible only “in some respect,” in relation to a specific aspect. What becomes decisive for authenticating motivation is the conviction that acts of perception and symbolization are mediated by cognitive structures, isomorphically reproducing sets of events and states of things. A frequently quoted example of similarity understood in this way is the analogy between the linear order of narration and the temporal sequence of actions¹⁷. Sometimes, an iconic interpretation also covers the order of *topic-focus* references, read as a specific counterpart to the sequence of emerging cognitive schemas¹⁸.

The role of resemblance in cognitivism¹⁹ is especially lucidly

¹⁷ This approach is represented for example in: T. van Dijk and W. Kintsch, *Strategies of Discourse Comprehension*, Academic Press, New York 1983.

¹⁸ See for example: T. Givón, *Introduction*, in: *Topic Continuity in Discourse: A Quantitative Cross Language Study*, ed. T. Givón, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1983; – W. Dressler, *Functional Sentence Perspective within a Model of Natural Textlinguistics*, in: *The Syntax of Sentence and Text*, ed. S. Čmejrková and F. Štícha, John Benjamins, Amsterdam 1994.

¹⁹ For the cognitivist discussion on resemblance, analogy and similarity, see for example: S. Vosniadu and A. Ortony, *Similarity and Analogical Reasoning*, Cambridge University Press 1989; – B. Indurkha, *Metaphor and Cognition. An Interactionist Approach*, Springer, New York 1992; – L. J. Rips and A. Collins, *Categories and Resemblance*, “*Journal of Experimental Psychology*” 1993, no. 122; – *Similarity and Categorization*, ed. M. Ramscar, U. Hahn, E. Cambouropoulos and H. Pain, Cambridge University Press 2000; – L. B. Larkey and A. B. Markman, *Processes of Simi-*

illustrated by the example of metaphor. It juxtaposes two disparate phenomena in order to extract their common aspect and unveil an unexpected affinity. Metaphor resigns from identifying objects in a binding manner, contenting itself with indicating their selected characteristics and suggesting potential similarities between them. It opens thinking towards a multiplicity of possible references and reveals the temporariness of the “objective” conceptual system, which owes its stability to our classification habits. To a certain extent, metaphor destabilizes the identity of the object by apprehending it through the prism of otherness and offering “perception of something as something else”. It is also of significance that the question of metaphor has ranked highly in the hierarchy of subjects investigated in the humanities. Numerous studies emphasize, for example, the privileging of metaphorization (characteristic for the discussed movement) over the syntactic order (exposed especially in generative grammar). Language ceases to be a rigid system of rules, and begins to be perceived as a network of tropes, susceptible to various transformations. Rhetorical figures attract the attention of cognitivists as “*Gestalt* images of experience” (i.e. means of organizing and sharing comprehensive views of the world), whereas syntax is reduced to the level of auxiliary machinery that binds and transmits textual representations. Thus, it may be assumed that the ability to discover resemblances is decisive in relation to the anthropological efficiency of language. At the same time, the principle of identity would be linked only to the mechanical reproduction of grammatical units.

Moreover, cognitivists assume that personal experience is the natural foundation of all communication, and that more complex cultural conventions build up on top of it. This general conviction is also linked to the elevation of analogy in scholarly practice. For example, cognitive poetics heavily underscores the similarity between reading strategies and cognitive scenarios that we use in direct in-

teraction. Therefore, the described method of analysis focuses on tracing textual anthropomorphisms that would incline the reader to identify with characters and their corresponding perspectives. Finally, responses of particular recipients would be conditioned by the possibility of different worlds coming into contact, and of recognizing analogies linking textual representations to biographical experience.

It is easy to notice that further questions (metaphorical cognition, feeling empathy, identification when reading) can be discussed as transformations of similar themes, although they may be entangled in different contexts. In every case, we see distant domains coming into contact, a selective shedding of light on phenomena, recognizing similarity in otherness and projecting features of one object onto another. The expansion of such problem areas aptly reflects the cognitivists' tendency to explain phenomena through systems of resemblance; moreover, it explains the effort to transcend the narrow scope of specific questions and the need to seek ever more capacious generalizations. It seems that a good example of such a large-scale idea is the so-called *conceptual blending*²⁰. This theory suggests that almost the entire dynamics of human thought can be seen as a process in which remote mental spaces are ingeniously blended. Thus, the ability to discern resemblances turns out to be a fundamental condition for orienting oneself in the surrounding reality.

4.

It is usually claimed that the patrons of poststructuralism are Nietzsche and Heidegger; some also add to this list the impulse that came from the area of psychoanalysis. However, apart from these obvious inspirations it has been pointed out since some time

²⁰ M. Turner and G. Fauconnier, *The Way We Think. Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities*, Basic Books, New York 2002.

that there are crucial similarities between some of the themes raised in the above movement, and ideas developed in works by Theodor Adorno²¹. Some underlined, among other things, that deconstruction resembles negative dialectics, since both approaches favour fragmented forms of writing (e.g. aphorism, paradox, essay) and similarly refer to insolubility. There are also ideological and thematic affinities, and finally – the fact that both belong to a broader tradition associated with criticism of instrumental reason.

Adorno clearly alludes to the discussed set of issues already in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, where he compares two ways of apprehending an object: magical, which weaves networks of diverse affinities, and scientific, which is based on systematic differentiation of identity. Magical thinking would be based on the principle of resemblance, since relations between objects create, within this approach, chains of symbolic substitutions, while the ritual presentation of a given thing consists of making gestures that make us resemble for a moment the thing itself. It is the “participatory” and mimetic character of such reference that would determine its competitiveness with methodical analysis²².

Knowledge produced by modern rationalism is not treated here as a consequence of the natural development of thought, but

²¹ For suggestions of such parallels see for example: M. Ryan, *Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1982; – R. Nägele, *The Scene Of The Other. Theodor W. Adorno's Negative Dialectic In The Context Of Poststructuralism*, “boundary 2”, 1982–1983, no. 1/2; – P. Dews, *Post-structuralism and the Critique of Identity*, in: *The Limits of Disenchantment*, Verso, London – New York 1995; – S. Gandesha, *The Theatre of the “Other”: Adorno, Poststructuralism and the Critique of Identity*, “Philosophy and Social Criticism” 1991, no. 3; – V. Safatle, *Mirrors without Images. Mimesis and Recognition in Lacan and Adorno*, transl. A. Kohnke, “Radical Philosophy” 139/2006.

²² M. Horkheimer and Th. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment. Philosophical Fragments*, transl. E. Jephcott, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002, p. 7.

is rather deemed an effect of violent deformation and self-righteous appropriation. According to Adorno, scientific knowledge tears out the given thing from a dense weave of dependencies (thus losing sight of the immense richness of dynamic connections by neutralizing the tension that is proper to them) and immobilizes it in the rigid confines of categories; finally, the thing is adjusted to fit other elements in the set. It should be immediately underlined, however, that in his criticism Adorno does not limit himself to manifestations of radical scientism or to particular pathologies of academic discourse, but attempts to point out a general drawback of conceptual thinking governed by the principle of identification. Using tools that are ill-fitted for objects is seen by the philosopher as a lasting deficiency of systemic analysis based on the conceptual violence.

Adorno directly refers to such structures, recognizing in the poetics of essay writing “an opposition to the four fundamentals, which Descartes’s *Discourse on the Method* locates at the basis of modern Western science and its theory”²³. From the Cartesian practical instructions he extracts the arbitrary philosophical implications in order to finally call into question the conviction – embedded in the project of the rational method – that cognitive structures conform to the order of things. Apart from the formalization of cognitive procedures, the German philosopher is visibly distrustful of the principle of ordering the world by means of unambiguous definitions, which he associates with the desire to rule as well as with violence, reification and the subduing of the particularity of things. *Negative Dialectics* also contains complaints about “identity-thinking”, degrading individual objects to the level of specimens or abstract representatives. The anonymity of concept is confronted here with the utopia of a cognition that would pursue the elusive dynamic of an particular being in accordance with the

²³ Th. W. Adorno, *The Essay as Form*, (1958), transl. B. Hullot-Kentor and F. Will, “New German Critique” 1984, no. 32, p. 161.

logic of its proper name (preceding at the same time the celebration of singularity, idiom and signature in deconstructive practice).

Sceptical distance towards established and closed formulas intensifies especially when touching upon the specificity of artistic phenomena. Adorno firmly claims that the utopian, transgressive character of art, which constantly questions its own status and endlessly seeks its own place, every single time undermines the meaning of “the philistine question *Is that still...?*”²⁴. Owing to such openness, authentic creativity would gain the potential to resist the mechanisms of reification and bureaucratic control, which are both inscribed in the act of defining (a similar line of argumentation returns in poststructuralism, whose representatives often refrain from defining, for example, what is literature or even deconstruction itself, eagerly employing metaphorical concepts, allusive suggestions and contextual paraphrases). This means that instead of forging clear-cut definitions and systematic classifications of artistic phenomena art should be considered in the specific mode of mutable approximations, which could replace the rigid relation of identity with a partial, temporary, local, aspectual and perspectival resemblance.

Naturally, such criticism of the rational method does not constitute an attempt at restoring magical practices and replacing conscious reflection with ecstatic ritual. The author of *Aesthetic Theory* does not demand a naïve return to shamanism, but rather attempts to infuse the discourse of the humanities with a potential of mimetic energy, finding its models mainly in art. One noticeable manifestation of such an inventive way of approaching the object closely seems to be the partial mimesis of the argument. For example, the quoted article by Adorno on essay writing is itself representative of such poetics, while his thesis from the study on Hölderlin (consid-

²⁴ Th. W. Adorno, *Art and the Arts*, (1977), transl. R. Livingstone, in: *Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003, p. 370.

ering specific treatment of abstract concepts) finds analogy in the attempt to weaken the equalizing function of universals (also, the principle of parataxis, commented upon in the said text, is reflected in the structure of the argument)²⁵.

However, the scope of this mimetic strategy should not be limited to pastiche-driven games and stylistic exercises. Adorno considers simple imitation an impoverished, “worse” variant of mimesis, as it identifies the object with a closed set of stable features, thus slipping into an idolatry of images. It should be remembered that the uniqueness of Adorno’s approach is determined by his recalling the *ban on representation*, which shifts emphasis from the creation of images to following traces, coming closer to religious traditions. Thus, the formula of “subversive mimesis”²⁶ is meant to denote a practice that does not reproduce the visible attributes of an object, but rather attempts to guide itself by the dynamic of a particular being. The choice of this strategy acquires an ethical motivation, for “all expression is the trace left by suffering”²⁷ – a remainder of the dramatic nature of singular experience. The thematization of trauma, which is inscribed into the order of symbolic codes, would result in its reification, and transform the mute trace into a vehicle of ideological persuasion. All the while, Adorno claims that the real pain, which escapes instrumentalization, makes itself available indirectly, through idiomatic (often unintentional) signs. This is

²⁵ Th. W. Adorno, *Parataxis. On Hölderlin’s Late Poetry*, (1974), transl. S. W. Nichol森, in: *Notes to Literature*, vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New York 1992.

²⁶ M. Cahn, *Subversive Mimesis: Theodor Adorno and the Modern Impasse of Critique*, in: *Mimesis in Contemporary Theory*, ed. M. Spariosu, John Benjamins, Philadelphia 1984, p. 27–64 (for other interpretation of this issue see for example K. L. Schultz, *Mimesis on the Move: Theodor W. Adorno’s Concept of Imitation*, Peter Lang, New York 1990).

²⁷ Th. W. Adorno, *Heine the Wound*, (1956), transl. S. W. Nichol森, in: *Can One Live after Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader*, ed. R. Tiedemann, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2003, p. 208.

why readers seeking to avoid the trap of reification should become sensitive to the peculiarities of the text, tracing its incoherencies and importunities, listening closely to what remains unsaid and capturing dispersed repetitions. According to this argumentation, the reader's task would be to transcend systemic distance, engage in mimetic resemblance and follow the trajectory of contingent record.

5.

It seems that Jacques Derrida has remained closest to Adorno's tradition²⁸; the former often sought to achieve in his writing an effect close to the mimetic strategies proposed by the author of *Aesthetic Theory*. This is easiest to observe when the French philosopher paraphrases forms and themes typical for the authors he comments on (as in variations on the proper name and signature, or in the "reistic" descriptions from the study on Francis Ponge's poetry²⁹). However, it is also possible to indicate cases in which contact with an artist translates into a more general problematization of the very commentary (e.g. the essay on Maurice Blanchot's anti-genre stance escapes typological classification). What draws attention in successive readings is the determination to find details that slip away from the order of intentional purposefulness and remain sign of particular experience, close to Adorno's "trace left by suffering" A clear example of this approach is, of course, *Shibboleth*

²⁸ This parallel has been discussed for example in: T. Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism*, Verso, London 1981, p. 141; – Ch. Menke, *The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida*, transl. N. Solomon, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge 1999; – J. Ph. Deranty, *Adorno's Other Son: Derrida and the Future of Critical Theory*, "Social Semiotics" 2006 no. 3; – B. O'Connor, *Adorno*, Routledge, New York 2103, p. 195–196.

²⁹ J. Derrida, *Signéponge/Signsponge*, transl. R. Rand, Columbia University Press, New York 1984.

for *Paul Celan*, a work in which Derrida is drawn to the unique significance of the eponymous term, treating it as unwitting stigma of group affiliation³⁰.

The affinity that exists between the said projects also manifests in the unique structure of their argument. Works by both authors are especially characterized by a tendency to juxtapose heterogeneous elements, almost lacking any common denominator, and to combine them in loose constellations. Instead of defining the key concepts, both philosophers prefer to unveil their potential gradually, through ingenious comparisons, paraphrases and contextual shifts. This is the case in the above-mentioned *Shibboleth*, where the paradoxical nature of poetic idiom is characterized by the analogy between date and circumcision: two figures joining the singularity of an event with the generality of the symbolic order. Drawing together remote domains entails a broader reconfiguration of references, because it reveals the traumatic foundation of all signification, which is often blurred in routine communication, and simultaneously allows us to grasp the textual aspect of the bodily experience.

However, the principle of resemblance has not won the post-structuralists' unambiguous approval (I am using label of poststructuralism as a reference to the intellectual movement, represented mainly by such authors as R. Barthes, G. Deleuze, J. Derrida, M. Foucault, J. Kristeva, J. Lacan, P. de Man). As a matter of fact, reasons for such ambivalence can be easily pointed out. Concluding by way of analogy is usually characterized by a tendency to override the multi-faceted nature of phenomena and extract from them an alleged essence, which would manifest in particular incarnations, but itself would not belong to the range of compared beings (partly explaining the role of similar constructions in classical theology).

³⁰ J. Derrida, *Shibboleth: For Paul Celan*, (1986), transl. J. Wilner, in: *Sovereignities in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan*, Fordham University Press 2005.

Someone might even conclude that raising the status of resemblance, associated with the logic of idealization, entails the risk of radically blunting the critical edge of poststructuralism. Hence, Derrida tries to counteract the congealing of hypostases, among others ways by adopting a certain arbitrariness of proposed juxtapositions and using variance in the introduced references, which do not yield to unification under a homogenous interpretation (e.g. the practice of writing creates, in some places, parallels to the sexual act, while in other contexts the act of recording turns out to be a transposition of memory processes; finally, due to its temporal character writing/recording can be treated as a figure of differentiating deferral³¹).

Although resemblance retains operational functionality on the level of particular applications, it does not have any dispositions making it suitable as a programmatically crucial issue in poststructuralism. It is the concept of *repetition* that acquires this function, as it allows reinterpreting the question of identity differently, i.e. by way of referring to a specifically understood *difference*³². This

³¹ Examples of such figuration are dispersed over many works published by Derrida, mainly in: *Freud and the Scene of Writing*, in: *Writing and Difference*, (1967), transl. A. Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1978; – *Of Grammatology*, (1967), transl. Ch. G. Spivak, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1997; – *Dissemination*, (1972), transl. B. Johnson, University of Chicago Press, 1983; – *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles*, (1978), transl. B. Harlow, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1979.

³² On poststructuralist concept of *repetition* see for example: J. A. Miller, *Transference, Repetition and the Sexual Real*, transl. R. Grigg, "Psychoanalytical Notebooks" 2011, no. 22; – G. C.F. Bearn, *Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze*, "Continental Philosophy Review" 2000, no. 4; – J. Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 2003; – M. Pound, *Lacan, Kierkegaard, and Repetition*, "Quodlibet Journal" 2005 no. 2; – S. Gendron, *Repetition, Difference, and Knowledge in the Work of Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida,*

happens in Derrida's thought, for in his crucial writings he does not refer directly to practical analogy, and bases his original model of communication precisely on the principle of iterability. However, deconstructive deliberations, usually gravitating towards undecidability, are markedly ambiguous in this area as well, allowing a certain margin of interpretative freedom. Gilles Deleuze, on the other hand, explicitly polemicizes with this category. His attack on the philosophy of identity seems still close to arguments made by Adorno and Derrida, directed against "identity-thinking," which is considered as cognitive violence that sets limits on the mutable nature of existence. The author of *Difference and Repetition*, however, transcends the above perspective, shared by Adorno and Derrida, when he groups relations of analogy and resemblance along with other instances of the representational philosophy he criticizes. He considers resemblance to be identity in camouflage, tactically adapted to the changeability of beings in order to make their localization easier. Analogy turns out to be a tool for brusque homogenization of phenomena, because it acts as a mediator through which one notion refers to many objects, creating subsequent "identification effects."

The above interpretation of resemblance as something subordinate to the order of identity defines the former's nature differently than what we find in Wittgenstein, who saw its anti-dogmatic potential and gave it the status of a rival cognitive principle. Deleuze's stern rejection of resemblance is motivated by the character of the ontology he creates, and is connected with the fact that he remains firmly rooted in a specific philosophical context. His criticism refers, after all, to the traditional opposition of analogy and explicitness – two rivalling concepts, each of which entails a different understanding of being's existence, and gives different status to general concepts. In the context of this opposition it becomes clear

and Gilles Deleuze, Peter Lang, New York 2008; – R. T. Pada, *Iterability and Difference: Re-tracing the Context of the Text*, "Kritike" 2010, no. 2.

why Deleuze strives to avoid predication by analogy, which is contradictory to his model of individuality as something that does not yield to symbolic substitution.

Regardless of this specific, individual motivation, other, more general premises may be indicated to have been decisive in securing the poststructuralist career of discussed category. First of all, transition from the concept of stable identity towards succession of incidental recurrences has been obviously stimulated by the psychoanalytic (mainly Lacanian) interpretation of compulsive repetition as a symptom of traumatic encounter with The Real, resisting reduction to remembrance and impossible to be assimilated into symbolic representation. Another crucial circumstance seems to be the fundamental temporalization of relationships described using this category. Even if resemblance does not offer a sense of stable identity and partially opens to the temporality of the comparing gesture, it still remains subject to the logic of perceptual and spatial notions, and assumes the stability of object references. At the same time, however, phenomena based on repetition have an absolutely temporal character – everything is carried away by the flux of random events; even discerned similarities become only passing moments occurring when the incessant flow of phenomena slows down. Paul de Man draws attention to this when he contrasts the deceptiveness of symbols, which entice us with ample possibility of identification, with the quotation-like splitting of allegory, which demonstratively repeats the references made in previous records and “establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference”³³.

This conceptual shifts naturally has vital consequences. In the space generated by the unceasing repetitions, subjectivity loses

³³ P. de Man, *The Rhetoric of Temporality*, in: *Blindness and Insight. Essays in the Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism*, “Theory and History of Literature” vol. 7, *University of Minnesota Press*, Minneapolis 1983, p. 207.

its privileged position, no longer being a permanent structure of meaning, but rather a trajectory of unintentional, contingent occurrences. Moreover, the traditional quest for accuracy of representations is partly replaced by the textual machinery generating subsequent imprints. So, it becomes clear that some readers tend to be troubled by such desynchronization. Within poststructuralism itself, however, the processual interpretation – linked to the incessant flow of accidental events – has been sanctioned as the only one that can account for the finitude and fleetingness of human existence.

6.

The diagnoses and propositions recounted above represent the achievements of two different scholarly traditions that have fundamentally different assumptions. However, they can be interpreted as parallel attempts at dethroning the compulsion of identification, and legitimizing more diverse procedures. Naturally, each of the two movements undermines the principle of identity in a different way, according to the logic of its own needs and capabilities. Cognitivism, which focuses on tracing relations of resemblance, reduces the pressure of systemic rules by gradually softening them. This finds reflection both in the doctrine of fuzzy concepts and in the category of profiling references. Poststructuralism, on the other hand, employs the strategy of destabilizing the order of immobilized identifications, and dispersing their correlates in a *flux* of serial repetitions, which is alluded to in such well-known metaphors as trace, countersignature or dissemination.

Despite the fundamental differences between the two formations, there do exist clearly discernible analogies as well as points of contact and convergence where general convictions meet. In the works quoted above we could notice clear signs of an anti-definitional stance, shared by many representatives of both movements,

although they occur in many forms and with varying intensity³⁴. A polemical attitude with regard to the classic model of coining definitions gains particular motivation here due to the special way in which it proposes to apprehend the object of study in the humanities. A traditional interpretation assumes equivalence between the defined concept and the characteristics ascribed to it, thanks to which a multitude of studied phenomena acquires the form of a coherent domain, and gradually succumbs to systemic analysis conducted using the category of identity. The discussed movements, however, rather emphasize the inconsistency, complexity and variability of objects, which continually change their functions and shift their boundaries; moreover, they can be described from numerous perspectives, focusing on different aspects. Within such an approach, every instance of identification can prove to be approximate and temporary, unable to meet the requirement of an unambiguous settlement. This is also linked to the dwindling importance of efforts undertaken to support the individual identity of particular disciplines as well as the methodological purity of procedures attributed to them.

Therefore, cognition ceases to consist in the application of a formalized method. It rather becomes an ingenious testing of various perspectives on a given object, which is confronted in a multitude of changeable contexts. The significance of this shift seems to be confirmed by two concepts introduced simultaneously within both movements as original figures of the heterogeneity of experience. On the one hand this would be the cognitivist theory of *conceptual blending*, which accounts for the creation of complex semantic structures by seeing it as melting of remote mental spaces. Poststructuralists, on the other hand, praise *contamination*, understood as a ubiquitous weaving of singularity and iterability – a paradoxical taint of difference on every identity. Naturally, the two

³⁴ See for example: M. Sinding, *After Definitions: Genre, Categories, and Cognitive Science*, "Genre" 2002, no. 35(2).

perspectives are conditioned by different world-views and discursive strategies; however, both views originate in a similar need to touch otherness, an urge to undermine fixed boundaries between various domains, or a wish to appreciate the accidental nature of events. What is more, in both cases the postulated opening has gained an additional, ethical legitimization: in cognitivism it is related to the special role ascribed to the mechanism of empathy, while in poststructuralism it is the ethics of hospitality.

It needs to be admitted that within the discourse of modern humanities there have indeed occurred changes that are harmonious with the above tendencies. Just several decades ago the dominant modes of narratological analysis included “Cartesian,” “identity-driven” and definition-oriented pursuits of fundamental meaningful units (e.g. *functions* or *mythemes*). Today, however, among the most popular works we find those basing on such metaphorical analogies as “narrative as therapy” or “literature as the art of seduction.” Whereas in studies of intertextuality Gérard Genette, among others, strove to methodically enumerate, define and classify the different types of intertextual relations³⁵, nowadays the greatest interest would rather be aroused by works devoted to such paradoxical concepts as “intertext as *simulacrum*” or “the impossibility of quotation.”

This shift provides authors with greater freedom in formulating hypotheses, at the same time facilitating study of relations between separate domains, and reinforcing the relationship between professional study and practical life understood as the sphere of existential, ethical or ideological dilemmas. Doubt seeps in when the innovativeness of unusual juxtapositions turns into a habit of linking any phenomena at random, with partial analogies being treated too literally and as overly binding. Today’s humanities abounds in

³⁵ G. Genette, *Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree*, (1982), transl. Ch. Newman and C. Doubinsky, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln 1997.

original concepts that refresh the perception of particular disciplines by way of profiling them metaphorically, but simultaneously running the risk of dogmatization, at least on a local scale (philosophy as mythology, text as cloth, knowledge as power, history as literature, culture as prison – these are only some of the widespread slogans). Thus, if thinking under the yoke of identity turns out to be too rigid and apriorical, a reflection that would be free from such constraints is exposed to other inconveniences connected mainly to certain arbitrariness, strong dependency on context, softening of analysis, vulnerability to ideological exaggeration etc. Thus, it would be erroneous to predict a thoroughgoing success of the above-mentioned attacks on the discussed identity-thinking. Due to their impact, however, identification has ceased to be a superior and exclusive principle of cognition, remaining at the same time an element of a broader configuration as one potential procedure, and partly modifying the impact of new figures of knowledge.

Translated by Grzegorz Czemiel

RADOSVET KOLAROV

SIMILARITY AND DIFFERENCE
AS SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY:
MATTE BLANCO'S BI-LOGIC

Who is Matte Blanco? This is a question which can be asked even by an erudite scholar of the humanities. The noisy and disputable fame of Ignazio Matte Blanco, oscillating between the definition of “a discoverer of a new conceptual Eldorado” and his opponents’ negation, spreads mainly over the Hispanic part of America and in Europe – primarily in Italy.

That is why here is a brief CV of him: born in 1908 in Chile; graduated in medicine in Santiago; at the age of 25 he is an associate professor in physiology, devoting himself later on to psycho-analysis and psychiatry and specializing in London; professor at the John Hopkins hospital in Baltimore and in the New York Medical Centre, at the department of psychiatry at the Catholic University in Rome; founder of Chile’s psycho-analytical Society; practising psycho-analyst and theoretician; reformer in science; follower of Freud and Melani Klein and on the other hand, of Russel and Whitehead; innovator of psycho-analytical theory. After his death all over the world were established groups and associations aiming to further develop his ideas. Eric Reiman, a member of the London group in bi-logic tells of the intoxication

(Rayner, 1995:2) he experienced after reading the major work by Matte Blanco (Blanco, 1975). And the participant in that same group Margaret Arden says that reading the above-mentioned book “gives rise to an undescrivable sensation of discovering truths one always knew but had been unable to formulate.” (Rayner, 1995:2).

In what lies the contribution made by Matte Blanco to psychoanalysis? The prime area of psycho-analysis is the sphere of human emotions – human intentions, instincts, impulses, etc... Besides, psycho-analysis deals with the pathological, the a-logical and often stays there, not being very fond of logical analysis, to say nothing of formal symbolical logic. Matte Blanco develops psychoanalysis along its own analytical path, investigating the logical structures and mathematical concepts underlying emotions and everyday intuitions. The pathos of his works is epistemological, without ignoring the psychic dynamism of emotions, he focuses on the process of thinking and of cognitive structures.

Underlying Matte Blanco’s theory is the dialectic of two notions: difference and similarity . In order to survive in the world around him man needs two rational operations: to localize him/her-self and the surrounding objects, to establish the differences between them, in other words, to be able to handle geometry and geography of things, the notions of surface point, distance, number, interval. On the other hand he/she has to be able to establish similarities between things, to form classes and sets among them and to recognize an already familiar object as the same one. The first thought-function is particularly important for survival and that is why it is the priority of consciousness, holding the focus of attention, while the classifying function which establishes similarities between objects – Matte Blanco believes – is entrusted to the unconscious.

The concepts of “similarity” and of “difference” get a parallel logical expression in the concepts of “symmetrical-asymmetrical”

relationship. Asymmetrical is the relationship which in its conversion changes its identity. "A" is larger than "B" in its conversion gets the expression "B is smaller than A"; "A" governs "B" becomes "B" is governed by "A" "A is the mother of "B" becomes "B" is a daughter of "A" .

Some relations, however, are symmetrical, i.e. in cases of conversion they preserve their identity, e.g. A is near B; A talks to B.

Matte Blanco believes that conscious reasoning activity, linked to the physical world and everyday thought employs propositions concerning asymmetrical relations. This asymmetrical thinking is similar to what Freud terms secondary thought process. Here reigns the bi-modal or two-sign logic: "either... or". Of course, it is accompanied by interwoven symmetrical relationships of similarity but the latter are a subordinate element.

The second thesis which is in fact the cornerstone of the entire theory proposed by Matte Blanco states that the *system of the unconscious selectively ignores certain asymmetrical relationships, treating them as symmetrical.*

This process he calls symmetrization. The latter is also apparent in dreams, psychoses and emotional agitation. This logic is psychologically expressed, e.g. in my intuition that whenever I do someone some good the good thing reverts back to myself to the same degree; I do B some good and vice versa B does some good to me. Although one recognizes one differs from the other, there exists an unconscious level at which the distinction between subject and object disappears . A typical example is the communication between a mother and her new-born child. A diffusive subjectless and objectless emotion appears – "It's fine" or "There is danger here", a predicative thinking as Matte Blanco defines it, whereby from the proposition there remains only the predicate, which can rather be expressed not as "something is happening" but as "something is", "something exists".

As conscious reasoning preserves in itself symmetrical rela-

tionships in a subordinate capacity, tipping the balance in favour of the asymmetrical ones, so the unconscious employs asymmetry in order to include it in the process of symmetrization. This dual logic Matte Blanco calls bi-logic

The symmetrization of the relationships of one class of objects unified on the basis of a common feature, means that the objects of that class become identical. Thus for example, within the largest possible class formed around the common feature of “subject to a touch” can be found together: the baby, as well as the stone. Their identification might seem artificial and even repellent intellectual operation. But we can imagine a playing child, lying on the beach and overflowed with water, who says “I am a stone”. Here, we see the paradoxical bifurcation between belief and unbelief, characteristic of every game. In psychoses and in dreams man could yield to the deception of really having become something different – a stone, an animal, a bug or what not.

Matte Blanco believes that Freud’s work “Interpretation of Dreams” of 1900 is his greatest achievement for humanity by virtue of having formulated in it the essential features of the unconscious processes. He believes moreover – rightly or wrongly – that psycho-analysis has not made true sense of these insights made by Freud and as a science it has veered away from its correct path. Applying the concept of “symmetrization” through a simple and at the same time powerful abstraction, Matte Blanco finds the common denominator, which, in his view, underlies Freud’s descriptions of the unconscious.

One of them is the disappearance of the temporal dimension. In accordance with normal logic, the concept of time and space contains asymmetrical relationships of intervals and distances. For instance the event “A” precedes event “B” and therefore “B” follows “A”. The point “A” is to the left of “B”, therefore “B” is to the right of “A”. The symmetrization of relationships in both cases however, makes void the notion of time and space.

Another Freudian feature is the replacement of the external by the internal reality. The symmetrization of spatial relationships in bi-logic, eliminates the opposition “external-internal”, “psychological-material”. The elimination of the separateness one from the other of the sections of space and spans of time, bearing upon diverse object relationships explains the mechanism of their gathering and localization into a single object, into what Freud calls *condensation*. Similar explanations are obtained for the *displacement* and for what the Austrian scientist describes as lack of contradiction, conflict-less co-habitation of opposite desires in the unconscious. The absence of contradiction here is a special case of the lack of contradiction in bi-logic, the obliteration of a relationship which says “this is not that”. Further on, where the symmetrical logic reigns, the whole is conceived as identical with its parts and the part is conceived as identical with the whole. Expressions like “I am all ears” or statements such as “L’etat c’est moi” (I myself am the state) merely manifest a superficial layer of that kind of thinking. The identity in question stems from the possibility the relationship “A includes B” to be converted into “B includes A in itself”.

This symmetry continues into the relationships between a class, a set and its members, which has already been hinted at. A set is a conglomeration of things having a common feature and yet remaining different. The systematizing within a set obliterates individuality between its members – the entire class and its components become identical. Reasoning in this way, Matte Blanco deductively introduces for the first time in psycho-analysis the concept of „infinity“ as a working element. He raises the question: when, in mathematics, a sub-set is equivalent of the whole set? The answer to this is given in the 19th century by George Cantor and it states „whenever the set is infinite“. The mathematical concept of infinity is transferred by Matte Blanco – or we should rather say checked – into the sphere of psychological experience. In it the experience of

infinity means „absence of boundaries, control, limits, endings and negative feed-back.“ Two powerful emotions underlie this experience – the joy of freedom and the horror of chaos. Every dramatic exaggeration employs infinity – be it in manic-hysterical psychoses or as an evocative gesture, expressing an emotive truth. Matte Blanco asserts that many emotions, e.g. being in love or profound sorrow can be investigated cognitively in light of the concept of infinity.

Accepting Freud's idea about the repressed unconscious as a defence mechanism, Matte Blanco is in fact interested in its other large unexpressed part which he substantiates as a structural causation in brain activity. Consciousness, preoccupied with the maintenance of balance between the individual and the surrounding environment, employs asymmetries and registers the symmetries but in small doses. It prudently sends the large spaces of the symmetries into the unconscious, into the deep funds of the equivalences and classes where the boundaries between the individualities are obliterated while the thought processes flow not in terms of propositions but in their abbreviated essence – in propositional functions.

I now go on to examine the relationship between bi-logic and the literary studies. Can we interpret metaphor in terms of Matte Blanco's theory? In the case of a metaphorical expression the transfer of meaning flows one-way from subject to modifier. The reverse transference is not obligatory nor is it topical. For example let us juxtapose the propositions “The child is jumping” and “The brook is flowing”. The two-term metaphor is “The brook is jumping”. The brook is likened to the child. But the inverse metaphor “The child flows” of “The child bubbles” would hardly seem felicitous.

In my studies of the Bulgarian poet Yavorov I hit upon something quite far from trivial, viz., the transfer of metaphorical sense between two terms is done in both directions (that is to say, it is an instance of a symmetry) and most specifically when there is an articulated metaphor in the text, the second, i.e. inverse direction

is done unconsciously in memory, after which this other, virtual metaphor becomes a generative figure, a matrix for the production of subsequent texts in the author's works.

For example the poem "Night" expresses a propositionally expanded metaphor "Fire-place – is mouth – "fire-place without fuel – a mouth about to voice damnation". In the poem as one can expect, there is no converse relationship "mouth is fire-place". In the world of "Night" the flaming eyes and skull and the pouring out lead in the skull of the poetic subject express figuratively the morbid state and fever and have no relation to whatever speech intention: "I close flaming eyes/ but in vein – no sleep,/ no brain, but seemingly lead/ pours out in a gnawed skull." The supplementary symmetrizing conversion ("mouth is fireplace") however appears in the unconscious of memory. It "remembers" the articulation strains of the fire fireplace and turns them to speech intention of the poetic "I". Now the flaming skull seems to provide the missing fiery substance, i.e. the fuel necessary for the speech articulation which the fireplace is deprived of. The motif of the fire-breathing sacred word, which is not articulated in "Night" appears. It engenders the poetic plot of a number of poems. Here are lines from the poem "Word": "Yes, it is here,/ under my forehead: sweetly anxious ,/ both endless and immeasurable short,/ in darkness and in flames."

In the poem "Night" the non-transparence is also persistently suggested, – the scant rays of light coming from the window: "the foggy window", "the dark window", "the window colored all in frost". In other words, the poet suggests the metaphor of a window as a wall. To a lesser degree he suggests the possibility of inverting the metaphor, i.e. of the "symmetrization" of the two terms – of the wall as a window. That is to say, the wall as icy, glassy. This inverse form, however emerges only in the unconscious of memory in the role of a generating matrix-figure, which evokes the poem "Icy Wall". In it the wall – enclosing the ontological space – symbolizing the "walling in of human existence" is icy and glassy.

In addition to literary texts, can we apply symmetrization from Matte Blancos' theory also to the concepts and terms we employ? One can say that symmetrization helps to solve problem situations. In literary criticism frequent use is made of the expression "the works of an author constitute a single work" whereby are expressed the structural links which serve to integrate individual works. A work by an author becomes a model of describing the entire body of his/her texts. What would happen if we symmetrize both terms, saying that "a single work is like a whole oeuvre"? At our disposal we have two reversible points of view comprising a hermeneutic circle. The transformation of an entire corpus or oeuvre into a model for a single literary work all of sudden carries us over into the post-structuralist notion of a work which denies the monistic model of a balanced, harmonious, static whole and carries the boundaries between the texts inside the space of a literary work, opening fissures in the seemingly integral textual units. The reception of a work becomes a multiple way of entering the artistic world via a number of trajectories illustrating multiple reading strategies. The work is ontologically modeled as a set of possible worlds, in the process of creation we see clearly delineated the vicissitudes, interruptions and contradictions, the curves in the author's process of invention.

Reversing directions of the links through symmetrization discloses the overshadowed logic of not immediately obvious, imperceptible features of the object, remaining in the shade as opposed to its visible, "bulging" features. The two directions of the modeling – the straight and converse work in the regime of supplementarity, outlining the whole spectrum of possibilities between the polar points in the process of observation. Thus the symmetrization can serve as a powerful heuristic tool in revealing of new, not obvious properties of investigated phenomena.

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FICTIONAL WORLDS THEORY
AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MIMESIS

Ever since Plato the status of fictional texts has been a constant problem for inquiries into literature. Some modern day theories of fiction attempt to produce a decisive break with the venerable notion of mimesis, which still bears the mark of Plato's condemnation of poetry as producing a shady copy of reality dangerous precisely due to being misleadingly similar to its original. One of the most recent among them is the "fictional worlds theory", proposed by scholars like Lubomir Doležel and Thomas Pavel¹, who attempt to apply the possible worlds semantics, developed by analytic philosophers like Saul Kripke and David Lewis, to the field of literary studies. Though, as this text intends to demonstrate, the result of this marriage between the theory of fiction and the formal semantics of possible worlds does not evade mimetic interpretation, but rather collapses into an ultimately classical version of it (precisely the one, formulated by Plato).

Fictional existence is not confined to the polarity of actual existence ("to be or not to be"). To exist fictionally means to exist in

¹ The focus of this text will be the ideas proposed by Doležel in his *Heterocosmica*, since he constructs his argument with explicit intent to oppose it to mimetic theories of fiction.

different modes, ranks, and degrees. This is one of the main principles of our semantics of fictionality and finalizes its divorce from the mimetic doctrine (147).

Despite the fact that the discourse on possible worlds has its starting point in Leibnitz, its current form in Anglo-American analytic philosophy is related to the way Saul Kripke resorted to the notion of possible worlds in order to clarify systematically the modal categories: possibility, necessity, contingency and impossibility. The concept of possible worlds establishes these categories in the following manner: a given statement is possible only if it is true in at least one possible world; it is necessary only if it is true in all possible worlds; its contingent only if it is true in some possible worlds and untrue in others; and its impossible only if it is untrue in all possible worlds. Besides clarifying modalities in this somewhat recursive manner, already in Kripke this notion is used to afford a new semantics for proper names. Kripke questions the Russelian identification of proper names with a bundle of descriptions. Russel missed a problem with this reduction of names to descriptions, which resides in a special class of statements, involving belief. For example: the statement "X believes that Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great" according to Russel's theory will not risk changing its truth value if we replace "Aristotle" with "the author of the *Poetics*". But that will not always be the case, since it is entirely possible that X precisely does not know or believe that Aristotle is the author of the *Poetics*. May be he believes it was Plato who wrote the *Poetics* and that Aristotle was teaching Alexander the Great. In this case the statement "X believes that author of the *Poetics* was the teacher of Alexander the Great" will not be true. Based on examples like these the equation of proper names with descriptions becomes obviously problematic. Kripke's alternative is to claim that the proper name is a rigid designator related to a multiplicity of possible worlds: worlds, in which Aristotle is not the author of the *Poetics*, and worlds, among them our world, in which

he is. Thus possible worlds are presented as domains of discourse, helpful in resolving semantic issues of statements (and especially counterfactual statements).

This type of reasoning with the help of possible worlds has become a way for developing logical semantics since the sixties in a two-dimensional direction, i.e. it offered a way for differentiating intension from extension. These two interdependent semantic levels derive from Frege's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* (see Frege 1960). For Frege *Bedeutung* is the level of relation between statement and world, i.e. the truth value of statements. *Sinn* on the other hand is "the mode of presentation" of *Bedeutung*. The way Frege defined *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* presented numerous problems, especially the question of synonymy and the semantics of fictional terms (flying horse). Since for Frege *Bedeutung* is the truth value of a statement, it turns out that all statements that share truth value are synonymous. The way out of this predicament was sought in intension. Unfortunately, the way Frege defined *Sinn* was lacking, since expressions like "flying horse" lack reference and as objectless are difficult to understand as "mode of presentation". The semantics of possible worlds provided a way out of this conundrum by defending logical (truth-relative) semantics through shifting the emphasis from truth values to truth conditions. Thus intension became a rule for assigning truth value with the aid of possible worlds. Montague, the pioneer of this line of development of possible world semantics for natural languages, defined intension as a function from possible worlds to extensions (see Montague 1974; a good summary of Montague grammar may be found in Partee 1989). Somewhat simplified, this means that we start with the language and the set of possible worlds, and intension is the rule of relating statements of the language to some portion of a subset of possible worlds. Montague's notion of intension comes close to the classical notion of proposition and as such is not heavily language dependent (i.e. it can be expressed in different languages without loss). Furthermore,

as Barbara H. Partee has pointed out (Ibid.:119), it remains intension in an extensional sense, i.e. this is a semantics that subordinates everything to reference. Possible worlds are there to provide all discourse with a proper domain.

Overall the semantic use of the notion of possible worlds aims at disambiguation. But this curative notion itself seems ambiguous, since the semantic problems, addressed here, shed no light on the question of the ontological commitment of the discourse on possible worlds. In this context one of the more contested positions is the indexical notion of actuality, presented by David Lewis (see, for instance, Lewis 1986). According to him, the actual world is simply the world, in which a statement under scrutiny is been produced. Therefore he claims that possible worlds fully exist and each one is actual from its own perspective, relative to the others. Others (among them Stalnaker 1984, Plantinga 1974; Cresswell 1988) have claimed that there are possible worlds, but only one of them has happened to be actual – our world. They generally agree with Kripke's insistence that "possible worlds are stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes" (Kripke 1980: 44). In this view "possible worlds" are most often considered as purely linguistic constructions with logical import.

A further complication in the theory of possible worlds comes from the questionable implication of the word "world" involved. As mentioned above, the difference between "genuine" and "actualist" basically comes down to this question. The actualist position considers possible worlds as abstract objects, among which one has been actualized and thus allows for full quantification. The genuine realists insist on treating possible world as concrete individuals. Beyond the difference between the abstract or concrete character of possible worlds, most theoreticians view these entities as maximal or according to Kripke's expression, they are "total 'ways the world might have been', or states or histories of the entire world" (Kripke 1980:18). Later his notion has been contested by Jakko Hintikka,

who insists that the talk of “possible worlds” should be restrained by a notion of relevance, which will let them be only “small worlds”:

In order to speak of what a certain person knows and does not know, we have to assume a class (‘space’) of possibilities. These possibilities will be called scenarios. Philosophers typically call them possible worlds. This usage is a symptom of intellectual megalomania. In most applications ‘possible worlds’ are not literally worlds in the sense of universes but merely ‘small worlds’, that is, so many applications of the language in question, typically applications to some relatively small nook and corner of our four-dimensional world. Such a space of scenarios is essentially the same as what probability theorists mean by sample space. It might be called the epistemic space. Depending on the application, the elements of that space can be states of affairs or sequences of events. What the concept of knowledge accomplishes in any case is a dichotomy (relative to the knower) of the elements of the epistemic space into those that are ruled out by *a*’s knowledge and those that are compatible with everything he or she (or it, if we are dealing with a computer) knows in a given scenario. (Hintikka 2003: 34–5)

Despite those differences in construing the precise sense and volume of the notion of possible worlds, it seems that the primary way, in which they can be differentiated, is by comparison. Differences are gouged always on the background of some parallelism, be it on a local (small worlds) or global (total worlds) scale. Consequently the relation between the actual world and the possible worlds is necessarily one of degrees of similarity, construed here very traditionally as a particular amalgamation of identity and difference. It should be stressed that this relation holds only between worlds and not necessary between the particulars that populate them. This is actually a point of contention between David Lewis (who spreads this logic of similarity to the particulars composing the possible world, which he names “counterparts”) and Kripke (who insists on the transworld identity of these particulars, guar-

anted in a non-essentialist manner only by the identical name as a “rigid designator”). For instance, according to Lewis Aristotle, who is a medic, is less similar to the Aristotle of our world and thus inhabits a more “distant” world from ours than Aristotle, who is an epicurean philosopher, while Kripke would insist that they have identical signification, since the name does not imply any description of what properties Aristotle has².

The debates in analytic philosophy around the notion of possible worlds, summarized all too briefly here, became complicated further by the insistence of some literary theorists (the most notable among them are Lubomir Doležel, Thomas Pavel, Ruth Ronen, and Marie-Laure Ryan – see Doležel 1998; Pavel 1986; Ronen 1994) on the usefulness of possible worlds theory for defining literary fiction (and narrative literature in particular), but only under the condition of differentiation between possible and properly fictional worlds. The theoreticians that hold this position claim that such a distinction is necessary in order to provide a definable specificity for literary texts among the various applications of the possible worlds model in logic, physics, philosophy, historiography³ and even its everyday uses. Here we will examine the conceptual arguments for the distinctness of fictional possible worlds, put forward by Doležel in his *Heterocosmica* (Doležel 1998).

Doležel claims his project is an attempt to compensate the ex-

² Kripke’s case gets a little more complicated when the question arises about situations like a dog or a computer named “Aristotle”. The notion of the name as a “rigid designator” implies a relation between a name and an object, fixed by an initial act of “baptism”. Consequently, if the two acts of baptism do not coincide (the naming of a boy in ancient Stagirus and the naming of a dog/computer as Aristotle), there will be no (transworld) identity.

³ The difference between historical and literary possible worlds is the topic of Doležel’s most recent book *Possible Worlds of Fiction and History*, which argues against any Hayden White-style equation of literary and historiographical discourse.

planatory deficiencies, presented in two major historical theories of literature: the structuralist case of conceiving the literary text as autoreferential, and the mimetic theory, which retains the heteroreferentiality for the text, although restricting it to the same world as non-fictional discourse. His recourse the possible worlds theory is presented as an attempt to provide a reference for fictional texts – a fictional world for each text, which is radically separate from the actual world. The last part is of particular importance, since according to Doležel anything that crosses the boundary, isolating the fictional from the actual world, anything that passes from actuality into the reference of the fictional text, changes its ontological status. The fictional world is ontologically homogeneous, everything within it is fictional, none of its elements is actual, even when it seems to be. For instance, the often cited in these discussions scene of the appearance of Napoleon on the battlefield in *War and Peace*: this Napoleon for Doležel is not the actual historical figure amidst a strange, counterfactual fictional setting, inhabited by non-actual characters, existing only in and through Tolstoy's work. He is no less fictional than these fictional entities that notice his passing through the battlefield in the novel⁴.

For Doležel the fictional world of the literary narrative is a semiotic construct, produced by performative speech acts with specific illocutionary force, whose two aspects – authentication and saturation – function as intension of the text. This coincidence between intensionality and pragmatics, the reduction of the intension of the text to its world-building operation, ultimately falls in line with the way intensionality is conceived in the formal semantics of possible worlds. The fictional world is correlative of the performative force of the literary text, and only the specifically fixed

⁴ Doležel admits that the fact that Napoleon, unlike most of the other characters in *War and Peace*, has an actual counterpart, has special significance in the work. However, he insists that in purely ontological terms the relation of the fictional Napoleon to the actual is irrelevant.

“texture” of the work produces its unique world⁵. This is especially apparent in the act of authentication, “the text’s power to grant fictional existence” (ibid., p. 145). There are numerous consequences from this position for Doležel’s project. The fictional world is not available before or independently from the literary text, it does not exist even potentially, awaiting to be referenced by the work. It is referenced by the literary text in its construction by this text⁶. Furthermore, any change in the texture does not result a change in an already constructed, developed, available world, but in the production of a brand new one⁷. This insistence by Doležel easily reminds us of the “heresy of paraphrase” condemned by American New Criticism. The analogy is quite apt and probably noncoincidental – in his project the “texture” is meaningful as well, though in a referential sense.

At the same time, however, the reference produced in this manner is able to separate itself from what brought it in to being – the text. Doležel himself emphasizes that the fictional worlds tend to be held in the memory of the readers for longer than the texture that brought them about (ibid., p.202). He comments on this in relation to the postmodernist rewrite, common in the last decades.

⁵ However, the literary narrative is not restricted only to fictional reference/construction. Doležel allows for the appearance of “imaging digressions” in the text (p. 27), i.e. certain statements in the work that refer or at least can be applied by the reader) to the actual world, for instance the famous first line from *Anna Karenina*: “All happy families are alike but an unhappy family is unhappy after its own fashion”. They are “shifts from constructive to an abstract mode of discourse” (ibid.). This means that the only sentences in the text that participate in fictional world-building, are the once which refer to particulars.

⁶ For Doležel the fictional worlds, as well as possible worlds in general, are only stipulations, creations of the human mind, in contrast with one unique world – the actual.

⁷ This is apparent in his discussion of postmodernist rewrites, which will be discussed shortly (see Doležel 1998, pp. 199–226).

These postmodern texts themselves produce worlds that relate in different modes with the world of the work they rewrite – they build parallel, complementary or polemical worlds. In any case, however, these are worlds *beside* the “protoworld” of the earlier work, i.e. they do not *change* this protoworld. This makes possible the formulation of some odd questions. It raises the problem where the world-constructing work of the text ends and where the separation of the world begins. As long as this separation is a necessary concomitant to the process of semiotic world construction of the text, then we may as well suppose that separation comes about simultaneously with the construction and thus with every world-constructing sentence (which is almost every sentence of the text). But that means that we can view every other sentence of the work as constructing a new world, rather than changing the same world, similar to the way Doležel claims things stand between the world of the primary text and the ones produced in postmodernist rewrites.⁸ And if this is not so, if each sentence of a work changes the same world as the previous sentence, why would the postmodernist rewrites not refer to the same protoworld, established in the earlier work, and continue expanding it?

It seems impossible to outline a sufficiently distinct boundary between the relations, holding between sentences in the same work, and the ones, holding between works, and thus between the world-building work within a single text and the world-building of intertextually linked works. The reason Doležel attempts to downplay this problem – that two different works might be engaged in the construction of the same world – is the risk of a certain mimetic moment sneaking back into his theory. The later work can continue changing the world of the earlier work only if it refers

⁸ As Radosvet Kolarov has noted, “in principle, the same forces of cohesion and disintegration are in operation within a text as between texts... the same message may appear as a text, part of a text, or an entire set of texts” (Kolarov 1992, p. 35).

to it as well. Then this later work will be a literary text that refers to a world that has already been available before it started its own world-constructing. Thus postmodernist rewrites will be not only world-constructing, but world-representing, world-”imaging” (in Doležel’s terminology) texts as well.

Yet this is not the most serious risk of a resurgence of mimesis in Doležel’s theory. The true risk stems from the direction in which he seeks a solution to the problem of the specificity of the properly fictional world among the other types of possible worlds – in its incompleteness. According to Doležel the primary feature of fictional worlds is their incompleteness, their components have only those characteristics that are imparted to them by the text and no others. We know of the world of Hamlet that the main character doubts, but we cannot claim anything in response to the question whether he has a nice singing voice. If Hamlet was an actual or even possible (in the sense in which standard possible worlds semantics treats possibility) entity, this question would have had a right answer. This is what makes fiction specific in Doležel’s view – Hamlet neither has nor doesn’t have a nice singing voice, the quality of his voice is indeterminate, he is incomplete in terms being in any way in relation to this (and other) properties. Yet this incompleteness, which extends to the fictional world as a whole, brings Doležel’s project extremely close to the classical platonic version of mimesis. After all for Plato the mimetic copies are precisely defined by lack, by incompleteness. Their existence is defined as participation in the Idea, i.e. they exist only in part, through their resemblance to the Idea, through those parts they share with. Still they lack the fullness of the Idea, in comparison with which they are only partial. They exist only to a degree. In Doležel’s version the incomplete double is the fictional world, since it is incomplete precisely in comparison to the actual, fully complete world. In fact Doležel describes fictional entities in the same way, in which Plato defines mimetic imitations – as having a degree of existence, of reality: “Fictional

existence is not confined to the polarity of actual existence (“to be or not to be”). To exist fictionally means to exist in different modes, ranks, and degrees⁹. This is one of the main principles of our semantics of fictionality and finalizes its divorce from the mimetic doctrine” (Doležel 1998, p. 147). Instead of being a divorce, this is rather the most traditional marriage we can imagine. It seems mimesis is unavoidable, as long as we apply to the fictional worlds the logic, derived from the semantics of possible worlds, which is necessarily dependent on their relation of parallelism to the actual world.

May be this persistence of mimesis can be avoided when the notion of possible worlds stops relying on this relation of parallelism. In fact this seems exactly what the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze has attempted in his rewriting of Leibnitz in his book on Proust and elsewhere (see Deleuze 2000). For Deleuze the possible worlds are not parallel alternatives to the actual world, with which they don't share the same domain, but precisely the opposite – all possible worlds pertain to a common universe.

Deleuze's view builds upon the characteristics of the monad in Leibnitz: it expresses a world and does not have windows. In the version, put forward by the French philosopher each monad, each individual being expresses its own unique world according to what is relevant for it, while leaving the rest aside as an obscure background. While in Leibnitz there is a harmonizing force, which selects for actualization only those monads that are compatible within a framework of a single world, for Deleuze there is no benevolent God that can guarantee in advance such compatibility¹⁰. The worlds, expressed by the different individual beings in Deleuze, are

⁹ The degrees of existence here concern the other intensional function of the text in Doležel's work – saturation, or the uneven spread of incompleteness, done by the literary work.

¹⁰ The precise term Leibnitz uses in this context is “compossibility” – compossible monads can share a world, while impossible cannot.

possible relative to each other. This is because the world a monad expresses is actual from its point of view and the worlds, expressed by others are immediately inaccessible to it. The notion of expression here involves the introduction within our a chaotic universe a difference between foregrounded relevances and obscure irrelevance, between an order of pronounced perceptible qualities and an imperceptible background. In each actual being the order of the relevant perceptual points is different and thus all the worlds, expressed by different individual, are themselves different. Each monad as an expression of a world in fact creates an order out of chaotic potentiality according to its singular point of view. As long as the monads are “windowless”, they have only their own world, they can occupy only their own point of view. The perspectives of the others are not available to them in their actuality, but only as a possibility. According to Deleuze it is art, literature, fiction that grants access to the potentialities, actualized by the others and their worlds (see Deleuze, 1989, p. 126–155). This logic of possible worlds seems preferable to the lineage of the formal semantics, since here instead of parallelism and similarity we find a model, based on expression and pure difference, hardly compatible to the classical model of mimesis.

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II.

IDENTITY AND SIMILARITY
IN LANGUAGE
AND COMMUNICATION

TERESA DOBRZYŃSKA

ALIKE, OR DIFFERENT?
HOW IDENTITY OF OBJECT IS DETERMINED IN
UTTERANCE

Determining the identity of things and phenomena, recognising their similarity or finding differences – are the basic intellectual actions enabling one to acquire and organise knowledge. These actions are traceable in any and all areas of human cognitive activity, whether manifesting itself in daily life or more advanced intellectually. The aforementioned relations are crucial to the lives of individuals and groups of people, or entire ethnic communities. And, they form the basis for functioning of language and of description of its structure.

As for reflection on language, not going back to a remote past and limiting the field of observation to our contemporary time, several research situations are identifiable on the ground of linguistics and philosophy of language where similarity and difference have become the key notions determining the peculiarity of individual doctrines. For instance, the notion of ‘distinctive features’, i.e. diversifying or discriminating elements, has become the basis for the structuralist systemic and comprehensive conceptualisation of language. This rule has been recognised as constitutive, one that determines the structure of various levels of the code, beginning with

phonology: “In the *language*, there are only differences” (“Dans la langue il n’y a que des différences”), Ferdinand de Saussure said¹. (Let us add that differences related to the occurrence of certain distinctive features are combined in the elements of the code with convergence and identity of other traits.)

Also the cognitive theories recognise similarity versus dissimilarity as the fundamental relations determining the shaping of notions and informing the categorisations consolidated in the language. Scholars representing this direction of research assume ‘family resemblance’² as the basis in typology, which is definable as partial, lesser or larger, overlap of characteristics of objects with those of the prototypical exponent of the species, which leads to crystallisation and singling out of natural categories. The notion of ‘bird’ is a frequently quoted example, constructed around the images or notions of birds such as pigeon or sparrow: the prototype within this category would not possibly be e.g. hen, ostrich, or penguin, such ones manifesting a lesser number of traits coincident with the remaining representatives of the bird species (as their ability to fly is poor or none, for instance).

Stating a similarity is the basis for discerning and describing various linguistic phenomena in a series of research into language and its uses; it consequently determines a multiple of detailed questions. In analysing the semantic potential of words, it has been found, for instance, that linguistic signs whose denotata are objects or phenomena recognised in the real world also signify, on a regular basis, their similarity-based representations, e.g. drawings, sculptures or mock-ups of such objects. Perception of similarities is

¹ F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, publié par Ch. Bally et A. Sechehaye, édition critique par T. de Mauro, Payot, Paris 1973; cf.: II: *Linguistique synchronique*, IV, § 4, p. 7.

² See: L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1973; E. Rosch, *Natural categories*, ‘Cognitive Psychology’, 1973, 4.

also an incentive for developing iconic signs of all sorts, including linguistic and poetic onomatopoeias, and enables to create similes and metaphors. Affinity of the meanings of various lexical units is a constitutive feature of synonymy; and so on, and so forth.

Bearing in mind these various manifestations of the relations of our present interest, let us focus on the significative, or semantic, organisation of language. Determining similarities and differences forms the basis for distinguishing notional categories enabling to refer to a number of things or phenomena regarded similar, if not outright identical, whilst remaining distinct in certain respects. The categorisation solidified in the language determines references made to the real world, with the recognised elements of reality thus gaining a notional, or conceptual, shape and a clear ontological status.

The considerations following below will focus on the use of linguistic measures in view of apt and exhaustive determination of things or phenomena; or, to use a more precise formula, in order to name things or phenomena in the way that seems adequate to the language user in a given situation. This implies a necessity to estimate the similarity or dissimilarity of an object (the object being referred to, and to which one is willing to ascribe a certain conceptual/notional form) as related to the content of the notion/concept as fixed in the meaning of a certain lexical unit. The focus is, therefore, on efficiency of linguistic measures in expressing the identity of objects of reference.

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Consideration of how an object or state of affairs is represented with use of a word reveals a gravity of the situation since the conventional social product, which a linguistic sign of a determined shape and close-coupled meaning actually is, is applied in an utterance to a unique object or phenomenon whose view is determined

by an individual's unique experience in the contact with such an individual object. The incompatibility of a notional/conceptual category consolidated in the language versus the individual reference situation stems from the very nature of categorisation and status of names. This problem is well known to philosophy of language and has been signalised in a variety of research contexts. Ernst Cassirer thus explained these issues, as he considered the potential of verbal signs in juxtaposition with nonverbal signs:

To give a name to an object or action is to subsume it under a certain class concept. If this subsumption were once and for all prescribed by the nature of things, it would be unique and uniform. Yet the names which occur in human speech cannot be interpreted in any such invariable manner. They are not designed to refer to substantial things, independent entities which exist by themselves. [...] The name of an object lays no claim upon its nature; it is not intended to be *physei on*, to give us the truth of a thing. The function of a name is always limited to emphasizing a particular aspect of a thing, and it is precisely this restriction and limitation upon which the value of the name depends. It is not the function of a name to refer exhaustively to a concrete situation, but merely to single out dwell upon a certain aspect³.

Hence, the notional/conceptual categories fixed in the language are characterised by content limitation and selectivity. Consequently, they impose a particular profiling⁴ of objects and a socially consolidated, one-sided perspective of view applied on such

³ E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*, Yale Univ. Press.: New Haven 1944, p. 134.

⁴ The term 'profiling', launched by cognitivists, is used here as comprehended by Lublin-based ethnolinguists; cf. e.g.: J. Bartmiński, R. Tokarski, eds., *Profilowanie w języku i w tekście*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin, 1998.

occasions. Aware of this type of correlation, language users feel these limitations of code potency as the factor that determines and, downright, deforms the image of reality and leads to perversion, not offering them freedom to fully express themselves and reach for the essence of things. As a scholar has put it, “Any attempt at crossing the gates of reality comes across resistance of language, across disillusionment”⁵.

This difficulty is insurmountable as long as one remains within the limits of the code’s semantic conventions. No categorial designation of an object is final or completely accurate; no such definition can grasp the unique essence of things in a fully adequate manner. This is reminiscent of one utterance of a Hindu guru from the Upanishads, as quoted by Philip Wheelwright: the guru expressed his sceptical attitude toward the possibility of imaging the reality and grasping its complete identity with word. Asked by a student about the legitimacy of use of a certain designation, he replied, “*neti, neti* – not quite that, not quite that”⁶.

We define objects with words and thus somehow communicate with one another, somehow being able to identify the designations of our utterances – but all this is ‘not quite that’...

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The determining function of language in the notional/conceptual sphere and the peculiarity of notions/concepts solidified in various languages has been realised at least from the time of Wilhelm von Humboldt, with his findings expanded in the studies of

⁵ M. Piotrowiak, *Chłopięce igrzysko. Wojenne mikrohistorie w poezji Krzysztofa Kamila Baczyńskiego*, [in:] A. Nawarecki, M. Bogdanowska, eds., *Skala mikro w badaniach literackich*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice, 2005, p. 93.

⁶ See: P. Wheelwright, *Metaphor and Reality*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 1962, p. 173.

Eduard Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. That 'language teaches us how to think' ("Durch die Sprache lernen wir bestimmt denken") was already observed by Johann-Gottfried Herder⁷. This knowledge and awareness has been deepened by our contemporary ethnolinguistic research into linguistic relativism and linguistic images of the world.⁸

Incongruity of language means with certain intended contents is sensed by many speakers. The problem has to be tackled by translators who seek to render the meanings of the original using equivalents in the language of translation. It is them who experiences, on a daily basis, the differences in the categorisation fixed in languages from various ethnic circles and endeavour to find (sometimes without a good outcome) the notional/conceptual equivalents of the original. Defying the semantic limitations of linguistic code is rather frequent with writers facing insufficiency or inadequacy of categorial linguistic measures used to express individual concepts of things and one's expressional needs. The sense of authority exercised by language over the process of reflecting human experiences is particularly frustrating for those creative artists who programmatically set as objective for themselves to overcome cognitive patterns and create a vision of the world that would possibly correspond to their intuitions. Poets are in constant search for words sufficiently capable semantically, apt and adequate, in their strife for rendering an ideal designation of the word projected in the language attuned to their individual manner of seeing objects

⁷ Cf. W. Dobbek, ed., *Herders Werke In fünf Bänden*, Weimar: Volkerverlag 1963, p. 7. For a discussion of the current of philosophy of language and linguistic anthropology of our present interest, see e.g.: M. R. Mayenowa, *Poetyka teoretyczna. Zagadnienia języka*, 3rd revised ed., Ossolineum, Wrocław, 2000.

⁸ In Poland, such research is developed particularly in the Lublin scholarly milieu (the 'red' series of books issued since the early 1970s by the local Maria Skłodowska-Curie University [UMCS] publishing house).

and phenomena. Even whenever a poet strives for the truth of utterance within the binding code, appeals are made ‘to give a proper word for a name of thing’. But even more often is it a sense of a much deeper impasse, for, as Adam Mickiewicz formulated it, “The *tongue lies to the voice*, the voice lies to the thought” (“*Język kłamie głosowi, a głos myślom kłamie*”)⁹.

The gap that is felt between objects and the categorial content of the words describing them may lead to a denial of the value of language as the means of communicating the truth. Where the word is called into question, there remains silence. Another path leads through limitless searching attempts where meta-linguistic reflexion is interconnected with a pre-linguistic intuitive idea of the foreboded meaning.

The nature of this process is well explained by the notion of meditation – in the variety which assumes linguistic activity. Magdalena Saganiak has described such process, naming thought practices of this kind ‘creative meditation’ and describing them as

an open-ended (non- logarithmisable) procedure driven by a series of impulses generated in the course of the procedure, not programmed externally other than by the truth about the object that calls for being discovered.¹⁰

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The eagerness for exactly copying the states of affairs in speech particularly asserts itself in the varieties of discourse such as the language of science or legislation, where introducing new

⁹ A. Mickiewicz, *Dziady* [‘Forefathers’ Eve’], Part III, Scene 2: *Improwizacja* [‘Improvisation’].

¹⁰ Cf. M. Saganiak, *Doświadczenie wewnętrzne jako źródło mowy. Medytacja w filozofii i poezji*, [in:] T. Kostkiewiczowa, M. Saganiak, eds., *Medytacja. Postawa intelektualna – sposób poznania – gatunek dyskursu*, Warszawa, 2010, p. 154.

terms and defining them is the recognised method of eliminating the difficulties. Similar endeavours appear nonetheless in many other domains, e.g. in journalism or common communication. The sense of non-congruity of the topical object of reference and the sign used in a given situation, whose sense or meaning is linguistically determined, leads to searching for more efficient means of expression.

Reproducing a phenomenon with a word, grasping its identity, weighing whether, and to what extent, its individual view is similar to the notional or conceptual pattern forming the basis for the categorisation assumed in a given language, are greatly complex issues. No surprise, such situations are accompanied by meta-linguistic actions of the utterance addressor who strives to signal a restricted, incomplete adequacy of the categorial designations he uses. Phrases such as ‘something of the sort’, ‘a sort of’, and the like, function as meta-linguistic signals of an incomplete adequacy of the categorial designations or descriptions being used. What they suggest is the approximate character of the predication applied. An interesting example of such categorial hesitation, triggering broad social resonance, are the wordings taken into account in the course of a debate, held at the Polish Sejm (lower parliamentary house) in early July 2013, on the commemoration of ethnic cleansing committed during World War 2, in 1943–5, by Ukrainian nationalists in Volhynia. Some MPs wanted the cleansing action (which bestially killed a hundred thousand Polish people) to be named homicide. Civic Platform MPs proposed to use the phrase ‘crime bearing the characteristics of homicide’, which was meant to abate the qualification’s acuity and rule out certain legal consequences regarding homicide, whilst at the same time reducing the tensions between Poland and Ukraine. Finally, the Sejm’s resolution has accepted the description reading ‘crimes bearing the characteristics of homicide’, used in reference to the killings in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, in line with the ruling party’s

policy. The categorisation has thus been expressed using a formula that revealed an epistemological hesitation, questioning or at least disputing the aptness of the phrase used, and indicating the possibility of employing various notional/conceptual categorisations of the phenomenon in question.

The instance under analysis shows how categorial hesitance may also be conditioned by practical considerations. Assumption of a specified cognitive perspective and selection of the categorisation that highlights certain specified aspects of a phenomenon is dependent upon a variety of factors, such as, for instance, the ideology professed and/or the sphere of values taken into consideration by the speaker. Thus, categorisation has a rhetorical dimension to it: it can be used with a persuasive purpose in mind, and become an instrument of manipulation.

The sense of discord between the word's categorial content and the thing being described by the word is at times so powerful that the meta-linguistic commentary attached now and then unmasks the mendacity or deceitfulness of the word being used. An interesting example of such unmasking role of expressions commenting on the categorisation method appeared in the Polish press on the occasion of discussing the course of a recent parliamentary election in Belarus.¹¹ An expressive borrowing from Russian, based on 'tze-' prefix (roughly translatable as 'pseudo-') was namely used, the deputies elected to the Parliament being named 'pseudo-deputies' and the manipulated election procedure, 'pseudo-election' – which was meant to work as a reservation that calling such dishonestly carried-out election simply 'election' and the elected representatives just 'MPs' would be inadequate as it would distort the actual situation.

Inverted commas is, as one could have noticed, a typical means used to signal deficient adequacy of words. One function of this mark is to discern the word(s) used, as it were, provisionally, thus

¹¹ Cf. *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily, issue of 25th September 2012.

indicating that the particular code means or measure has somewhat coincidentally proved of use, as a ‘solution at hand’ – but it clearly could (have) be(en) replaced by a description or word better stylistically suiting the context. For instance:

(From a scholarly dissertation): “This study will discuss certain ‘troublesome’ names of genres. [...]”

As far as I can judge, the users choosing one-segment names to mark the genological attribution of Web texts intend to highlight the specificity or ‘otherness’ of the genres in the internet.”

(From an essay): “The author leaves the reader no room for objections or doubts whatsoever. He would not hide his feelings, or ‘model’ his attitude toward the issues he presents. [...]”

In the above-quoted fragments, the inverted commas (‘ ’) single out the uses of words perceived as somewhat imprecise, or not entirely canonical, indicating instead a ‘makeshift’ character of the word or expression used. It is one of the many functions of quote-phrases, one that can be attached to those enumerated by Maria-Renata Mayenowa in her excellent study on this particular subject-matter.¹² The following statement by this author, formulated in the Saussurean categories:

¹² For meta-linguistic functions of inverted commas, see: M. R. Mayenowa, *Expressions guillemetées. Contribution à l'étude de la sémantique du texte poétique*, [in:] *To honor Roman Jakobson. Essays on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday*, vol. 2, The Hague – Paris 1967, pp. 1315–1327. Among the uses quoted by this author, none would actually perfectly fit the examples quoted in this essay; Mayenowa’s focus is on insertions or interpolations from other codes and styles of speaking. For purposes of our present interest, inverted commas indicate a reserve with respect to the linguistic sign taken from the speaker’s own national code – a sign sensed as inadequate and is used in a provisional fashion.

Il est évident que dans l'expression guillemetée, comme dans toute autre expression métalinguistique, il y a réactualisation des rapports de signification, et ceci sur les deux axes: rapport signifiant-signifié et rapport signifié-”referent” (p. 1319).

proves true also for these uses. Similarly to other uses, the inverted commas have a meta-linguistic function – or, putting it otherwise, signal a lengthened (pieced-out) modality superimposed upon elements of utterance. Their use adds a slightly ironical tint to the tone and marks the speaker's distance with respect to the congruency of the specified code measures. In contrast to other types of irony, the addressee in the utterances quoted above is the language itself, which offers its users not-quite-precise and adequate categories.

This form of self-distancing against (the) language appears in scholarly and journalistic texts¹³, especially in the genre of essay. Inverted commas expressing a reserve toward the content of a word and reservations such as ‘X, so to speak’, ‘as it were, X’, ‘X, as if’, and the like, can be found in multiple texts. In some cases, it appears downright as a stylistic fashion. The distancing inverted commas are often used with e.g. metaphorical uses and lexicalised linguistic metaphors sensed as alias names used in a not-quite-obligatory manner. Just to consider the following details from scholarly texts:

¹³ The mannerism of abusing inverted commas in the journalistic style was once stigmatised by Stanisław Barańczak: “Journalists are so cautious that they would apply the inverted commas or quotation marks to just anything”; cf. S. Barańczak, *Interpretacja dziennikarska*, ‘Nurt’, 1972, No. 4, p. 64. This author might have had in mind, in the first place, a disposal of responsibility for the word as an alien's word; still, journalistic cautiousness also manifests itself in signalling a modified sense of words that do not completely correspond with the actual or topical needs of the text.

According to certain modern anthropological theories, culture would consist in 'getting infected' with mental representations such as e.g. beliefs or convictions.

The categories at work herein are unobtrusive and 'fixed'.

As a thought movement, European Romanticism may serve in post-modernity as a medium for nostalgia and for attempts taken at re-'enchanted' it. [...]

Particularly interesting appears the featured role of Cyprian Norwid as an innovator 'foreshadowing' the diction of Thomas S. Eliot.

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How, therefore, to copy in the language and show in poetry – in texts being the most sensitive to the word and to its potential in creating an image of the world – that infinite abundance of phenomena entangled in a network of contextual dependencies and revealing themselves to the speaking subjects from a permanently altering cognitive perspective conditioned by the unique experience of each individual?

A few discursive procedures can be pointed out which attempt at tackling the problem. One is such that the initial recognition of the object, its allocation to a certain general notional or conceptual category, is accompanied by a specifying segment or a series of designations that enrich its image and endeavour to individualise the object being described, thus adjusting the misfit content of the earlier-applied notion/concept.

Czesław Miłosz thus wrote of a meadow, multiplying its characteristics with use of a sequence of epithets and attempting at giving the phenomenon a one-of-a-kind shape:

It was a riverside meadow, lush, from before the hay
harvest,

On an immaculate day in the sun of June.

I searched for it, found it, recognize it.
 Grasses and flowers grew there familiar in my childhood.
 With half-closed eyelids I absorbed luminescence.
 And the scent garnered me, all knowing ceased.
 Suddenly I felt I was disappearing and weeping with joy¹⁴.

The meadow – a riverside blossoming meadow being watched in a beautiful June weather; the meadow the poem's 'I' has been looking for in his entire life – owes its uniqueness to its peculiar location in the space, appearance, season of the year it was beheld in, and to the fact that there grew the grasses and flowers familiar to him from his childhood. Epithets have been employed in the above-quoted description to identify the meadow. The epithets are pretty numerous in this piece (four epithets are used, whereas their series is usually confined to three). But even if the characteristics of this meadow described by Miłosz encompassed ten, a hundred or a thousand traits, it would not have been able to stand up to the task of complete and accurate imaging of the object. Similar is the case with description when unfolded up to the limits of the text's full compositional segment, as in describing an individual, environs, or season of the year, or up to the limits of the utterance as such, as in the case of descriptive poem. Yet, even the most detailed characteristics would not suffice to adequately grasp the limitlessly rich singular nature of an object or phenomenon.

Philip Wheelwright suggests in situations analogous to this one a solution close to such series of epithets, although fragmented into a number of successive acts of predication. Opposing the pessimistic conclusions on impotence of language in confrontation with

¹⁴ C. Miłosz, *A Meadow*, trans. by C. Miłosz and R. Hass, in: C. Miłosz, *New and Collected Poems (1931–2001)*, ECCO, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 2001, p. 597.

the reality, he proposes that acts of categorisation be multiplied, in order to approach the essence of the object being described:

If reality is intrinsically latent and unwilling to give up its innermost secrets even to the most enterprising explorer, then the best we can hope to do is catch partisan glimpses, reasonably diversified, all of them imperfect, but some more suited to one occasion and need, others to another. If we cannot hope ever to be perfectly right, we can perhaps find both enlightenment and refreshment by changing, from time to time, our ways of being wrong. [...] The truest explanation of anything is not necessarily the one that is most efficient or that is most free from incidental error. Perhaps truth, like certain precious metals, is presented best in alloys. In that case the way toward it will be through a guided succession of tentative errors¹⁵.

The above-quoted C. Miłosz's description of a meadow refers to one more technique, much more efficient though solipsistic one. One comes across a suggestion that the meadow described in the poem is identical (although not the very same) as the meadow the 'I' has remembered from his childhood. It is with respect to that one-of-its-kind meadow (not a meadow in general, 'as such') that he utters his '*Veni, vidi, vici*': "I searched for it, found it, recognize it". In order to grasp the object's identity, one has therefore to refer to someone's cognitive act: the object's identification in the awareness of another individual. It is a must that imagination is involved, and switching takes place from a notional template to a concept or image of the concrete phenomenon: such concept or image is generated in the mind of the poetic 'I', and is attainable to the reader of Miłosz's poem only because of his/her empathic ability (particularly in its manifestations that, along with the emotional sphere, are with respect to cognitive aspects and the taking-over of the Other's perspective).

¹⁵ Wheelwright, op. cit., pp. 172–173.

On analysing the empathy phenomenon and its role in the linguistic communication process, Jarosław Płuciennik introduces the notion of simulation as a “mental attempt to put oneself in the other individual’s shoes”; he goes on explaining that

It is the most concisely definable as a view whereby our understanding of the others is not achieved by automatic application of some ad-hoc constructed theory which allows to conclude what thoughts and intentions explain the actions of other people, but through experiencing the situation of the others, ‘in their boots’, or from their point-of-view, thereby understanding the object of experience and thoughts of the others.¹⁶

Another efficient method of expressing the unique qualities of an object, as perceived by the subject, is, obviously, comparing it against known things or transference thereupon of the traits of such things. This is a domain of similitudes and metaphors. Similar phenomena are thus evoked, enabling to transfer their connotations to the main topic of the utterance.¹⁷ This compensates the lack of an adequate name, to an extent.

Let us analyse another example:

¹⁶ Cf. J. Płuciennik, *Literackie identyfikacje i oddźwięki. Poetyka a empatia*, Łódź, 2002, p. 35.

¹⁷ In describing the generation of metaphorical/figurative meaning, I have used the theory of lexical and encyclopaedic connotations as developed and described by Yuri Apresyan, Igor Melčuk and Lida Iordanska; see: J. Apresjan [Y. Apresyan], *Semantika leksykalna. Synonimiczne środki języka*, trans. Z. Kozłowska, A. Markowski, Warszawa, 1980, pp. 94–95; idem, *Pragmaticheskaya informatsiya dla tolkovogo slovaria*, [in:] N.D. Arutiunova. ed., *Pragmatika i problemy intensional’nosti*, Moskva 1988; L. Jordanskaja [L. Yordanskaya], I. Mielczuk [I. Melčuk], *Konotacja w semantyce lingwistycznej i leksykografii*, [in:] J. Bartmiński, ed., *Konotacja*, Lublin, 1988.

A strange object appeared in the sky, something like a grand cigar. It was a zeppelin. The 'cigar' came down, and mooring ropes were cast from it.

Here, the object is recognised gradually. It is initially described in general terms, as an object which is, however, somewhat dissimilar to other flying objects: 'a strange object'. The process of recognising the object's identity goes on, with the speaker making use of the spotted similarity of the object to a cigar: the former is *something like* a cigar (as already remarked, similar indication of wanting similarity is the case with phrases such as: *something of the sort, as if, so to speak, as it were*, and the like). The metaphor-in-absentia appearing in the subsequent sentence: *the 'cigar'*, referring to the zeppelin, is put in inverted commas since the word is used in an untypical, figurative way; the parallel reason is, however, that it refers to the content of the preceding sentences, its semantic potency being a derivative of the thought operation expressed there as a similarity between the object being observed and (a) cigar is perceived.

Common to the various uses of similes and metaphors is that they refer to the act of thought on the part of the utterance addressor; hence, the nature of the phenomenon being described is finally approached within the human consciousness, also in this case. It is man who perceives a resemblance of things or phenomena¹⁸, and it is resultant from his suggestion that the addressee ought to figure out the object being characterised, as furnished with certain detailed traits. Again, communication is more complete in this case if empathy-laden.

The difficulties with rendering similes or metaphors subject to negation or contradiction are explainable by the predication being

¹⁸ "Creating a good metaphor is, indeed, tantamount to perceiving resemblances in things dissimilar", Aristotle wrote. Cf. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1457b, transl. George Whalley, Montreal 1997: McGill-Queen's University Press.

tied up with the cognitive act of the addressor, with the similitude perceived by him.¹⁹ Contradiction is possibly applicable with predicates, allocated characteristics or profiles; nonetheless, negating of what someone else has spotted or perceived, or what has seemed to the individual, is impossible or inefficient and merely pointless. Otherwise, we would be forced to rely on precise determination of such contents, which is not feasible. This fact is not challenged by an empathic feature of metaphor-based communication, which is aimed at raising a resonance in the addressee, or among the addressees.

All the above-outlined situations prove that the dramatic inability to express the unique essence of a thing with use of linguistic measures may be overcome, to an extent, with multiplication of cognitive perspectives and their related acts of predication; in the first place, through coupling the cognitive act with the concrete act of speaking. By employing a variety of mental powers, it brings the speaker closer to grasping the identity of the phenomenon being named.

There always remains a gap or crevice between the word and its designated object, though. It can thus be said, following Martin Heidegger, that the function of language is not to evoke any presence of (a) thing, but instead, merely to lead the man to a type of experience that enables a thing to 'be the thing'.²⁰

¹⁹ The possibility that figurative utterance might be disproved has been quite markedly rejected by Donald Davidson, who argues that vivid and non-conventionalised metaphors have no graspable or stable meaning, only gaining a sense in every single act of interpretation. See: D. Davidson, *What Metaphors Mean*, 'Critical Inquiry', 5, Autumn 1978 (reprinted in: S. Sachs, ed., *On Metaphor*, Chicago, 1979). The issue of veracity of metaphors has also been considered by e.g. Max Black; cf. M. Black, *More about Metaphor*, [in:] A. Ortony, ed., *Metaphor and Thought*, New York, 1979.

²⁰ Cf. I. Lorenc, *Logos i mit estetyczności*, Warszawa 1993, passim, p. 107.

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Let us notice, as a final remark, that the issues considered in this essay are further complicated due to the functioning of linguistic signs in communication process, in dialogue. Owing to an intersubjective character of linguistic actions, it has to be assumed that the search for ways of exact representation of things with use of linguistic means has to be accompanied by adequate attitude of the message's recipient (addressee). The latter ought namely to accept a semantically provisional nature of the words being used, and non-finality of the message, whilst in parallel participating the processing of its content, using to this end the pieces of information coming from the utterance itself and the categorial measures it uses, and, likewise, those originating in the context and taken from a broader resource of off-language knowledge (which is coupled with the linguistic signs as its encyclopaedic connotations²¹). Hence, the crucial role rests with an active interpretation of the sense and empathic attitude toward the interlocutor. Assumption of such an attitude enables to intuitively grasp (to the extent as necessary for rapport and action) the unutterable conglomerate of features and states determining the identity of the object being described. That said, participants of the dialogue ought also to take into account the possible categorisation shifts: specifically, biased description of objects or phenomena being a form of manipulation.

Translated by Tristan Korecki

²¹ For more on connotations embedding the invariant content of word, see: J. Apresjan [Y. Apresyan], *Semantyka leksykalna ...*, pp. 94–95; idem, *Pragmaticheskaya informatsiya ...*; L. Jordanskaja [L. Yordanskaya], I. Mielczuk [I. Melčuk], *Konotacija w semantyce ...*.

РЕГИНА КОЙЧЕВА

ДРЕВНЕБОЛГАРСКАЯ ПИСЬМЕННОСТЬ И ЕЕ ВИЗАНТИЙСКИЕ МОДЕЛИ – ПОДОБИЯ И РАЗЛИЧИЯ¹

Начало и развитие древнеболгарской письменности неразрывно связаны с ее отношением к византийским образцам. Такая культурная ситуация выдвигает на передний план проблему идентичности в ее основном значении: «одинаковость, тождественность» (Български тълковен речник 1976: 260), без прямой связи с личностью и человеческим самосознанием. В данной статье с помощью трех научных дисциплин – истории, лингвистики и литературоведения – будет показано значимое присутствие дихотомии «подобие – различие» в нескольких ключевых для палеославистики пунктах по шкале: «алфавит – письменный язык – литература», будут отмечены некоторые взгляды Романа Якобсона по этим вопросам, а также и подобие и различие между его взглядами и общепринятыми мнениями в болгарской медиевистике.

¹ Русский перевод статьи, включая цитаты – Наталии Брауэр.

1. АЛФАВИТ

Исследуя несколько молитв в глаголическом Синайском эвхологии Роман Якобсон ассоциирует своеобразие древне-болгарской графической системы с отстаиванием права независимости:

«В борьбе за неотъемлемое право употреблять родной язык в церкви необходимо было в согласии с существующей тогда идеологией показать внешнему миру и в особенности Риму и Византии, что славянское литургическое слово и пение имеют свои собственные, оригинально оформленные буквы и невмы – осязаемые визуальные символы духовной независимости и самостоятельности».

(Jakobson 1985: 250)

Бесспорно то, что «буквенные начертания в глаголической азбуке (на которой написан Синайский эвхологий – *прим. м.*) имеют свой собственный специфический облик, благодаря которому она резко отличается от почти всех известных письменностей», а единственным исключением, которое отмечалось в науке, является наличие «известного подобия» «между глаголическими буквенными фигурами и знаками ефиопского письма» (Илчев 1991б: 47). Но если условием, посредством которого славянская письменность завоевала бы в IX в. свою независимость и международный авторитет, было именно отличие ее письменной системы от других, как тогда можно объяснить засвидетельствованную в истории противоположную тенденцию – к уподоблению, вызвавшую возникновение второй славянской азбуки – кириллицы, в которой большинство букв «вполне идентичны соответствующим им знакам византийского маюскульного унциала» (Илчев 1991б: 47)? Отмеченное противоречие получило в болгарской палеославистике

объяснение, которое парадоксальным образом противоположно высказыванию русского лингвиста. По мнению Ивана Добрева залог независимости и авторитета древнеболгарской письменности состоит не в удалении, а именно в приближении славянской письменной системы (в лице кириллицы) к эллинице:

«...болгарские владетели Борис и Симеон должны были считаться с многими историческими и чисто практическими обстоятельствами, такими как дипломатическими отношениями с Византией; старинная духовной властью Цареградского патриарха на восточноболгарских территориях, чьей приемницей так или иначе была Болгарская церковь; вероятностью того, что если не будет сделана какая-либо существенная уступка Константинопольской Патриархии, то Болгарская церковь ... может быть отвергнута восточными патриархами и тогда пострадает международный авторитет, завоеванный Болгарией после крещения, и пр. Решено было в основу болгарской письменности заложить греческий алфавит (буквы византийского уставного письма), чтобы стала видна... приемственная связь с византийской богослужебной литературой... . И так, около 893 г. в болгарских государственных центрах Плиске и Преславе уже существовала вторая древнеболгарская азбука, которая в честь славянского первоучителя Константина-Кирилла Философа позже названа была кириллицей».

(Добрев 1985: 157, 159)

2. ПИСЬМЕННЫЙ ЯЗЫК

Обратный случай – различие относительно византийской модели, которое, однако, проявляется во имя утверждения знаменательного подобия на другом уровне – можно отме-

тить в одной энигматической особенности древнеболгарского письменного языка – отсутствии словных ударений. Ученые неумоимо указывают на этот факт (см. напр. Якобсон 1923: 358), так как он слишком агрессивно ограничивает периметр любой попытки стиховедческого анализа древнеболгарских текстов. Однако упорное заострение внимания на этой проблеме оставила невыясненным существенный вопрос: почему на самом деле в древнеболгарском письменном языке не указываются словесные ударения. Отсутствие акцентных знаков было бы вполне объяснимо, если ударение являлось бы фиксированным, какова ситуация в современных западнославянских языках. Такой пробел оправдан и в латинском языке, где словный акцент практически имеет только две валентности (второй или третий слог с конца фонетического слова), регулируемые установленными правилами (Георгиева 1995: 12). Однако в древнеболгарском языке, созданном на основе Солунского славянского наречия, «ударение ... было свободным и подвижным (т. е. могло перемещаться в разных формах одного и тоже слова или в группе родственных слов)» (Илчев 1991а: 79). Правда и сегодня существуют языки с таким же ударением, которое не указывается письменно (напр. английский). Первостепенным, однако, является факт, что в греческом языке, с которого сделаны первые переводы на славянский и который послужил как основной язык-модель при создании письменного древнеболгарского языка, ударения пишутся не только над полнозначными словами, но даже и над их отдельно стоящими грамматическими членами. В таком случае как можно объяснить отсутствие акцентных знаков в древнеболгарском?

На первый взгляд логично выглядит предположение, что безакцентный облик древнеболгарской письменности был ориентирован на потребности Великоморавии, где языком церкви был латинский, а западнославянское наречие в этом регионе, вероятно, уже тяготело к фиксированному ударению, если су-

дять по современным чешскому, словацкому и польскому языкам². Эта версия, однако, не может объяснить почему позднее, уже в письменной продукции Первого Болгарского Царства, ударение, которое там было свободным и подвижным, продолжает не указываться. Учитывая то, что еще в конце IX-го века в Болгарии была проведена жесткая реформа письма, а именно создание новой азбуки, прибавление акцентных знаков в письменном слове было бы совсем безобидной иновацией.

Мне кажется, что ответ на данный вопрос близок к концепции о наднациональном характере древнеболгарского языка, формулированной Романом Якобсоном так:

«На грани двух тысячелетий единство древнецерковнославянского языка решительно превышает по значению разницу между его местных и темпоральных редакций. Подобным образом и смысл и предназначение различных религиозных сочинений на этом языке являются без сомнения междуплеменными.»

(Jakobson 1985: 248–249)

Многозначительное отсутствие акцентных знаков в древнеболгарских письменных текстах является одной из форм декларирования замысла древнеболгарского языка – быть наднациональным, универсальным литературным языком для всех славянских народов принявших крещение. Именно поэтому его называют еще и объединяющим названием «древнецерковнославянский». Если святые братья Кирилл и Мефодий поставили бы в своих переводах ударения своего собственного наречия, литературный древнеболгарский получил бы отпечаток конкретной региональности, которая нарушила бы его универсальность, так как разнотипные акцентные системы современных славянских языков подска-

² По вопросу о границах Великоморавии см. Младенова 1999: 15–31, 50.

зывают, полную вероятность того, что еще в IX-ом веке одним из различий между отдельными славянскими наречиями были именно места ударений.

В свете этого объяснения становится ясно, что отклонение от византийской модели (в данном случае – отсутствие ударений) подчинено высшей духовной цели – созданию универсального письменного языка для всех славян, который сосредотачивает в себе прежде всего объединяющие языковые черты отдельных наречий и устраняет разъединяющие, каковыми являются словные ударения.³

3. ЛИТЕРАТУРА

Дихотомия «подобие – различие» имеет многообразные проявления в древнеболгарской литературе и в ее богословских основаниях:

– в христианском учении о т. наз. обожении человеческой личности, при котором человек уподобляется Богу, становится богом по благодати – не случайно в православной терминологии монах, достигнувший святости, называется «преподобный»;

– в теории об образном познании св. Дионисия Ареопита, в согласии с которой задача средневекового текста – указать на связь между земными явлениями, которые он описывает, и их трансцендентными соответствиями посредством конструирования образов, подобных объектам или субъектам Божественного мира или отличающихся от них (согласно терминологии св. Дионисия – «подобных священновидных образов» и «неподобных образотворений») (см. Станчев 1982: 18);

³ Это обобщение относится к языковой системе в целом, без учета ситуаций неизбежного выбора конкретного диалектного характера, как напр. при рефлексах праславянских сочетаний *tj и *dj, и т.п., часть которых связана с распространением моравизмов в Болгарии.

– в нормативности и широко развернутой интертекстуальности древнеболгарской литературы, в связи с которой новые тексты следуют (а иногда и трансформируют) установленные жанровые, стилловые и концептуальные модели, как правило византийские, и заполняются цитатами из старых авторитетных источников, первенствующим среди которых является Священное Писание (Ангушева 2008: 18–19). Сходный характер имеет и художественный принцип отождествления с уже известными образцами: автор уподобляет святого человека – объекта агиографского повествования – конкретному библейскому прототипу и приобщает его к определенному типу святости (Станчев 1982: 26–28);

– в музыкальном аспекте гимнографии, где различные тексты исполняются под одни и те же мелодии, характерным примером является т.наз. «подобен» – песнопение, чья мелодия заимствована из другого песнопения;

и многие другие.

Поскольку некоторые из этих вопросов рассматривались неоднократно в научной литературе, а другие очевидны, я останавливаюсь только на некоторых аспектах.

Сильный интертекстуальный заряд древнеболгарской литературы гарантирует ее гомогенность на макроуровне, так как мультиплицирование предварительно заданных мотивов, концепций и даже целых текстовых пассажей повышает степень подобия между различными произведениями. Эта специфическая литературная ситуация, однако, угрожает индивидуальности и художественному единству отдельного произведения, особенно что касается песнопения, которое, например в гимнографическом жанре канона, состоит из чередующихся разнотипных по тематике строф (это в основном ирмосы, тропари и богородичны). Поэтому средневековые авторы разработали различные механизмы для объединения отдельных компо-

нентов в одно художественное целое, которое обеспечило бы уникальность данного сочинения по сравнению с остальными. Эти механизмы могут быть задействованы на всех уровнях текста, начиная с его музыкальной и фонетической структуры и кончая его самыми глубокими смысловыми пластами.

Часто один из способов построения художественного единства реализуется в виде скрытого кода. В агиографии таким кодом на семантическом уровне является библейский тематический ключ – это интертекстуальная ссылка на конкретный священный текст, которая встраивается в точно определенном месте в начале жития и раскрывает духовное послание сочинения. Библейский тематический ключ участвует в построении смыслового единства текста, так как «вынесенная в начальные строки тема может быть развернута в форме лейтмотива, который управляет всей семантической системой произведения» (Пикио 1993: 391). Акростих – это другой вид скрытого кода в форме тайнописи, типичный для песнопений. Он обычно связывает все части песнопения и защищает его мозаичную структуру от распада. Во многих случаях код реализуется в виде скрытой симметрии между отдельными компонентами произведения, которая несет в себе смысл формального символа Божественной гармонии. Показательные примеры такой симметрии содержатся в анализах Якобсона основных гимнографических строф-моделей (см. напр. Jakobson 1985: 242–243, 244). По принципу симметрии распределены и гласы канонического триодного цикла епископа Константина Преславского. В гармонии с целостным контекстом цикла, посвященного теме распятия Христа, эта конфигурация гласов отсылает к симметрии фигуры Христова креста и начинает звучать как многоголосое песенное преклонение перед саможертвой Спасителя. Таким образом порядок гласов в древнеболгарском великопостном цикле исполняет функцию внутреннего кода, который участвует в построении единой композиции произведения, перестра-

ивая по-новому подобный внутренний код греческой модели этого цикла – акrostиховых триодных канонов св. Иосифа Песнописца (Койчева 2010; Koucheva 2011).

В жанре канона, который состоит из песен, а каждая из них – из одной строфы-модели (ирмоса) и моделированных по этому ирмосу строф (тропарей), единство произведения конструируется прежде всего на основе подобия строф песни между собой. Это подобие может наблюдаться на различных уровнях словесного текста. На фонетическом уровне, из-за отсутствия ударений в древнеболгарских памятниках, в научных исследованиях оно обычно измеряется количеством и распределением слогов. В древнеболгарской литературе IX–X веках, однако, ритмическое подобие в жанре канона распространяется не только по линии «ирмос – тропари» (имеющей прямое отношение к проблеме единства произведения), а является триизмерным: кроме как по линии «ирмос – тропари», оно осуществляется также по линиям «слово – музыка» (где сопоставляются слоги и невмы) и «оригинал – перевод». Степень соответствия по числу ритмических единиц по этим трем направлениям – предмет давних споров в палеославистической гимнологии, охватывающих амплитуду от реконструирования вполне изосилабических текстов (см. напр. Pavić 1936, Jakobson 1965, Svane 1968) до тотального отрицания существования изосилабизма (см. Попов 2013: 169–175).

Бесспорно, однако то, что модель всегда может быть распознанной в моделированном тексте – как в следовании образцу, так и в отклонении от него. Этот неопровержимый факт свидетельствует о том, насколько значима роль подобия и уподобления в самом общем смысле в древнеболгарской литературе, а духовный фундамент этой средневековой особенности, согласно формулировке Александра Наумова, коренится в стремлении всего и всех к соединению во Христе (Naumov 1983: 66, 69, 74).

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THE IDENTITY OF SIGN AND TEXT IN DIGITAL SPACE

Digital texts reveal a complex identity, which is premised upon both similarities and differences. Similarities arise from the fact that digital texts are embedded in existing culture, combined with the fact that all successive instances of culture are inevitably rooted in that culture itself. The identity of digital communication is thus premised upon existing signs, texts, and discourses; and it develops in the process of their adaptation and reinterpretation. This derivative nature of digital communication enables digitality to remain rooted in social communication and existing culture. It also ensures that cultural recipients and participants are well-disposed towards new technologies and their resulting creations, as well as encourages the recipients' active involvement and transforms them into active users of culture.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned digital identity also reveals unique characteristics. Its originality is the result of combining the existing textual order with the realm of digital technologies. In effect, the act of communication gains a new digital onticity, although it remains rooted in existing culture with regard to its semiotic and semantic aspects and thus continues to be easily accessible to cultural participants. This dual discursiveness of texts is reflected in the fact that polysemiotic and multimedial depictions

on the end–user level are met with corresponding monosemiotic specifications on the level of markup code. Depictions present on the end–user level (written text, music, pictures, movies), which from the perspective of social communication are understood to represent different sign systems, are interpreted as signs of uniform nature on the level of markup code.

For participants in and active users of culture, for whom culture, with its diverse offering of cultural texts, which change with the passage of cultural time (paintings, written texts, musical compositions, movies, etc.), is a point of reference, digital communication forms a space in which different systems of signs, diverse media, and various artistic styles coexist with one another; a space where forms encountered in existing cultural texts are being adapted, reinterpreted, and remixed. For programmers and web developers, who are aware of the fact that these transmissions are structured on individual bits, digital signs are no different from one another with regard to their nature and all digital transmissions form a single, cohesive system. The dual or even hybrid identity of digital communication is thus apparent on the level of the sign itself.

Digital technologies **introduce a new sign and text structure**. The structure of the digital sign is determined by its multivariate character. To put it in simpler terms, the digital sign can be presented in a version intended for the end–user, in which case it exists in various semiotic forms, as well as in a version intended for the web developer, in which case it also manifests itself in various different manners (i.e. programming languages and bit memory). Overall, therefore, the digital sign can be said to have two distinct levels: **the end–user level and the markup level** (Figure 1a, 1b).

On the first of the two levels the digital sign presents itself to the users' senses on their computer screens, but is also recognizable in terms of its function as a carrier of meaning (semantic aspect) and / or as a textual tool, the aim of which is to link one text to another or to alter the text in some capacity.




Figure 1a



Figure 1b

The end–user level should be considered the fundamental level of the digital sign despite its dependence on the markup level. Indeed, the digital sign has been created first and foremost with social communication in mind, which takes place on the end–user level. In other words, the markup level exists with the end–user level in mind and not *vice versa*. Moreover, as far as the process of communication between users and data transmission are concerned, the fact that the on–screen information is coded with the use of other structures on the level of markup code is not of great significance. Instead, this feature is relevant with regard to the ontic and epistemological character of the digital sign, as it foregrounds the digital sign as belonging simultaneously to different language–discourses, among which are those of computer science and social communication, to name just two fundamental ones.

The sign on the end–user level is multi–semiotic, multi–medial, and multi–discursive in character. In effect, the sign can represent the following semiospheres: verbal, iconic, acoustic, and mixed (e.g. iconic–kinesthetic GIF files); create texts which represent various medial systems (music, literature, film, photography) and belong to different social discourses. The sign can contain elements belonging to different codes (e.g. a low battery alert combines an iconic sign, an acoustic sign, and a textual sign; as well as a sign characteristic of digital communication with a sign referencing traffic warning signs). This semiotic diversity is accompanied by discursive diversity. One sign can belong to several cultural discourses and fields simultaneously. This variety of relations between signs, texts, and cultural discourses is responsible for the syntactic and pragmatic aspects of the sign on the end–user level.

The semiotic aspect of the end–user level is characterised by optionality, or, in other words, **variability**¹. **Variability manifests itself in the phenomenon of assigning a single meaning to vari-**

¹ L. Manovich, *The Language of New Media*, The MIT Press, Cambridge-London 2001.

ous signs at once, i.e., to an iconic sign (e.g. a scissors icon), a textual sign (e.g. a “cut” command), an alphabetical–algebraic sign (e.g. “Ctrl + X”) and, in newer software versions, to textual descriptions (periphrasis). The same phenomenon is also true on the level of text, where the same textual information can be presented in a textual, graphical, numeric, photographic, or cinematic manner, contributing to the formation of polisemi-otic and multimedial synonymies, or even semiotic doublets.

Textual meanings are created in the process of linking textual signs, graphic signs, and acoustic signs, which were thus far confined to different discourses, interacting with one another. The ease with which miscellaneous signs are combined leads to the migration of existing meanings and functions of signs and blurs their boundaries.

The functional aspect of digital signs manifests itself in the ability to refer the user to another sign and text (intermediary signs) and the ability to alter the text in some capacity (operational signs). Not all signs within hypertext are intermediary signs, although each sign could be one in theory. The existence of this function is pointed out on the level of representation (drawing attention to a word, several words, or an excerpt from a text by means of underlining text or using a different font colour) or accepted as a convention (e.g. as icons on toolbar buttons), as well as indicated by a cursor change. Another factor which enables this particular aspect of the sign are the user’s own actions – the intermediary character of the sign reveals itself only under the condition of interactivity.

A link as a constant element of discourse changes the characteristics of communication’s limits. The beginning and the end of discourse are not determined once and for all by the sender’s intentions, but they are moveable – each time they are different, defined by the user (but only in the frame of the program). As Bertrand Gervais points out,

The hyperlink acts like a sign – it stands for something else for someone; however, once programmed, it does so identically in every case. The hypertext link, once activated, and this despite out interpretants, always goes to the next text to which it has been linked. It can never be faulty. Granted, it can be defective – in which case it is completely ineffective – however, it can never link to something else beyond what has been established”².

Linked texts which in a given moment constitute the context, a second later can become the main text. In the process of reading, the main thread or the central character in a hypertext novel can give way to other threads or a different character simply because of the reader’s choice. The relations between text and context are determined by the recipient and the assumed order of reading. The interchangeability of these relations is, however, intentionally designed, it is inscribed in the onticity of hypertext.

Linking activates the **digressive** mode – linked words become a pretext (they encourage) to abandon the **actual (present) order of discourse**. When talking about abandoning the order of discourse, I use the word “actual” and not e.g. “main” on purpose. In digital discourse, which is based on the choice of links, passing from one part of the webpage to another, or from one website to another, it does not make any sense to talk about the main discourse.

Definitions of hypertext mostly highlight the non-linearity of reading. According to them, hypertext disturbs the linear order of the text and privileges the associating mode. Since the possibility of passing from one text to another had been designed and inscribed in the structure of hypertext, it seems that this passing by means of links does not disturb the pre-established order, but it actualises it. By clicking a link, the user does not break into another text,

² B. Gervais, *Is a Text on This Screen? Reading In an Era of Hiper-textuality*, in: *A Companion to Digital Literary Studies*, ed. R.Siemens, S.Schreibman, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden-Oxford 2013, p. 198.

but uses the predesigned possibility of opening it. The solution to this apparent aporia is to perceive the discrepancy between text and discourse. In traditional communication, discourse somehow respected the order of reading determined by the text. For example, in journalistic discourse, the order of reception was determined by the order of the text. The situation is different in digital discourse, which adapts the text by subordinating it to its own specificity. And this specificity means that it is possible to pass from one text to another via links. In digital journalistic discourse, therefore, the order of reading is determined by digital discourse, which enables both the reception of the text according to the textual order and according to the order determined by discourse (possibility of passing to another text via links). Thus, it is possible for **the order of text and the order of discourse to split**. It is also possible for discourse not to respect the order determined by text.

Hypertext is intentionally open text, devoid of **confines**. Of course, one can and should talk about the confines of separate textual units (e.g. a press article on the Internet). However, locating a link within a textual unit blurs the confines of the text. It enables the user to create text outside of the traditional framework and to designate a new framework, which in turn leads to their multiplication.

The possibility to pass freely from one text or plan to another and to connect semantic units of diverse complexity and semiotic organisation by links, leads to textual convergence in the sphere of expressiveness and the functionality of text. Texts become a mixture of already existent forms. They join narrative elements with non-narrative ones, textual forms hitherto reserved for other genres of texts and discourses. As Markku Eskelinen writes, "It is hard to deny that texts are both thematically and formally heterogeneous"³.

³ M. Eskelinen, *Cybertext poetics. The critical Landscape of New Media Literary Theory*, in: *Continuum*, London – New York 2012, p. 109.

Another crucial function of digital signs is the fact that they enable the user to perform certain actions on other signs and texts. I will refer to such signs as operators (**manipulators**). A typical example of a manipulator is the cursor sign, which is not part of the text itself, but is nonetheless associated with discourse.

The second level of the sign is the aforementioned **level of programming code (the IT level)**, and in particular – the level of HTML markup. This level is not visible on–screen after turning on the computer; rather, viewing it is possible after performing additional actions.

As opposed to the sign on the end–user level, the sign on the markup level does not refer to the social (cultural, extratextual) realm, but rather, it refers back to itself – to the representation rendered in the web browser on the end–user level. The HTML file specifies the sign that users will see on their computer screens. The content of the sign on this level is thus **metatextual**. Information regarding the manner in which the sign will be rendered on the end–user level is dispersed on the markup level – divided among various tag attributes, which define particular features of the sign. Such information performs a defining function and each individual record is equally important (no hierarchisation). For example, information regarding a sign which is rendered as *a* on the end–user level, or, in other words, a letter sign with particular attributes (representing a font of particular type, size, format, and colour), will be dispersed among several separate record–signs on the markup level. Information regarding the content, italicisation, boldfacing, or the colour of the sign will each be stored separately. In consequence, the end–user level and the markup level reflect two different approaches of thinking about the sign. Features of a particular sign on one level are represented as individual signs of equal importance on the other.

The nature of the sign on the markup level (e.g. in a HTML file) is best captured by terms such as: description, definition, dec-

laration, disposition – in relation to the sign and the text on the end-user level. Such signs define the type and the features of the document, its relations with other objects (links referring the users to the content of other websites), the composition of the website (organiser signs), as well as specify the content (semantic signs) and the style – the manner in which content signs are rendered on the end-user level (modifier signs). Features of the sign that we can see on the end-user level are described in different places on the markup level. It means that the representation of the sign displaying on the computer screen on the markup level is compound (Figure 2).




Figure 2

Another feature of the sign is its **semiotic aspect**, or, in other words, the particular manner in which the sign presents itself to our senses (as a textual element, an iconic element, as movement, sound, or a combination of the above). There are differences in how the semiotic aspect of the digital sign manifests itself on the end-user level and the markup level. On the level of markup language, when considering a particular markup language such as HTML, we are faced with a specific system of graphic signs: letters, numbers, and mathematical symbols. The aforementioned signs form specifications regarding the specific appearance of content on websites and the particular formatting of their textual elements. The final com-

position of graphical elements is the result of either the **grammar of the markup language** (e.g., the rule that opening tags should appear before their corresponding closing tags or the rules of tag nesting, which govern the order of introducing opening and closing tags with specific markup instructions) or the best practice of striving to achieve the maximum transparency of markup – i.e. the **pragmatics of the markup language**. The semiotics and semantics of the sign and the text on the level of markup code function as meta characteristics – they refer to the sign (and the text) on the end–user level.

The semantic aspect of the sign and the text refers to their denotative and connotative functions. The meaning of the sign and the text on the level of HTML language is fulfilled by their syntactic behavior – i.e. the relation that both enter into with their corresponding signs and texts on the computer screen. On the level of markup code, signs perform a metatextual function and either declare the document type or define particular textual elements – i.e. the content and composition of textual material. Within an HTML file, tags can be defined as arbitrary signs – functioning in accordance with the particular conventions of the HTML markup language, which was created by Tim Berners–Lee and Dave Raggett in the last decade of the 20th century. Each HTML tag is paired with a single specific instruction with regard to the composition of text on the end–user level. For example, the `^{` `}` tags indicate that the textual content enclosed between them should be rendered in superscript, the `<code>` `</code>` tags indicate that the enclosed textual content should be rendered in a monospaced font, and the `<u>` `</u>` tags indicate that the enclosed textual content should be underlined.

In contrast with text on the end–user level, text on the level of markup code is unambiguous and strictly devoted to defining and rendering textual content in web browsers. On this level, however, such meanings–specifications are not intended for the recipients

of and participants in culture themselves. Instead, these meanings–specifications are directed toward another level (software), where such instructions are interpreted in accordance with preset rules. In other words, on this level there is no interpretative freedom. Rather, the act of interpretation on this level is reduced to the mere act of automatic transposition (processing); the act of deciphering signs which are understandable to the web developers alone into signs legible to all end–users. It is just on this final level that the sign and the text enter the domain of social perception and cultural reception; and open themselves up for interpretation through their mediation.

Signs which refer to formatting specifications or metatextual information are not the sole domain of digital culture. In the world of traditional text, such digital signs and specifications have their equivalents in annotation signs, which instruct the readers to divert their attention to other parts of the text, as well as the annotations themselves and the works cited section, which both refer the reader out of the present text – to other texts. The act of referral is made possible due to readers’ knowledge on the structure of texts, which readers gain in the course of familiarizing themselves with the textual medium (as well as in the course of their education). On the other hand, punctuation marks, which define each text segment as a declarative sentence, a question, or a quote, could be considered the equivalent of metatextual digital signs.

Digital technologies alter the existing features of the sign (e.g., a sign’s material character, the methods of its presentation, and its meaning) and their mutual relations. One does not need to look further than the sign’s **material character** for evidence of this alteration. Digital signs do not resort to natural matter as their media of choice (like sculptures, for which the media of choice is stone or wood), nor do they resort to technologically processed matter (like written language, which requires paper). Digital signs do not choose a particular material anchor on the basis of their specific

character (whether its iconic, acoustic, or textual). Instead, digital signs dismiss matter, which would constitute their **physicality**, altogether.

Although the various sign systems within traditional media relied on different kinds of matter, digital text itself on the level of markup code depends on **immaterial** signs (**immaterial matter**). Signs of the same kind are used irrespective of whether or not the signs' recipients will encounter text, see static or animated pictures, or hear sounds on the end-user level. Immaterial matter (electromagnetic beams, 0–1 mathematical code, or computer data storage) is common to all semiotic forms of digital signs. In consequence, mixing and combining statements dependent on different methods of representation has never been easier and what has been thus far considered to be different semiospheres in fact comprises a single digital semiosphere. This particular characteristic of the digital sign is in turn responsible for another: namely the fact that the digital sign is easily modifiable and receptive to change on both the markup level and the end-user level.

Messages visible on a computer screen are not permanently bound to a material object. A single computer screen is capable of displaying millions of texts one after another without ever becoming bound permanently to any one of them. Considering that before the onset of digital culture texts were in fact **textual objects**, or, in other words, texts embedded in objects, this feature of digital texts marks an essential departure from the past. Before the development of digital culture objects were the medium and storage of texts: sculptures (stone or wood carved into a text), paintings (paint over canvas or wood), books (bound sheets of paper with handwritten or printed text). Culture irrevocably altered the allegiance and function of matter. It transformed natural matter into textual matter.

Each digital sign has its representation within at least two basic discourses: **the discourse of computer science** and **the discourse**

of social communication. Signs from the discourse of mathematics (like the aforementioned parenthesis mark) and signs from the discourse of the humanities are not the same in kind (although both can be the same in appearance). However, when it comes to digital communication, the sign on the end-user level (contributing to the discourse of social communication) and the sign on the level of markup (contributing to the discourse of computer science) are in fact **one and the same thing – the digital sign** (although varied on each level in terms of representation, meaning, and function). For example, an on-screen horizontal line for separating textual content corresponds to the `<hr>` tag in the source HTML file. In both cases we are dealing with the representation of a horizontal line, although this representation is iconic on the end-user level (a visible horizontal line) and alphabetical-algebraic on the level of HTML code. Furthermore, both representations also differ in terms of their functions: the function of the on-screen line is to separate textual content, whereas the function of its corresponding HTML tag is to indicate that a horizontal line should be rendered on the user's computer screen (in the user's web browser).

In the digital realm, text-sign-discourse relations become even more complicated. The sign becomes ambiguous with regards to its being as a result of the linking function. The linked sign is at the same time a semantic unit (like in traditional text), a syntactic unit (the sign indicates relations with other signs and texts), and an intermediary unit – it connects and often also transports data from one text and discourse to another. In consequence, the sign implicates itself into different texts, as well as implicates the texts themselves into different discourses. The recognition of different levels leads to the creation of a new polysystem (a multi-discursive system).

Digital technologies are tools of transmuting textual forms and structures thus far implemented in separate discourses or media. They provide both a tool and a space for the **restructuring**

of text and discourse – creating recombined textual, generic, and discursive forms, for remediation (that is defined as “mediation of mediation”⁴. Computer Role Playing Games, which adapt literary and film narrative structures, might serve as a good example here. The assimilation of texts and digital discourses to already existing ones (e.g. a website which implies the continuation of a traditional paper book, the introduction of animation which imitates turning pages, the website design of digital libraries which iconically alludes to traditional libraries) function as a familiarisation of the new medium, an attenuation of conversion from one technology to another – from the technology of print to digital technology. Jay David Bolter and Diane Gromala ask:

Why design a news and information Web site to look like a newspaper? Because a newspaper is still seen as the “natural” way to present news. . Put a story in a multiple-column format with headlines and by lines, and people will regard it as news(...)⁵.

Above all, however, they semanticise the message, they take part in creating meanings. As such, they are an example of the new approach to text organisation, in which meanings are co-created not only in a polisemiotic or interactive way, but most importantly, in a multi-discursive manner, where a textualisation of media tools takes place, as was the case with the text-creating function of the interface.

These modifications prove that technology is not only a means, but also a manner of experiencing, and as such has a creative character. The reinterpretation of identity of literature in digital media can be confirmation of this true. As Roberto Simanowski observes,

⁴ J.D. Bolter, R. Grusin, *Remediation. Understanding New Media*, The MIT Press, Cambridge-London 2000, p. 55–61.

⁵ J.D. Bolter, D. Gromala, *Windows and Mirrors. Interaction Design*, in: *Digital Art, and the Myth of Transparency*, The MIT Press, Cambridge-London 2005, p. 92.

“In digital media, literature is digital in a double sense; it uses a small set of distinct, endlessly combinable symbols, and those symbols are now produced by binary code. The first sense of digitality refers to the semiotic paradigm of the material (the distinct units), the second sense of digitality refers to the operational paradigm of the medium (the binary code as basis for all data in digital media). If we agree on the criterion that digital technology is used for aesthetics, not just for presentation, then being digital in this double sense is not enough to be considered “digital literature”. Or actually, I should say: that’s one “digital” too many, because using the old system of symbols in a new medium only creates literature in digital media, but not digital literature”⁶.

CONCLUSION

Signs, texts, and discourses are closely interrelated. The sign is the basic meaning-making building block of text, its structure is analogous to the structure of the text itself. Both, in turn, are dependent on discourse – both participate in discourse and both contribute to its creation. Moreover, both require communication media – technologies which allow for their existence. Due to the aforementioned interrelations, each change to one of the elements prompts changes to all other elements as well. This also applies to the identity of the digital text as well – an identity which remains in a transient state, borrows from other sources, exists in a hybrid manner, and is created with the use of dynamically-evolving digital technologies, which change the identities of signs, discourses, and media.

⁶ R. Simanowski, *What is and Toward What End Do We Read Digital Literature?*, in: *Literary Art in Digital Performance. Case Studies in New Media Art and Criticism*, ed. F.J.Ricardo, Continuum, New York-London 2009, p. 13.

III.

IDENTITY AND SIMILARITY
IN LITERATURE

АЛЕКСАНДР ПАНОВ

ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ ХУДОЖЕСТВЕННОГО
ДИСКУРСА
КАК ПРОБЛЕМА ЛИТЕРАТУРОВЕДЕНИЯ

Обычно литературоведы редко задаются вопросом об объекте своих исследований. Ведь еще в названии научной дисциплины содержится определение того, что будет изучаться, а именно – самой литературы. Но литература, чье название, кстати, тоже определено не вполне четко, будучи явлением сложным, довольно многолика и обладает разными формами проявления. Этим и объясняются самые разные подходы к ее изучению, ведущие, на самом деле, к обособлению разных по своей сути объектов исследования. В свое время объектом литературоведческого интереса являлась психология творчества, позже – познавательные возможности литературы, а в дальнейшем – сам принцип литературности, исторические изменения поэтики, структура текста, поведение читателя, социологические аспекты бытия литературного произведения и т.д. И, в зависимости от выбранного объекта исследования, выявлялись те аспекты довольно сложного явления «художественная словесность», которые составляли будто бы фундамент его сущности.

Замена одного объекта исследования другим часто вызвана появлением какого-либо вопроса, способного перевернуть

картину художественности, созданную очередной попыткой объяснить литературу, основываясь на том или ином отдельно взятом ее аспекте. Наше поколение формировалось в те времена, когда основным объектом литературоведческого изучения являлся текст с его составляющими: структурой, принципами построения, взаимодействием между формирующими текст знаковыми единицами и т.д. Все, что находилось за пределами текста, было не только незначительным, оно на самом деле просто не существовало. Стоило анализатору только попытаться обосновать какой-либо свой вывод примерами из социального *бытия* произведения, как его сразу ставили на место возражением «Этого в тексте нет!». И дискуссия тут же прекращалась. Все это продолжалось до тех пор, пока непослушный андерсеновский ребенок Арнольд Лийферт не задал совершенно простой вопрос «А чему служит литература?»¹ С другой стороны, влияние теории текста было все еще настолько велико, что подзаголовок его эссе снова приводил к идее текстуальности – «Литературный текст как событие».

Лийферт не литературовед в строгом смысле этого слова, но его идея легла в основу одного из фундаментов появившегося в это время направления рецептивной эстетики. Об этом говорит название одной из основополагающих книг школы – «Текст как действие» Карлхайнца Штирле.² А от идеи рассматривать текст как действие до потребности изменить объект исследования – всего один шаг, поскольку, как говорит сам Штирле, текст может характеризоваться когерентностью, повторяемостью и связанностью содержащихся в нем языковых средств и отнюдь не участием в социальной практике. С другой стороны, по мнению Штирле, проводимое Ф. де Соссюром разграничение между *langue* и *parole* не является достаточным

¹ Liefert, Arnold. „Wozu Literatur. Der literarische Text als Geschеhnis“. In: Liefert, Arnold. *Essays & Aufsätze*. 2008.

² Stierle, Karlhainz. *Text als Handlung*. München, Fink, 1975.

основанием для того, чтобы доказать общественный характер речевого действия, которое Ф. де Соссюр определяет как преимущественно индивидуальную реализацию субъективного сознания говорящего. В целях учета факта внешней нормативной стабилизации и институциональной ситуативности отдельного высказывания, Штирле вводит понятие дискурса, формулируя его как речь в общественном пространстве.³ Но в этом пространстве речевое действие не могло бы существовать, если бы его не воспринимали как конкретизацию какой-либо существующей уже дискурсивной схемы. Как раз существование подобной схемы за каждым конкретным дискурсом придает высказыванию идентичность. Это так, поскольку текст, представляя собой языковое единство, обладает именно когерентностью, а не идентичностью. В то же время как раз идентичность может внести стабильность в конкретный социальный смысл речевого действия, отличая его от всех остальных возможных смыслов, которыми потенциально обладает знаковая структура текста.

Проблема идентичности дискурса является фундаментальной для того, чтобы понять художественное произведение как вид социального действия, так как только формированием четко выстроенной структуры знаков, какую представляет собой текст, можно идентифицировать его смысл по отношению к какому-либо определенному контексту. В качестве примера Штирле приводит юридическую практику древних римлян, считавших, что завещание приобретает силу закона только в случае, если при помощи свидетелей можно выделить всего один возможный контекст. В нашем случае, однако, проблема в том, что художественная словесность по сути своей исключает возможность существования одного единственного контек-

³ Stierle, Karlhainz. „Identität des Gedichts. Hölderlin als Paradigma“. In: *Identität. Poetik und Hermeneutik VIII*. München, Fink, 1979, S. 508.

ста. Художественный дискурс, как правило, непосредственно не связан с коммуникативной ситуацией, закодированной в находящейся за ним дискурсивной схеме, и по этой причине отношение «индивидуальное высказывание – дискурсивная схема» становится весьма проблематичным.

Понятие «идентичность» ведет свое начало от теории логики и, в основном, означает совпадение двух самостоятельных единиц: $A = A'$. В условиях речевого общения это означает, что все основные аспекты в структуре индивидуального высказывания будут совпадать с требованиями существующей уже в коммуникативной практике дискурсивной схемы. А она обязательно должна задавать параметры коммуникативной ситуации, включающие в себя характеристику субъектов высказывания, время, место, точку зрения, отношение между хронотопом описываемого действия и хронотопом высказывания, отношение речевого действия к референтной реальности, а также возможность речевым действием, символическим по своей сущности, оказывать воздействие на реальный мир. Вот почему любой художественный текст построен так, чтобы по его прочтению можно было реконструировать возможный дискурс, который бы поставил смысловой потенциал знаковой структуры в парадигму какой-нибудь дискурсивной схемы. А это, в свою очередь, содействовало бы реализации заложенного в дискурсивную интенцию социального действия, бывающего в одно и то же время, и символическим, и реальным.

Но проблема в том, что художественность начинается с акта нарушения прямой связи между фактической коммуникативной ситуацией, переросшей в определенную дискурсивную схему, и дискурсивной структурой специфического языкового явления, названного нами художественным произведением. В определенном смысле, художественный дискурс одновременно содержит в себе и дискурсивные и антидискурсивные тенденции. В отличие от фактических дискурсов прагматической

речи, характеризующихся тем, что каждый элемент структуры высказывания следует требованиям дискурсивной схемы, структура художественного дискурса отличается множеством элементов, чья функция непосредственно не связана с конкретной коммуникативной ситуацией, но играет особую роль в реализации художественного акта. В качестве примера мы могли бы привести ритм и, вообще, организацию стиха. С точки зрения истории, введение ритмически организованной речи связано, с одной стороны, с необходимостью вывести данное высказывание из потока обыденной речи, придавая ему особый статус, и, с другой, с потребностью облегчить его запоминание и сохранить его в коллективной памяти таким, каким именно оно и является. Впоследствии, функции ритмической организации расширяются по мере ее вхождения в аспекты дискурса, не имеющие отношения к коммуникативной его зависимости: смыслообразование, организация системы смыслопорождающих повторений, в том числе контрастов и т.д. Иными словами, ритмическая организация становится элементом когерентной структуры текста и выходит за пределы схем дискурсивной организации.

Практическим следствием этой неустановленности дискурсивной идентичности художественной словесности является возможность генерирования не одного, а гораздо большего числа дискурсов. И здесь речь идет не об обычной нестабильности смысла и многозначности разных индивидуальных прочтений, а о реализации разных по своей сути дискурсов, превращающих один и тот же текст в несколько совершенно разных произведений.

Рассмотрим несколько примеров.

История о том, как ветхозаветный царь Соломон рассудил двух блудниц, описана в третьей главе Третьей книги Царств и она довольно популярна. Попытаемся проанализировать рассказ, учитывая три разные по своему характеру дискурсивные

схемы. Первая из них отвечает требованиям непосредственного речевого общения. Допустим, речь идет о реально случившемся событии, о котором рассказывает кто-то из свидетелей. В этом случае, конечно, на передний план выступит сугубо *информативная* функция речевого действия – превратить необычное событие в достояние как можно большего числа слушателей. Но, поскольку событие на самом деле необычное, то и рассказ о нем очень скоро перешел бы в парадигму другой дискурсивной схемы – *рассказа-воспоминания о памятном событии*. Это так, поскольку социальная функция данного дискурса в значительной степени отличается от функции простого рассказа-информации. Ведь бывают события, которые стоит сохранить в коллективной памяти, чтобы они служили примером для людей и были их ценностным ориентиром.

Именно эта функция и явилась ведущей в тот момент, когда непосредственный рассказ очевидца был перенесен в структуру библейского повествования. Значительная часть Книг Ветхого Завета ставит перед собой именно такую задачу – сохранить историю еврейского народа, поскольку она лежит в основе идеологического сплава общества и объединяет его основной сюжетной линией, повествующей об отношениях Бога и его народа: о сотворении, первом завете, забытом завете, спасении и т.д. Наряду с этим, однако, включенный в структуру конкретной главы Третьей Книги Царств рассказ о необычной мудрости царя Соломона-судьи становится частью другого отношения: им библейский повествователь хотел проиллюстрировать определенный, сугубо идеологический постулат: главное в жизни не богатство и сила, а мудрость, непосредственно вытекающая из упования человека на Бога. Так же как Иосиф, брошенный братьями в глубокий ров, поднимается и становится вторым человеком в египетском царстве благодаря своему упованию на Бога и полученной от него мудрости, и Соломон в первые же дни своего царствования молит бога

дать ему одну только мудрость. В этом контексте рассказ о необычном суде превращается в доказательство идеологического постулата, т.е. в *экземплум* – дискурс, обладающий функцией, совершенно иной по сравнению с функцией рассказа-воспоминания о памятном событии. Рассказ-экземплум указывает на то, как надо решать экзистенциальные загадки человеческого бытия и таким образом принимает функцию мифологического повествования, подобного тому об Эдипе, разгадывающем загадку Сфинкса. И, если мы продолжим следить за двумя рассказами – об Эдипе и Соломоне, то убедимся в том, что они развиваются в несколько необычной параллели: как бы мудры оба они ни были, что доказывается успешно пройденным испытанием загадкой, двое легендарных царей не смогли избежать падения – им не хватило мудрости, чтобы узреть основной закон бытия. Эдип сумел разгадать заранее заложенный в загадку ответ, но не сумел постичь предопределение судьбы и поэтому в конце был вынужден лишить себя зрения. Соломон же забыл, что мудрость его не его же заслуга, а дана ему богом, и, пренебрегая им, он практически разрушил свое царство, которое сам укрепил благодаря именно этой мудрости.

Функция экземпляра становится ведущей, когда тот же самый рассказ входит в структуру драматургической притчи Брехта «Кавказский меловой круг». Спор двух колхозов о плодородной долине очень похож на спор блудниц о том, чьим является живой ребенок. И вполне естественно то, что мудрый старый певец пытается объяснить сущность конфликта, ссылаясь на древний сюжет о мудром суде ветхозаветного царя. На этом, однако, схожесть кончается. Потому что целостный контекст, в основе которого лежит знакомый сюжет, совершенно иной. На месте Соломона, наделенного мудростью за свое упование на бога, мы видим мелочного люмпена Аздака, сумевшего обманом и небольшой долей удачи дорваться до роли судьи, чей девиз: «Я беру!» Можем ли мы

ожидать, что такой человек сумеет прозреть глубокую правду жизни и справедливо отсудит спорного ребенка не родившей его матери, а той женщине, которая спасла его от испытаний и вырастила его? По-видимому, здесь надо преодолевать инерцию двух, глубоко засевших в ментальности людей предрассудков: что ребенок всегда принадлежит родной матери и что люмпену, взяточнику, недостойному человеку никогда не подняться до настоящей человеческой и божественной мудрости и справедливости. Но получается так, что вызов, неожиданно брошенный Аздаку, сотворил чудо и мелкий взяточник превратился в мудреца, превосходящего даже ветхозаветного царя Соломона, поскольку он не только постиг путь к истине, но и почувствовал, что истина не всегда в утвержденных стереотипах мышления. Иначе говоря, история о мудром суде не может быть только экземплумом, доказывающим идеологический постулат, в котором произведение пытается нас убедить. Она уже превращается в *казус* – жанр словесной культуры, который задается целью спровоцировать способность реципиента оценивать факты и находить верные решения. В этом, впрочем, и состоит основной художественный принцип Бертольта Брехта и созданного им неаристотелевского театра, а именно – преодолевать иллюстративность искусства и превращать его в вызов.

Мы увидели, как один и тот же рассказ, состоящий из одних и тех же элементов текстовой структуры и поставленный в разные контексты, не только меняет свой смысл, но и реализуется при помощи разных дискурсивных схем. Эти схемы требуют разного типа поведения реципиента и, соответственно, реализуют разные по своей сути социальные функции: рассказа-информации о необычном событии, рассказа-воспоминания о памятном событии, экземплума, иллюстрирующего определенный идеологический тезис, и казуса, заставляющего реципиента переоценить существующие

идеологические догмы. Можно ли говорить об идентичности этих дискурсов, если основные параметры повествования, в том числе и параметры коммуникации, совпадают друг с другом? И действительно ли совпадение отдельных элементов повествования настолько бесспорно? Да, на уровне формы, наверное, так оно и есть, но, что касается сущности, совпадения все-таки нет. Потому что, как правильно отмечает Штирле, идентичность определенного действия постигается посредством идентичности действующего лица, формирующего идентичность своей роли посредством того же действия.⁴ В то же время реализуемые при помощи информации, воспоминания, экземплума и казуса повествовательные и рецептивные действия довольно разные, чтобы можно было говорить об идентичности действующих лиц.

Здесь мы представили случай, в котором рассказ о событии может формировать несколько разных по своей структуре и социальной функции дискурсов. И все-таки, когда речь идет о рассказе, требования к структуре языкового выражения не такие высокие – язык в значительной мере свободен. Иначе обстоят дела с поэтически организованной речью. Возможно ли, чтобы лирический текст, нередко обладающий виртуозной организацией языкового выражения, вошел в разные дискурсивные парадигмы и в результате формировал разные дискурсы? Было бы интересно узнать, реализуются ли совершенно идентичные по структуре тексты в несовпадающих в функциональном плане дискурсивных схемах. Каким бы ни парадоксальным не выглядело это предположение, подобная трансгрессия вполне осуществима. Еще Цветан Тодоров в своем введении в «Жанры дискурса» доказал, что связь между функциональным и структурным аспектами возникает не по необходимо-

⁴ Stierle, Karlhainz. „Identität des Gedichts. Hölderlin als Paradigma“. In: *Identität. Poetik und Hermeneutik VIII*. München, Fink, 1979, S. 509.

сти, т.е. одна определенная функция реализуется не в одной только единственной структуре.⁵

В болгарской литературе существует в этом отношении очень характерный пример – поэзия Христо Ботева. Несмотря на то, что его стихотворения сегодня воспринимаются как литература, при чтении которой естественное читательское поведение – виртуальная реконструкция определенного, заложенного в структуру текста фикционального дискурса, их бытие не всегда было таким. Во время их написания, а и довольно долго после этого, эти стихотворения существовали в общественном пространстве прежде всего как песни, подчиняющиеся фольклорной парадигме анонимного песенного творчества, или как специфические ритуальные действия (в форме песни или чтения наизусть), активно участвующие в разных общественных событиях. В большинстве случаев текст остается почти идентичным тому тексту, который спровоцировал возникновение фикционального дискурса. В случае разных дискурсов, однако, не все элементы структуры текста имели бы одинаковое значение. В одних случаях – определенные элементы играли бы более важную роль, чем другие. В других – даже дискурсивная схема могла бы целиком измениться, не вызывая при этом существенного изменения языковой формы. Это наблюдается, например, при построении коммуникативной ситуации в текстах Ботева, функционирующих как песни или как письменно зафиксированные и воспринимаемые индивидуальным чтением стихотворения.

В сущности, кто говорит в стихотворениях Ботева, исполняемых в режиме анонимного фольклорного пения? В письменном варианте текстов мы обычно встречаемся с субъектом, называющим себя «я» и в нашем сознании именно он ведет повествование, ему принадлежат речевая активность и интенция. В плане, анонимного фольклорного песнопения, однако,

⁵ Todorov, Tz., *Les genres du discours*. Paris, 1978. p. 8.

это невозможно. Здесь в качестве носителя речевой активности выступает неизвестный «повествователь», чье повествование включает в себя диалог героев независимо от того, является ли этот диалог двусторонним, каков, например, он в поэме «Гайдуки» («Хайдуги»), или предполагаемым, как в стихотворении «Матери» («Майце си»). Так или иначе, тот, кто называет себя «я», уже не субъект художественного выражения, а объект изображения, каким объектом является и само его слово. Он оказывается в роли обычного героя, в принципе, равнозначного всем остальным. Это, кстати, признак фольклорной песни, вообще, поскольку именно в ней очень часто наблюдается совпадение речи повествующего с речью самого героя.⁶

Последствия этой «объективизации» лирического «Я» довольно серьезные. «Я» теряет не только свое привилегированное положение владетеля слова (основной признак индивидуально-творческой художественной системы), но и принципиальную позицию «внеаходимости» по отношению к описываемой ситуации. Оно остается внутри этой ситуации, что существенно меняет его точку зрения и влияет на образ мира, представленного в произведении. Но надо еще кое-что отметить. Тот факт, что слово не является чьей-нибудь индивидуальной собственностью, делает его «общим», циркулирующим в открытом пространстве всей дискурсивной вселенской общности, что, в принципе делает его незаконченным. Песню можно видоизменять, сокращать и продолжать, и это отнюдь не осознается как недопустимое вмешательство в чью-либо индивидуальную речевую интенцию. Ведь интенция тоже общая. Как нам известно, певцы без промедления воспользовались этим своим имманентным правом и доставили немало хлопот будущим текстологам.

⁶ ср. **Георгиев, Никола.** *Българската народна песен. Изобразителни принципи, строеж, единство.* София, изд. „Наука и изкуство“, 1976 г.

Вполне противоположной оказывается ситуация с лирическим выступающим в случае функционирования этих же текстов в виде фикционального литературного дискурса. В подобной ситуации позиция выступающего не только не совпадает с позицией «хора», но и проявляется как позиция яркой индивидуальности, не отличающейся от позиции действующего или переживающего героя. Он же, со своей стороны, совсем как в произведениях романтизма, находится в «оппозиции» толпе, выступая в роли героя с периферии – изгнанника или бунтовщика, чей основной порыв – отвергнуть существующее статукво.

Что касается существования этих текстов в форме ритуального действия, там позиция говорящего не очень четко определена. С одной стороны, это позиция яркой индивидуальности, правда, не такой уникальной и внемерной, как у романтического героя, с другой, это позиция авторитета, передаваемая, обычно, статусной ролью певца, пророка или насмешника. Факт, что ритуальное слово принадлежит трагически погибшему за свободу отечества поэту-революционеру, особенно значим для воздействия произведений Ботева в качестве ритуального слова.

Эти три разных по своей сути проявления говорящего в рамке дискурса вызывают соответствующие позиции воспринимающего субъекта. В случае анонимного пения позиция реципиента (в то же время он проявляется как очередной исполнитель песни) полностью совпадает с позицией говорящего, поскольку оба они играют роль участников хора общности. При проявлении ритуальных действий происходит то, что Ханс-Роберт Яусс называет «ассоциативной идентификацией» – каждый участник ритуала может присоединить, ассоциировать себя с любой из ритуальных ролей. В этом и состоит основной механизм воздействия ритуального слова.⁷

⁷ **Jauff, H.-R.**, *Ästhetische Erfahrung und literarische Hermeneutik*. München, Fink, 1972.

В случае восприятия фикционального дискурса роль читателя сводится прежде всего к действиям, направленным на реконструкцию дискурса и основанным на коммуникативном, идеологическом, общественном и эмоциональном опыте реципиента. Таким образом произведение провоцирует процесс, подвергающий испытанию общепринятые стереотипы поведения и взгляды на жизнь. Этот процесс специфической художественной идентификации вызывает, со своей стороны, то, что названо Яуссом «эстетическим опытом».

Во всех рассмотренных случаях мы неизменно приходим к одному и тому же выводу, а именно, отличия дискурсивных схем друг от друга определяют идентичность конкретного речевого действия, а отсюда и особенности социальной функции художественного акта. Независимо от того, каким является дискурс – фикциональным или прагматическим – он всегда символичный, поскольку реализуется при помощи знаков и знаковых структур. Для того чтобы художественный дискурс перешел из мира символических в мир реальных действий, необходимо, чтобы и отправитель, и адресат строго следовали обязанностям, прописанным им дискурсивной схемой. В результате переноса поведения участников художественного акта в поведенческую парадигму из мира действий это самое поведение приобретает смысл. Именно эта особенность дискурсивного поведения лежит в основе социальной функции, выполняемой литературой. Вот почему изучение художественных дискурсов и способа, посредством которого они приобретают идентичность в мире символических действий и поведенческих парадигм, позволяет литературоведению добиться более адекватного понимания сущности и функционирования художественных произведений.

Сегодня, говоря о литературе и художественном дискурсе, мы чаще всего имеем в виду фикциональные дискурсы.

Очень большая часть произведений словесности не вписана, однако, в эту парадигму. Вот почему первый шаг, который нам следует сделать, – определить тип дискурса, в котором реализуется соответствующее произведение художественной словесности.

Являясь произведением культуры, художественный дискурс не может оставаться только в пределах прагматической речевой практики. Иначе говоря, любое произведение словесности не может реализоваться при помощи одного только прагматического дискурса. В то же время значительная часть этих произведений находится за пределами парадигмы сугубо фикциональных дискурсов. В них связь с реальной речевой и поведенческой ситуацией все еще ощутима, а часто и само произведение настаивает на своей связанности с непосредственной реальностью. Таков случай с фольклором. Все исследователи подчеркивают, что человек, связанный с фольклором, верит не только в достоверность описываемых в песне или сказке событий, но воспринимает и речь, реализующую художественный акт, как равнозначную, принципиально равнопоставленную с нормальной прагматической речью. Подобна же ситуация с литературными произведениями тех периодов, когда все еще полностью не была сформирована парадигма фикциональных дискурсов. Приведем в качестве примера поэзию Ивана Вазова. В его стихах очень часто лирический повествователь обращается к собеседнику, учитывая отношения во времени и пространстве обоих участников коммуникации, как это делается в условиях прагматической речи.

С другой стороны, дискурс песни, в которой голоса индивидуального исполнителя и «хора» всех возможных певцов сливаются, тоже не способствует построению дискурса фикционального типа. Они, конечно, символичны по своему характеру, а это означает, что, в какой–то степени тоже фикциональны,

но это вовсе не та фикциональность инсценированного дискурса, о которой говорит Райнер Варнинг.⁸

Иными словами, когда мы определяем идентичность какого-либо дискурсивного действия, недостаточно только наметить схему, парадигмы которой придерживается данное речевое поведение. Нужно еще определить отношения между прагматической и символической реальностями, с одной стороны, и с другой – характер взаимоотношений между миром прагматической коммуникации и тем, в чьей парадигме реализуется конкретное речевое действие. Проблема усложняется еще тем, что сама художественная деятельность уже обнаружила всю сложность отношений между разными типами дискурсивной идентичности и превратила их в художественное средство выражения. Наивная условность литературы девятнадцатого столетия, когда границы между фикциональным и нефикциональным миром еще не были четко определены, используется сегодня только в произведениях тривиальной литературы. Любое произведение, ставящее перед собой более высокие цели, стремится разорвать однозначность этой схемы и начинает сложную игру между разными уровнями фикциональности, непрерывно нарушая идентичность дискурсивных схем. Вот характерный пример:

Фильм Клода Лелуша «Смелость любить» (*Courage d'aimer*) начинается как обычное фикциональное повествование о встрече двух людей, связывающих профессиональную и личную судьбы. Спустя недолгое время, однако, пара распадается из-за интриг одного искусствителя и желания поддаться им женщины, вообразившей себе, что легче добьется желанного результата, если освободится от мужчины. В итоге, брошен-

⁸ **Warning** Reiner, „Das inszenierte Diskurs. Bemerkungen zur pragmatischen Relation der Fiktion“ in: *Funktionen der Fiktiven* (Poetik und Hermeneutik X) Hg. Dieter Henrich und Wolfgang Iser, München, Fink, 1983.

ный любовник, певец по профессии (роль исполняет Массимо Раньери) впадает в глубокую депрессию, породившую исключительно сильную песню «Смелость любить». Песня очень быстро становится хитом, а ее автор – самым успешным исполнителем года. Понятно, что песня выполняет роль, которую в структуре пьес Брехта выполняют музыкальные интермедии – комментировать изображаемое действие. Этим способом реализуется полностью тот эффект отчуждения, о котором говорит Брехт, и вся рассказанная здесь история теряет свою «аристотелевскую» непосредственность, характерную для условности первой степени. Выход из идентичности рассказа, однако, на этом не кончается. Поддавшаяся искушению героиня терпит крах и в результате тоже впадает в депрессию, результат которой – биографическая книга, повествующая об истории неудавшейся любви. Но книга попадает на глаза режиссера и им оказывается не кто иной, как сам Клод Лелуш во всей его биографической достоверности – режиссер сам исполняет собственную роль, рядом с ним его настоящая, из реальной жизни, супруга, он сам ведет переговоры с реально существующим литературным агентом и т.д. В то же время один из периферийных героев, на чьей функции мы тоже остановимся, изображает в одной из сцен попавшего в трудную ситуацию героя. Оказывается, его биография полностью повторяет реальную биографию исполнителя роли – итальянского певца Массимо Раньери. Между прочим, героя фильма тоже зовут Массимо. Таким образом граница между фикциональной и непосредственной реальностью становится очень расплывчатой. Провокация, однако, продолжается. Режиссер Льюш решает экранизировать книгу, написанную героиней-предательницей, но убежден, что именно она и ее брошенный любовник удачнее всех исполнят в фильме свои фикциональные роли. В ряде сцен зритель в зале с трудом разбирается в том, в какой именно условной парадигме происходит тот или иной эпизод – в фик-

циональной реальности экранного повествования или во время съемок. Сами герои тоже теряются в зыбком пространстве между своей «реальной» и экранной жизнью. В итоге, героиня доходит до предела своего отчаяния и лишает себя жизни. Таким образом, будто придуманная реальность неожиданно приводит к вполне реальным последствиям в жизни участников сюжета.

Чтобы добиться, однако, художественного эффекта, нужно сделать так, чтобы на изображаемое действие можно было посмотреть со стороны. Это условие, как доказывает М.М. Бахтин, является обязательным для любого искусства.⁹ Но как в этом узле разных уровней повествовательной условности, дополненной кроме непрерывно звучащих песен еще эффектом отчуждения, мы могли бы обнаружить так необходимый ракурс постороннего взгляда? Ведь любая составляющая действия, несмотря на уровень условности, каким-то образом помогает зрителю осмыслить все остальные составляющие. Иначе говоря, любая точка зрения является одновременно взглядом снаружи и взглядом изнутри.

В этом случае мы сталкиваемся с явлением, напоминающим описанное Ю. М. Лотманом в статье о семиосфере.¹⁰ По мнению автора, семиосфера представляет собой семиотический универсум, в котором сходятся разные семиотические акты. Сразу после выхода статьи в свет этот взгляд поставил совершенно резонный вопрос – раз семиосфера есть универсум, то с какой точки зрения можно было бы ее осознать и определить. Согласно теории М. М. Бахтина эта точка зрения должна находиться снаружи, но что находится вне универсума? Единственный возможный ответ предложили полушутя уче-

⁹ Бахтин М. М., «Автор и герой в эстетической деятельности». В: Бахтин М. М. *Эстетика словесного творчества*. М. 1986 г.

¹⁰ Лотман, Ю. М., «О семиосфере». В: *Труды по знаковым системам* 17, Тарту, 1984 г.

ники Юрия Михайловича – Господь Бог. Сталкиваясь с этой же проблемой, Клод Лелуш полушутя-полусерьез решил ввести в переплетение дискурсивных реальностей именно фигуру Бога. Один бог все знает – впереди и позади во времени и пространстве, только его точка зрения может в какой-то степени упорядочить разнонаправленное повествование, протекающее в нескольких отдаленных друг от друга реальностях. В этом режиссеру помогло открытие Кшиштофа Кесьлёвского, который в один из фильмов своего «Декалога» вводит странного персонажа – молодого мужчину, сидящего на берегу озера вблизи дома, где разворачивается трагическая коллизия действия, и будто направляющего невидимой рукой поступки героев и ход ситуации. У Кесьлёвского образ бога подчеркнуто статичен и вовсе не вмешивается в ход происходящих событий, в то время как у Лелуша он намного активнее. Действительно, он и здесь прежде всего наблюдатель, но время от времени комментирует происходящее, дает информацию о том или ином герое, а также не забывает напомнить о себе: Я бог. Хотя и конципированная как иронический контрапункт, эта фигура нужна экранному рассказу для того, чтобы стала понятнее повествовательная перспектива и чтобы можно было провести грань между разными уровнями фикциональной и псевдореальной идентичности экранного действия, с одной стороны, и разными дискурсивными актами, при помощи которых фильм повествует о случившемся, с другой. Будучи богом, этот образ может быть воспринят и как заместитель судьбы, управляющей жизнью человека, но прямо не вмешивающейся в нее. Отсюда идет и одно из внушений фильма: судьба человека – результат его собственных поступков.

Приведенные примеры были подобраны так, чтобы могли проиллюстрировать разные аспекты проблемы роли дискурсивной идентичности в реализации художественного акта. В первом случае речь шла об изменении жанровой парадигмы, в

которой реализуется один и тот же рассказ, и в итоге – о переменах в единой стратегии воздействия и социальной функции дискурса. Во втором случае мы проследили за тем, как один и тот же текст, находясь в разных модусах своего социального бытия, меняет до неузнаваемости дискурсивную схему, посредством которой художественный акт реализуется, выполняя разные социальные функции. В третьем случае речь шла об этапах художественного развития, при котором идентичность дискурса колеблется между непосредственным участием в социальной и коммуникативной прагматике, с одной стороны, и условностями фикционального дискурса, с другой стороны. В четвертом случае мы столкнулись с использованием разных дискурсивных идентичностей, служащих средством выражения, выявления смысла и воздействия художественного произведения. Иными словами, вопрос об идентичности дискурса и ее значении для протекания художественного акта, а отсюда и для социальной функции художественной словесности, имеет исключительно широкие параметры проявления. По этой причине его значение для литературоведческой интерпретации исключительно большое, и стоит ему посвятить немало усилий – не меньше тех усилий, которые посвящены изучению текстовых структур.

DARIN TENEV

UNIQUENESS AND IDENTITY
OF THE LITERARY WORK

Since the 1970-ies it has become a common place for the domain of literary studies to question the identity of the literary work. In the mid-1980-ies a collection of theoretical essays under the title *Identity of the Literary Text* (ed. Mario Valdes and Owen Miller, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) to which authors such as Jonathan Culler, Paul Ricoeur, Wolfgang Iser, Hans Robert Jauss, Michael Riffaterre and J. Hillis Miller contributed, raised the question “whether or not the notion of identity itself can any longer be held to be a meaningful category applied to the literary text” (p.ix) and in the preface Owen Miller went as far as to say that the view “that textual identity, in the sense of the recovery of the determinate meaning, has been shattered” is a “consensus view” (p.xix). None of the essays in the book gives any simple answer and all of them, in one way or another, concurred that identity is not something given, something immediate, and that texts in one way or another resisted with dispersion and elusiveness the identity prescribed to them.

And yet, how is it that when we talk about a work¹, say Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, even if we disagree on every point regarding the text, it would seem that we are still referring to the *same* work? How is it that it would seem to be the same work even if it disagrees, so to speak, with itself? (Let me give you a somewhat misleading example. In *Hamlet's* first folio (from 1623, based on the Second Quarto from 1605) we read the famous monologue: "To be or not to be, – that is the question: – / Whether 'tis Nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,/ Or to take arms against a sea of troubles..." (etc.), while in the First Quarto from 1603 we read: "To be or not to be, Aye there's the point,/ To Die, to sleep, is that all? Aye, all:/ No, to sleep, to dream, Aye Mary, there it goes.")

I will try to propose in a very schematic way a hypothesis, one that I am very uncertain about, which will take as a departure point a critique of Kripke's notion of naming. (*Naming and Necessity*, Cambridge: Harvard, 1980) The reason for choosing Kripke is that with his theory of the name he tries to see how an identity is fixed "across all possible worlds" (p. 47), or in all possible states of this world. (Kripke stresses the fact that he does not understand the possible worlds as distant planets or foreign countries (see for exam. pp.43–45) but as different states of the same world.)

Kripke describes the name as rigid designator and he defines rigid designator as the designator that "in every possible world [...] designates the same object". (p. 48) Names are what supports

¹ To speak of "work" is already an idealization. As I will try to show, the idealization is based on the naming that the "work" "itself" makes possible. In other words, the work is nameable. On the one hand, the work is nameable, and on the other, there is an act of naming. These are the two unpredictable and non-predetermined possibilities of the literary work inscribed in it as its other.

transworld identification. This claim is played out against David K. Lewis's view that there can't be real transitivity when we speak of possible worlds since the identity, and here D. Lewis is closer to Leibniz than Kripke, won't be the same identity in a different world. Lewis speaks of counterparts and similarities between the entities and not of transworld identity. (On Lewis, see Kripke, p. 45n13) The problem with Kripke's solution is that it presupposes what it had to prove, namely the identity the name as rigid designator is designating. And this is most obvious when he concedes to Lewis's notion of "counterpart" precisely when he discusses the problem of problematic identity relation, his most telling example being "For example, if various parts of a table are replaced, is it the same table?" (p.51) Only to the extent that we do not put identity in question the name would serve as a rigid designator in Kripke's sense. However if even in *this* world an identity is problematic then not only names as rigid designators won't fix the reference across all possible worlds but they won't fix the identity of the reference even in this world. *The possibilities already traverse this (actual) world.* The things around us in general, and all the more the literary works bear non-predetermined possibilities within them. In this sense, the counterpart relation introduced by D. Lewis seems to be more to the point and yet I think that his notion of similarity or resemblance should be radicalized. What is at stake here is not the resemblance between one given entity (in the actual world) and its counterpart (in some possible world) but the resemblance of the entity with itself. The thing resembles itself. That the thing resembles itself means that there is no model or original preceding it, no model or original whose resemblance it would be, beside itself. (On the resemblance preceding the model and originary mimesis I would refer to Blanchot's *L'espace littéraire*, Derrida's *De la grammatologie* and *La dissémination*, Lacoue-Labarthe's *Typographie*, and Jean-Luc Nancy's "L'imagination masquée".) That the thing resembles itself would mean for us to think resemblance not

starting with identity but the other way around, and therefore to link resemblance with difference.

The work resembles itself – it has no identity that precedes this resemblance and we have to speak not of identity of the original, but of its difference with itself. In its turning to itself the work precedes itself and this is the way it inscribes in itself (before there is something like “self” or “itself”) possibilities that are not pre-determined, the possibility for ever new, unexpected and not-predetermined readings.

In its resemblance with itself the work becomes nameable. When it turns to itself the work marks itself, marks the resemblance that it is. The mark itself is not individual, it is infinitely divisible.² It is because of this that the work becomes nameable. This is the way that opens the work towards a speech act that will name it.

The name fixes not an identity in the actual world (and across all possible worlds) but a particular side of the resemblance of the work with itself. To put it in other words, *what the name fixes is a particular set of possibilities*, a particular set of all (uncountable in principle) possible states to which possible states the work will be related. (It can be noted in parenthesis that the very possibilities that help identify a work also ruin the work’s actual identity.)

However the naming itself is at the same what makes possible the war of names, *the war for the name*: relating (seemingly the “same”) thing to other sets of possibilities, and therefore to other wholly different identities. It is here that the question of uniqueness rises not as a transworld identification, but as that which allows *transidentical indication*.

² On mark and re-mark, see Derrida, “La double séance”, *La dissémination*. Cf. « [...] quand une écriture marque et redouble la marque d’un trait indécidable » (p.238) Derrida speaks already of this specular relation with itself of writing.

Identity is built on what the name fixes and indicates as a set of possibilities (possible worlds, possible state of this world) for the work. But precisely “*the work*” is what is in question. If it in some way precedes its own identity how can we speak of it, when thus it is nothing less than unidentifiable? The answer is the work’s uniqueness.

Uniqueness is what works through the identities, across identities. It is a *transidentical* “index”. Therefore it does not fix a given set of possibilities though it can keep the traces of former identities. Uniqueness is an effect of the name (in the here transformed sense of Kripke’s rigid designator) yet it is not an identity but what is left after we remove all identity traits (traits of identity; traits for identification). It resembles Husserl’s notion of monad (see *Cartesian Meditations*, §33) that is not anymore as anonymous, general and abstract as the transcendental subject, and yet has no other trait than being that without which the Ego cannot be concrete. There is differentiation – or rather *distinction* – but there is no individuality (it is infinitely divisible) and there is no identifying trait. Not an identity across all possible worlds but uniqueness across all possible identities.

Uniqueness, pure uniqueness can never be given as such. It becomes thinkable on the basis of a theoretical work (or rather on the basis of practical formalizations). This notion of uniqueness can help in solving the problem of identity when identity changes, transforms, when all traits of a work, be they formal, thematic, material, are replaceable and/ or questionable. If we return to the two *Hamlet* versions we can say that there are two identities, two different identities, but a unique work.

Usually when speaking of a work we confuse its possible identities with its uniqueness. We rarely, if at all, speak of the uniqueness

as such. And yet, even when we disagree about the meanings, about the content, about the formal traits of the work, we succeed in indicating the concrete work because of the unique mark inscribed in it across the possible identities, uncertain and infinitely divisible as a promise for another reading, unpredicted, non-predetermined.

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MAGDALENA SAGANIAK

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
IN THE EXPERIENCE OF A WORK OF ART

PREAMBLE

It is impossible to conceive aesthetics without axiology and anthropology, and then these stripped of ontology and epistemology. Wanting to know what is the aesthetic object, we must know what kinds of objects (entities) there are, and how the aesthetic one is distinguished from the others. Wanting to know what is the aesthetic experience, we must also know who is experiencing, what is being experienced and what kind of experience is given. Attempts to define the aesthetic experience usually end up in a blind circle. Considering the concept of aesthetic experience in a general scope, one might say that it depends on the perception (knowledge) of the aesthetic object, which is usually one that can be experienced externally via the senses. The aesthetic object then is one which possesses valid aesthetic characteristics. If we ask, what are these, we must answer that these are characteristics with the ability to arouse aesthetic experience. In this way we have returned to the part we had wanted to define.

DEFINITION DIFFICULTIES

To escape the circle, one needs to have at least one of the parts defined independently. We might start by simply listing the aesthetic qualities, such as beauty, ugliness, a tragic aspect; but the definitions of these – as anyone knows – are embroiled in age-old philosophical discussion. Indicating what is the aesthetic object, in view of their innumerable variety, meets with such vast difficulties that even Plato resigned from formulating a general definition of an object of beauty, at the close of his dialogue *Hippias major* only to announce that “Beauty is a difficult concept”; and to explain it he needed the theory of ideas. Stanisław Ossowski in his famous *U podstaw estetyki* (“On the Foundations of Aesthetics”)¹ resigns from having a definition of the aesthetic object and attempts at describing the phenomenon of aesthetic experience, an easier matter. Even so, he does not achieve a complete success, for although he finds the game *genus proximum*, he does not discover a satisfying *differentia specifica* to set apart the aesthetic experience from other types of game.

And so the most important aesthetic concepts – of Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Schiller, Schelling, Hegel, Scheler, Ingarden, Gadamer, Sartre – never appeared on their own but within a comprehensive theory, even taking on the guise of a system. It might seem that one cannot achieve a definition of aesthetic experience that does not fall into the vicious circle, if one does not adopt principles of being, value and cognition. The wider an area of reality is under reflection, the easier it is to construct within it a satisfactory theory of artistic object and aesthetic experience. However – it seems – these definitions are never quite independent from each other. They always appear together, in a certain involvement; the subject conditions the object and the experience.

¹ Stanisław Ossowski, *U podstaw estetyki* (1933) (“On the Foundations of Aesthetics”), 3 ed. Warsaw 1958.

To slacken the bond and express it not in the guise of a general judgment but one relating to various types of experiences, we could say that a certain object requires a certain type of experience. Aestheticians are mostly unanimous in their conviction that there is something like aesthetical competence, that is the ability to perceive a given work of art according to the rules it sets (this combines both the ability to find *Gestalt*, along with orientating perception, attention, activating proper cognitive powers, knowledge of convention, ability to open oneself to experience). Is it also the other way around? Can a type of aesthetic experience create its own object? This only seems paradoxical: it is possible and happens for instance in creating the so-called internal landscape. So, can it be that a certain type of object and aesthetic experience might create their own subject? Here I would be most sceptical. While I am ready to acknowledge that the aesthetic object differs from an object that exists in the physical world, on which it is founded, however paradoxical it may sound, I would be inclined to say that aesthetic experience may introduce differentiation to the subject, perhaps even alteration, but it cannot – in the full sense of the word – create it. Among these three it is the subject which is strongest. This seems a fairly obvious constatation, but its adoption has far-going consequences. If thus there are certain types of aesthetic experience, such as the experience of elation or tragedy, then there must exist subjects of such qualities to allow these experiences to take place in them. If we adopt a dynamic or antinomic theory of aesthetic experience – and there are such – then there must exist subjects, which can take up the dynamism or take down the antinomy.

In this sketch I shall be considering the matter of aesthetic experience and attempt to describe it on grounds of the theory of cognitive subject, and so virtually within the scope of philosophical anthropology or anthropology of art. I shall consider a certain group of theories of aesthetic experience, which can be linked

mainly to the turn of the 18th and 19th century and with Romanticism.

But I shall begin with – a very general and really strictly formal – definition of the aesthetic subject as something perceived in a so-called aesthetic frame.

AESTHETIC FRAME

The aesthetic frame – a mysterious procedure that can change any perception into aesthetic. A specially equipped object (work of art) can by itself initiate perception of it in an aesthetic manner. But – one can propose any random object to be grounds for aesthetic experience. This happens in the case of “ready-made” art, but also – albeit with some reservations – in the case of photography. The fact in itself of photographing a fragment of reality (or putting it on camera film) alters the way in which this object is seen. However – as an exercise – one can effect such changes by the power of decision only, without any intermediary procedure. Simply, one can start to look at a given thing (this landscape, this object, this configuration of objects) as at something aesthetic. For many theoreticians this is proof that there are no aesthetic objects per se (specially furnished, possessing specific construction, different particular features), but only a special attitude, which can be learned. Although one might argue that humanity learned this attitude precisely from particularly shaped objects, then derivatively transplanted it onto other objects, with other features, which then became recognized as aesthetically valid, and furthermore onto any objects, in any way endowed – one cannot reject the validity of this argumentation.

But how does the aesthetic frame function in the experience itself? According to Stanisław Ossowski, aesthetic experience primarily depends on extracting from the stream of ordinary experiences, that is a special perception of a time fragment (together

with its content), which Ossowski describes as “focus on the present” (instead of “focusing on the future” and using time for practical effects), and so a certain type of disinterestedness, also being a return to the freedom of perception known from childhood and related to play. This needs a specific kind of isolation, the aesthetic frame precisely. Ossowski claims it is easiest to achieve by illusion.

Illusion that can be taken with artificiality or fictitiousness.

ACHIEVING THE AESTHETIC FRAME THROUGH FICTIONALITY

One could start from the definition of object – after Ossowski – as allowing one to enter the domain of game, via a feature known as fictionality. The idea of an aesthetic object as one which demonstrates fictitious elements appeared already in ancient times. To this day the category of fiction is used in definitions of a work of the art of literature, allowing at the same time to distinguish so-called belles lettres, nonetheless creating the problem of description of so-called literature of fact, which then remains outside the framework of belles lettres.

As known, Aristotle demonstrated that objects and events presented by a poet – in opposition to those presented by a historian – are not real but only possible (presented as though real). German theorist of literature Landwehr, having also an interest in logic, approached the fictional statement as a statement of particular modality. On grounds of Landwehr’s excellent study one can define realism and fiction (or possibly distinguish various types of fiction)². If an ordinary statement presents what is real as real, what is possible as possible, what is necessary as necessary etc., while a lie presents what is unreal as real, then a fictitious statement (one

² Jürgen Landwehr, *Fikcyjność i fikcjonalność*, trans. Anna Nasiłowska, „Pamiętnik Literacki” 1983, v. 4.

which uses fiction) presents what is possible as real (so-called realism) or what is impossible – as real (some types of fiction), but also what is possible as impossible, what is necessary as only possible, what is possible as necessary etc. (these would be different types of fiction). Landwehr qualifies such behaviour as a language game, which can also be met outside literature, in ordinary communication. In this game there is an intentional transformation of modality – on acceptance of the issuer and receiver of the statement. Landwehr believes that in this way both subjects participating in the language game assume some fictional features.

A similar thought appears with Richard Ohmann³, who uses Austin's theory of acts of speech. The precise concepts of Austin, who differentiates three aspects of each statement: locution, illocution and perlocution, are utilised by Ohmann to define literary text – as fictional. From Ohmann's analysis it arises that a fictional statement preserves the locutional aspect principally intact, but transforms the illocutional aspect. A literary statement presents a fictitious act of speech, in which there is created an artificial (fictional) speaking subject, addressing the listener in an artificial (fictitious) situation, created by this act of speech.

As we can see, transmitting-receiving instances are as a rule accepted to be symmetrical, with the result that recognition of the aesthetic object should lead not only to fictionalise the transmitter (artist) but also the receiver as the perceiving subject. But because the subject cannot just invalidate its existence, fictionalising can exist only with duplication.

³ Richard Ohmann, *Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature*, "Philosophy and Rhetoric" 4 (1971), nr 1, p. 1–19; Polish translation: *Akty mowy a definicja literatury*, "Pamiętnik Literacki LXXXI, 1980, v. 2, p. 249–267.

DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO THE RECEPTION OF ART

Now one needs to have such a theory of the subject which experiences that will allow for a description of this fictionalising of the subject – and its eventual duplication. The aesthetic experience then becomes a very complex internal experience – in which the aesthetic object is a catalyst and conductor of various processes.

Such anthropological concepts have appeared in the history of aestheticism. They were prepared by relatively closely connected concepts of Kant, Schiller and Schelling. They assume dynamism, even antinomy of the aesthetic experience. Also they construct a strong enough concept of the subject itself for it to be able to bear this dynamism or internal antinomy.

Kant (this being a great contribution of his) showed that participating in the aesthetic experience are various human cognitive powers (senses, imagination, intellect, reason), although – in his opinion – the aesthetic experience does not furnish any, not even the haziest of experiences; and the aesthetic experience may be supported on the play of a number of cognitive processes aimed in different directions, which do not necessarily have to aim towards any predictable final state, or may even depend on a certain dissonance⁴. Similarly, having concluded that beauty is a dynamic phenomenon and is fulfilled only in the perception of certain objects by humans, Schiller and Schelling⁵ connected beauty with

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1790), Polish translation by Jerzy Gąlecki, *Krytyka władzy sądzienia*, Warszawa 1986.

⁵ Friedrich Schiller, *Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, in einer Reihe von Briefen* (1795), Polish transl. by Jerzy Prokopiuk: *Pisma teoretyczne. „Listy o estetycznym wychowaniu człowieka“ i inne rozprawy*, Warszawa 2011; Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *System des transzendentalen Idealismus*, Polish transl. by Krystyna Krzemieniowa: *System idealizmu transcendentálnego*, Warszawa 1977.

creation, and the latter with liberty. In *The system of transcendental idealism* the act of perception of a work of art becomes analogous with the act of its creation. In one case and the other, the creative powers of humans are involved, while Schelling has these identical with the unconscious forces of nature, also present in humans but subjected to a certain kind of rigour. According to Schelling, the creative process combines unconscious forces of nature with the efforts of consciousness which utilises some established rules. At the same time it brings together freedom (the liberty to create) and necessity (rigour) and infinity with finiteness. And so it connects infinite contradictions. Its weaker repetition is the aesthetic experience.

IS AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE CHANGE?

The problem we are considering of the impact a work of art has on its recipient can be approached as a question about change. This change can be perceived either as permanent or impermanent, vanishing at the point when experience terminates; nonetheless the history of philosophy brings reflections that rather support the permanent character of the change. Aristotle perceived the purifying role of *katharsis*. Plotinus – ascent to beauty; ancient and Enlightenment tradition professed didacticism (teach through play) – Schillerian tradition included beauty in the *Bildung* concept (in Schiller's utopia at the same time there is being built a harmonious happy human as well as his proper environment – a state of free, beautiful, graceful, cultured people).

A special position is held by the act of creation (and perception) in the Romantic tradition: it is most often described as an expression of the interior (soul) but understood not as an expansion of ready content or form but autoformatting – often formulated as the utopia of the self-forming subject. In some conceptions, art could lead even to transgression, that is overstepping the bounda-

ries of the subject. This singular approach can be distinguished by contrast to the phenomenological tradition: in the phenomenological approach the aesthetic experience leaves the subject virtually unmoved – it is consciousness which approaches the object, gleans its image (phenomenon) preserving the boundaries of one and the other.

Meanwhile in art the issue often is violation of these boundaries – even if momentary and arbitrary, only imagined – for the recipient – presented in an aesthetic frame. It is about meeting a certain other reality – only imagined but preserving the quality of being experienced. In the meeting with persons and experiences presented within a work of art there sometimes occurs the phenomenon called projection-identification, of endowing the persons therein schematically presented with properties and feelings known from own experience. However, the aesthetic experience is not simply concern for the fate of the protagonist as though it was one's own. The aesthetic experience provides a difficult role for the recipient: identification, simultaneously preserving distance.

Perhaps then the issue here is the introduction of difference – which nonetheless preserves identity – the identity of itself to itself – envisaged, designed, sublimated, only possible but even impossible, even so remaining in connection with the real me.

The aesthetic frame renders possible this identification. The frame not only isolates the object but protects the subject. The subject also reveals itself in the aesthetic frame which in a way keeps it within its own boundaries. Crossing this boundary becomes a certain ritual, feast, preserved sometimes in theatre, still entering into a liaison with sacred spheres and rites with ceremonial dress and definite delineation of the boundaries of the work of art. In spite of appearances, metaphorically speaking, the theatre curtain does not so much separate the audience from the work of art but

becomes a gateway into its domain, as well as a shield of protection for the recipient.

As mentioned above, the crossing of this boundary in many aesthetic theories is described as a duplication or projection of the cognitive subject (recipient), sometimes accompanied by duplication of the author (artist). This idea – as we have seen – appears on a fundament of the speech acts theory and within the field of logical research on the pragmatics of language. It also appears in other formations of thought, even as varied as phenomenology, existentialism and structuralism. Structuralists in a number of ways have accented the artificial nature of the speaking subject. Because the act of communication is usually presented as symmetrical, so they also attribute artificiality to the subject who is perceiving a work of art. The recipient – entering a presented world, learning to use a specific language, where meanings are not dependent on the system but on the place in the structure of the text; entering into communication with the artificial persona of the speaking subject – is to be fictionalised himself. However – as underlined by Roman Jakobson – fictionalisation does not mean severance of the link with the subject, which only “duplicates”⁶. In a similar way, as the presented world maintains connections with the real world (the power of reference of the sign is transformed and weakened but not broken), thus the author preserves the link to the speaking subject he or she has created and – by analogy- the reader with the virtual reader already included in the text. Jean-Paul Sartre describes this situation as the ‘pact of generosity’ – the subject is created who encounters the reality presented but without abandoning the link to himself⁷.

⁶ Roman Jakobson, *Linguistics and Poetics*, “*Style in Language*”, ed. Thomas Sebeok, New York 1960.

⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Qu'est-ce que la littérature?* (1948), English translation by Bernard Frechtman: *What is Literature?*, New York 1949; Polish translation by Janusz Lalewicz: *Czym jest literatura? Wybór szkiców kry-*

Only deconstruction does not stipulate duplication of the subject connecting it simply and directly with the act of perception – and because beyond its various acts (speech, perception, action) the subject virtually does not exist, it cannot duplicate but only proceed smoothly from its one articulation into another, from one dispersion in an infinite context – into another.

And so one can regard aesthetic experience as generating a certain kind of internal diversity in the subject. Or – alternately – as multiplication of experience in the world (as cognition of a certain kind concluded within the aesthetic framework – according to Ossowski). More dramatically one might view it as transgression, as negation of one's own self or self-alienation. At once also there arises the question, whether this means weakening or strengthening its identity.

The resolution of this issue depends on the adopted concept of subject.

For instance, on grounds of the philosophy of Schelling (early, with the amplification of the concept of subject identity seen from a perspective of late works) these opposites – if they are opposites – have a common foundation: the subject. At the same time both conscious and unconscious, according to Schelling. Unconsciousness gives rise to creative powers, also present in nature – unconsciousness is just as much *residuum* of the subject as consciousness. With Schelling both these spheres are creative, although in different ways. On the grounds of Schelling's philosophy it is not difficult to explain why a reader will feel for any randomly chosen hero – this lies within the creative capabilities of the self without detracting from it – on the contrary – taking advantage of its very essence. Simply, the unconscious self is creative because of its very nature. If consciousness preserves its power, it can accompany the process in a passive or active way, noting the course of events or steering them – the usual workings of consciousness.

The contribution of classical German philosophy is to show the multitude of layers of aesthetic experience, its internal diversity, dynamism of the process itself, of its phases, embroiled in ethical and epistemological problematics. In this respect, the aesthetics of the 20th century is regression rather than development. Reaching back to nineteenth-century thought we find a set of conceptual instruments, which allow for in-depth understanding of the complicated process of aesthetic experience, that also is a creative process, activating the creative powers of the subject, initiating all its cognitive powers and bringing cognition – also of oneself as a being able to differentiate internally and to change. That is why the experiencing of art may entail abandonment of the shape of one's consciousness as well as its recovery – sometimes already reconstructed, but always on consent from the subject.

This reconstruction might be carried out as identification with someone else, presented in a work of art or contained in the rules for its perception. Could this change be permanent or would that signify a violation of the subject's identity? It would seem that only a naive recipient identifies entirely with a work of art, allows to be swept away, "loses consciousness" so to speak. A seasoned spectator is carried away but all the time aware of existing in a space that is contained within the aesthetic frame, which provides safe entry to a certain experience and also exit – through the same gateway, return to oneself, soberly poised in-between two realities. This controlled duplication – a certain kind of game that the subject plays with himself – is possible thanks to the very essence of art, which is the creative act of the artist, in a way repeated by the recipient.

Let us repeat the question in that case, whether aesthetic experience strengthens or weakens the subject. Is the duplication that art requires not a violation of the subject's identity? On the contrary, it seems that this is change which preserves identity. This would entail an internal differentiation – preserving identity nonetheless. If so – paradoxically – this type of action would strengthen

the construction of the subject, highlighting its possible potential but curbing it with a kind of constraint.

If all aesthetic experience brought about a new form for the subject, the subject would fall apart and fragmentize. The semiotic tradition presents the aesthetic object as an attack on the subject's coherence – this idea appears for instance in the writings of Yuri Lotman⁸. But against Lotman's suggestions, the subject does not seem to be an institution this fragile. The existence itself of aesthetic experience and the possibility of introducing change – with preservation of identity – supports the concept of subject which explains how this is possible.

CONCLUSION

It has a metaphysical character, applying to the human as a certain type of being, capable of aesthetic experience.

Who (what) is the human as the subject of aesthetic experience? Who, since he/she can be a creator – as an artist and as a recipient. Who, considering the possibility of aesthetic experience that supposes fictionalisation and duplication of subject?

Perhaps one might assume that the subject is neither its consciousness nor unconsciousness, nor even a combination of the two, is not any of its cognitive powers nor their conglomerate – is the substratum of all these powers and qualities, capable of creating and shaping these powers. The subject is neither of the shapes which it can become in its lifetime, in real life, or in a work of art. The subject is something that itself is capable of almost any change but in spite of this continues to exist as a thing identical unto itself, more yet: capable of setting out subsequent changes,

⁸ Yuri Lotman, *Siemiotika kino i problemy kinoestetiki*, Tallin 1973, Polish translation by Jerzy Faryno and Tadeusz Miczka: *Semiotyka filmu*, Warszawa 1983.

steering entry into various states, as we can see in the reception of a work of art.

If so, then one must adopt the so-called essentialistic concept of the subject, which assumes that there exists *essence* – a core of identity which remains intact when the subject enters into miscellaneous states and becomes various figures possible. One has to accept the existence of this essence, even if it might be supported on some types of functionalism, i.e. on a relatively constant ability to transmute all stimuli and steer all processes according to individual functions.

Translated by Elżbieta Krajewska-Feryniec

GEORGI ILIEV

RECURSIVITY, SIMILARITY
AND IDENTITY WITH EXAMPLES FROM THE
WORKS OF JAVIER MARIAS

This text, although quite short and hence methodologically incomplete, aims at outlining a phenomenon of literature that is of major importance for its recent development. As it becomes clear from the title it views the doubled concepts of similarity and identity that affect fictional texts in many ways – as problem of plausibility, as a problem of literary realism and the depiction of “real types”, as problem of the merging of the fiction of the novel with extraliterary entities, as philosophical problem of the possibility of a given world, of building different fictional universes. All this applies even to cases where it is difficult to discern identity from similarity. The present attempt is also restricted to the works of Javier Marias, whose prose in many respects resembles the novels of psychological characterization by Henry James and Marcel Proust. In our contemporary cultural situation it happens quite rarely for one to encounter works of such depth in characterization, descriptiveness and the long lost endeavor of precise naming of similarities, the so called thick description.

I am not going to address similarity and identity as metaphysical concepts or in their relation to analytic philosophy, but would

rather consider their validity for literature from a phenomenological point of view and with a slight psychoanalytical slant. In order to reveal the concepts of similarity and identity as internal to the novel the choice of literary texts is of crucial importance for Javier Marias systematically thematized some of the basic parameters of the world of modern philosophical literature and novels. Time, space the construction of the Self in his works are elaborated to such an extent as to create an impression of metaliterariness¹. Hence the possibility for us to make an experimental approach at supposed structures beyond the genre of the works and the basic philosophical reference points. What I am trying to say is that in resorting to the techniques of some classical modern novels, Marias achieves a modern mythological vision of the role of the novel which is to cope with basic parameters of the world as phenomenon. The word mythology may not even appear here again but can be replaced by little psychoanalysis and quoting social prejudice about literature. It is a mythology about the fictionality of the novel.

There is also another feature of this fiction that requires preliminary attention and it is its recursivity. It does not imply the mere existence of “wondering motifs” in the different novels, which would make the assumption universally valid and pointless. Many episodes and contemplative parentheses in these novels are explicitly requoted and reconsidered many times in one and the same work or through different works, conversations are multiply quoted, almost every new described event leads to registered change in

¹ I would refrain from using the concept of metafiction coined by Lubomir Dolezel since I do not consider the works of Marias as emphatically disclosing the authentication procedures of the fictional world building (Dolezel, L. “Mimesis and Possible Worlds”). Moreover that it would confuse his approach with the techniques characteristic of nouveau roman and the postmodern writing. To my opinion, the metaliterary element in these novels is slightly more emphasized than that of, for example, Henry James, sometimes parodying his writing.

the meaning of previous events. The multiple existing references are a common rhetorical figure and it is difficult for an interpreter to prove that it is not a mere cognitive instrument or an instrument of memorization, but a constitutive element of the fictionality of the novel. Let us start with some references to the commonsensical truths of the personages, something that is most probably a reminiscence of the novel of nineteenth century, and namely with the phrase “those people” which is often used. The lines quoted share the purpose of revealing human characters through certain outwardly signs and most of them are related to the occupation of the characters of the novel *Your Face Tomorrow* who are profilers in the field of espionage, but at a very “high level”, the level where the knowledge of the culture of the Other is the most important thing.

“he’s obviously one of those people who is impossible to draw out, and who only says what he really means or what he knows he can safely reveal.”

“...one of those people who enjoy retailing and acquiring any hot news to show how well-informed they are.”

“...he would doubtless not have understood those people who love to speak about their experiences...”

“...one of those people who add ,you know‘ to everything, which is always a sign of someone who knows nothing at all.”

“...he’s one of those people who avoids sadness and is bored by suffering.”

“...she was one of those people who, even if they try, cannot or don’t know how to speak softly or even to pause for a moment...”

“...one of those people who like to look the part of the artist, the eccentric. They may or may not be artists, it doesn't matter.”

The only thing that saves *Your Face Tomorrow* from being proclaimed an apology of commonsense is, paradoxically, the extreme density of such phrases which is unlikely even for the descriptions of characters and manners dating back to Antiquity. But there is also something else. These similarities are most often stated as mutual identities of many people sharing strange and perverse clothing or manners. And while these similarities become identities, many other cases where the commonsensical language implies the word identity, the novel of Marias would rather dissect the tissue of a similarity. Cases of identities are presented as strings of similarities, something like blind-searching for a lost definition. Hence the figure of mutual substitution of identities and similarities deeply imbedded in the dense tissue of these novels. Let's take as an example a case of national identity. The national identity is usually taken to be either a fate or an ideological construct imposed from the outside, it is related either to the culture and political disposition of a society or to family traditions and the claims of folklore and ethnography. The national identity as a phenomenon is either genuine or fake. Yet here we have a peculiar type of acquiring a national identity. The character Patricia Peres Niux from *Your Face Tomorrow* is of half Catalan and half English origin, but she is enthusiastic about being fully British and about the possibility to prove it. Then she would not even mention the fact that her mother was English but rather present the national identity as always altered, as a sequence of similarities. She is similar to many others who became British.

“There's Cyril Tourneur, a contemporary of Shakespeare, and the poets Dante and Christina Rossetti, and Byron's lugubrious friend, Dr. John Polidori, and Conrad's

real name was Korzeniowski. Gielgud is a Lithuanian or Polish name, and yet no one spoke better English on the stage; Bogarde was Dutch, and then there was that old actor Robert Donat, who played Mr. Chips, his name was an abbreviation of Donatello, I believe. (...)He (my father) hyphenates his two names (Pérez-Nuix) but I don't. I'm like Conan Doyle."

Peres Niux urges the man she is talking with to see all these faces and to recognize her at last. The casus of her Britishness is supported with many examples, but she almost does not speak of herself at all, she does not try to define the British as a concept, she does not give reasons but only similarities. The "imagined community" turns into a real one. I would hereby mention a concept coined by Professor Nikola Georgiev, namely the concept "literaturonim". It is a specific rhetorical figure with which he designates the specific similes between literary entities – personages, works of literature, authors – cases like the claim that Bay Ganyo is the Bulgarian Tartarin of Tarascon, or that or that "The Song of Roland" is the French "Iliad". The idea of Prof. Georgiev is mainly related to the specific kind of quoting in literature and in metaliterary texts. I am referring to this idea to rather address the peculiar criteria for registering formal similarity (not commented or explained similarity) in the literary discourse. If we view the Peres Niux example in the perspective of this Georgiev's idea it will be interesting to notice the writers among the quoted British. The things related to literature appear to be more likely as objects for similes, as if it is easier to describe something by naming a writer, a personage or a literary work. And these tendencies are not only thematically set but constitute a specific figurative of the works of fiction.

Many things are a matter of point of view, as the cliché goes, but in the fiction of Javier Marias we can watch how the watched object is changed by the look itself and (in a paradoxical or psychoanalytical way) the look and the object are alike. Three characters

of the novel *All Souls* – a mother, a small boy, and a grandfather – have similar eyes expressing the feeling of horror and decay. Each of them watches the other without thinking neither of horror nor of decay, but the eyes he sees infect him with those feelings and thus the gaze multiplies. „This feeling of decay was already in the gaze“, it is there before the bearer can realize it with all the Lacanian implications of this situation which we will not analyze regarding this episode. The three people watching each other constitute an allegory that escapes the flow of the narrative.

The structures of identity and similarity lie at the basis of the implicit statement of the text as a fictional one and their reverse, partly reverse, the interweaving of their meanings, or the sheer sublation of the two play a constitutive role for the phenomenon of fictionality. I mean that mainly regarding the characterization and description where the narrative as such is not that dense, if we may say so. The persistence or vanishing of similarities shall be viewed a bit later with the help of some narratological paradigms. It is also worthy to mention the work of Wolfgang Iser who, in his book *The Act of Reading* considers fictionality to be a balance between what the text mentions and the things that are left to the imagination of the reader according to the hidden but implied convention of the literary work. The question is yet whether this is the only hidden but paradigmatic instruction delivered implicitly to the reader.

The elements that are crucial to the narrative and the ones having supplementary function, such as “unnecessary” descriptions and similes, are seriously discussed by the authors from the field of narratology. In his “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative” Roland Barthes divides the narrative elements into functions and indexes. The functions to a great extent follow the functions of Vladimir Propp, they are moves crucial to the flow of the story and form sequences. The sequences don’t need to be made of successive functions and that allows us to reconstruct the skeleton of the story and, at the end of the day, to point out the “important

things”. The indexes on their part refer in an unspecified way to the whole work or to something not mentioned in the text. The important point with the indexes is that they do not interact directly with the functions. I will take the risk of simplifying Barthes’ model and say that the indexes signify the “less important” things that might at another semantic level turn out to have been more important for the functions.

Here come the famous examples from detective novels and spy novels – the sequence “committing a murder – uncovering a murder” and the indexes like the number of telephones in James Bond’s office which create the atmosphere of highly technological espionage. The similarities in the work of Javier Marias should be defined as indexes in the said novels, i.e. they characterize the personages through long monologs, for example the use of eloquent similes and commonsensical identifications might add specific atmosphere to the conversation of some elite intellectuals and Oxford spies. And this interpretative approach is not bad but is maybe a bit insufficient. Such statements, although staying aside from the narrative itself, are multiply repeated and serve as topics for discussion. Sometimes an important topic of the novel might be triggered by seeing a man with tattooed heels who will later be referred to as one of those with the tattooed heels (*Your Face Tomorrow*).

We can receive similar results if we consider Tsvetan Todorov’s suggestion from his text “Grammar of Narrative” (*Poetics of Prose*). He recommends describing all dynamic and static elements, actions and descriptions, to be decomposed to simple narrative predicatives, i.e. to be retold in simple sentences for the purpose of the systematization. The adjectives, meaning also the multiple similes, should be represented with the help of simple sentences. The reconstruction of the national identity of Patricia Perez Niux would thus acquire not only a large extended description but the “imagined community” would also have a peculiar rhizomatic charac-

ter – each and every man mentioned will be described by his or her relation to all others.

Other narratological possibilities are given by the texts *S/Z: An Essay* by Barthes and “Narrative Transformations” by Todorov. The specific structures of similarity and identity in narrative texts would then be recognized as markers of the culture in which the text functions. Todorov speaks of the so called “transformations of soul” including there all opinions, views, prejudices, etc. Three of the five “codes” Barthes defines are not directly related to the sequences of acts in the narrative. These are the semantic code which includes the mechanism of connotation caused by the text; the symbolic code including the binary oppositions in the text; and the cultural code including every corpus of knowledge the work refers to. Marias’ novels are not and their endless parentheses are not inappropriate for such interpretation. And yet, before the text puts its accents on certain binary oppositions, connotations and references (or allegories), it elaborates a network of identities and similarities. They are designated or implied in the speech of the characters or the impersonal narrator and come as passively synthesized. These elements can contribute to setting the text in an abstract horizon of its happening as fictional, which does not coincide with the message of the text. In Javier Marias this substratum is most often related to the combination of real life facts and fictional facts which are indiscernable and the relation between the different universes of his novels. On a thematic level these problems can also be observed. I will examine the topics of the possibility for a real person to become a literary personage and the possibility for one personage to meet his similar counterpart from another novel.

How does one become a literary personage? We can see that in a work of Marias which belongs to a unique genre – a mixture of memoiristic prose, documental photography and pure fiction. The title is *The Dark Back of Time* and the roads to becoming a literary character are three – through the name, through the voice and

through the gaze. The use of the Lacanian concepts here should probably deserve additional interpretation while the ambivalence of the happiness and pain in being a literary character shall only emphasize the encounter between desire and language. Another important direction that will not be examined here is the initiation of the newbie personage to the quasi-social institution of literature.

The first example is about Professor Francisco Rico, a real life scholar and a friend of the author as far as I could find, and it is about the name of the professor. The narrator in the book (this time his name is Javier Marias) offers the professor to become a character of an immortal novel since literary science does not guarantee immortality. And that is how it happens, Rico agrees and is promoted into a personage from the novel *All Souls*. The first requirements set by the professor are related to the personality of the character who is actually him but is named Professor Del Diestro: "Are you writing about scholars? Seducers? Illustrious men?" Later on, the newbie personage realizes the real power of the author and his speaking takes a hysteric direction. After the "mirror stage" of recognizing himself in the attractive Spanish professor from the novel, Rico is confronted by the Name: "I've decided that I don't want to appear in this little novel of yours as Professor Del Diestro or what-have-you or anything else. If I'm in it, I want to be in it as myself, Francisco Rico." And then he resorts to the scientific discourse which has suddenly been rendered irrelevant: "There are real places and institutions in your novel, aren't there? ... Don't play the fool with me young Marias. ... You are going to call the Prado Museum the Prado Museum in your novel. ... I don't suppose that you'll be writing that someone went to the Meadow Museum...". Identities and similarities are hopelessly interweaved – what is better for the personage, to be more similar to himself or to be easier to identify. Through the whole work of this author all real personalities have always been depicted as implausible. The same applies also to the professor and intelligence officer from the University of Oxford,

Toby Rylands from *All Souls* who is later named Peter Wheeler in *Your Face Tomorrow*. But in *Your Face Tomorrow* Toby Raylands has already died and his adequate copy Peter Wheeler appears as his brother nobody knew about.

The second example is about the disappointment of the real personality who has been incorrectly quoted in the literary work (*The Dark Back of Time*). Professor Toby Rylands, the said scholar and spy has not only made a scientific career but has also taken part in determining the fate of his country in many unknown ways. But the author has misquoted him in *All Souls* and not only that, none of the statement of the fictional character does not coincide any real statement of Rylands. So the discourse of the Master has been expropriated. The only thing that's left of his words is his laugh – “sharp like a machinegun”. Learning about that from the novel Rylands gets extremely angry for one week. Then he tries to read the novel again and he likes it.

The remaining example on the real personages is about the gaze that makes them the same semi-memoir. A family of antique booksellers named Stone recognize themselves in the fictional Alabaster family from the novel *All Souls*. Their main concern about that is how much of them did the author see, who of the two is more subjected to the author's gaze of the two. They also want to give publicity to the fact that they are heroes of a novel. They do not feel offended if the statements on their fictional counterparts are of negative connotation, the important thing is to be the object of observation. They are at the same time hungry for the gaze of the Other and they keep their own gaze over their literary counterparts. And here comes their complaint to the author – the wife has not received enough attention in the novel, the narrator (obviously identical to the author) didn't ask the female bookseller any questions about the books in their store. The Stones find an interesting explanation for that: “He (Javier Marias) picked up on a habit some dons (Oxford Professors) have of not seeing

women...". The appalled Marias later on comments on that in *The Dark Backof Time*: "... a habit a had never heard of before, which consisted of not seeing women, not registering them, erasing them, passing the gaze over them as if they were invisible or did not exist". The grotesque character of the Stone/Alabaster family is due to the full coincidence of their idiosyncratic eroticism and their social strivings. The tale about them implies a parody of the commonsensical truth that the gaze of the artist is always true and bears some important message. The interplay similarities and identities is a successful way for Marias to create a psychoanalytical fairytale about the meaning of fictionality in *The Dark Back of Time*.

And here comes the most antimimetic issue related to our topic in Marias. The question addresses the interaction between the similar universes of two different novels and whether two similar personages whose identical features make them counterparts can be characters in a single novel plot. The term "universe" is coined for such situations in fantasy novels and games with plot but could that happen with a new classical author like Marias? Juan Ranz from *A Heart So White* and Jaques Desa from *Your Face Tomorrow* are people of similar thinking process and their occupations are also similar in their view, their fathers are different but their wives are identical and they are named Luisa. The two Luisas share the very similar description in the two novels. Where is the limit of the recursivity and the similarity? Is it possible for one of these novels to make a drastic breach of the logic, according to which the protagonist Desa/Ranz views the world? If so, than the two identical personages, the wives can meet. Is it possible then for Luisa to meet the other Luisa, they both live in Madrid. Let us show how all this is about to happen in the novel and yet it does not. Jaques Desa speaks with the sister of his wife that the latter has found a new lover who is obviously aggressive and poses danger to their children. Then the sister says that someone Ranz (an early equivalent

of Desa from the other novel) also knows the new lover and he has had certain problems with him concerning his wife.

“Well, after seeing that cut on Luisa’s face—which left me with a really bad feeling—I asked an acquaintance of mine, Juan Ranz, about Custardoy, who he’s known since they were children. ... as a matter of fact, his wife’s name is Luisa too.”

The disturbed logic of the novel could put the novel closer to the fantastic genre. Yet Desa pays no attention to the striking coincidence. The problem is that obviously, due to certain classical heritage, the strange meeting cannot happen with any of the conceptually based personages. Yet the above quoted proves that the issues of recursivity, similarity and identity are not mimetic. They are a constitutive force of narrative both as an indispensable element and as a danger of imposing a unified logic destroying the taxonomy of personages and events. At the end I will remind the devastating critique of Novalis (fragment “On Wilhelm Meister”) to the conceptually similar characters of the novel “Wilhelm Meister” by Goethe:

“On Wilhelm Meister: Lothario is nothing but a male Terese and a transitional character to Wilhelm Meister. Natalie is a merging between the aunt and Terese, thus she is an improved aunt. Jarno is actually a transition from the Terese to the abbot. The uncle is limited as is the aunt. Wilhelm Meister is the merging of the uncle and Lothario.”

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MACIEJ MROZIK

STORY AND CHANGE¹

REFLECTING ON CHANGE

This sketch is devoted to the presence of the idea of “change” in some definitions and descriptions of story, as well as of certain other related concepts.

Change is, of course, an elementary human experience. The Polish psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński wrote: “Life is characterized by a dialectic of change and permanence. Life is ceaseless change; this is a consequence, among other things, of its metabolic character – living beings are what is referred to as ‘open systems’ – that is, they exist owing to a constant exchange (metabolism) of energy and information between them and their environment, they can-

¹ I would like to thank dr Grzegorz Grochowski who, in a discussion, expressed his doubts about my understanding of the motif of metamorphosis, and mentioned Aristotle and *peripeteia* – I cannot find my notes so I can’t repeat exactly what he said anymore, but it was in pondering his doubts that the present text germinated. And he is also the one who alerted me to the complications of understanding “vanity” in Ecclesiastes. I would also like to thank dr Joanna Sztuka for helping me in getting hold of a lot of the literature cited in this essay – her assistance was invaluable.

not exist without their environment.” (Keipiński 1992: 9–10)². Thus, for human beings as biological entities, change is connected with (is a consequence of) ex-change, and therefore change (indirectly) links them with other beings, with the world – not only because it is a quality they share, but also because contact with other beings entails it.

Living organisms are therefore prone to change – on a biological level, change (and metabolism) is how life manifests itself. But in a physical sense too, change is characteristic of living organisms. At least that is how one could read the following passage from Erwin Schrödinger: “What is the characteristic feature of life? When is a piece of matter said to be alive? When it goes on ‘doing something’, moving, exchanging material with its environment, and so forth, and that for a much longer period than we would expect an inanimate piece of matter to ‘keep going’ under similar circumstances”.

Schrödinger goes on to explain that “When a system that is not alive is isolated or placed in a uniform environment” it undergoes a series of changes and eventually “the whole system fades away into a dead, inert lump of matter. A permanent state is reached, in which no observable events occur. The physicist calls this the state of thermodynamical equilibrium, or of ‘maximal entropy’” (Schrödinger 2006: 69).

It is in terms of entropy that Schrödinger explains metabolism, and here again, as in the Keipiński quote above, metabolism is shown as an important part of a somewhat paradoxical process: “Every process, event, happening (...), everything that is going on in Nature means an increase of the entropy of the part of the world where it is going on. Thus a living organism continually increases its entropy (...) and thus tends to approach the dangerous state of maximum entropy, which is death. (...) the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive.” (Schrödinger 2006: 71).

² Translations of quotations from Polish editions of texts are my own – M.M.

When no countermeasures are applied (where there is no life) things will display “the natural tendency (...) to approach the chaotic state” (Schrödinger 2006: 73). This shows change as somewhat ambiguous and its role as paradoxical. It may lead to chaos (death) or order (life). But isn’t order something we associate with permanence rather than change? The reflections quoted above would suggest that this permanence is sustained through change. One may perhaps say that both authors see a link between ex-change (metabolism) and change (life), and both see in life that “dialectic of change and permanence” (Kepliński).

There are of course other aspects of change and other planes on which it can be considered (far more, in fact, than this introductory section can cover). In Western culture, change has been a subject of reflection for many centuries. A famous example are “the Heraclitean doctrines” which, according to Aristotle, held “that the whole sensible world is always in a state of flux” (Aristotle 1989: 987a). In Plato’s *Cratylus*, Socrates quotes Heraclitus (Heraclitus): “Heraclitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream” (Plato 1921: 402a, see also 401d)³. This seems similar to

³ The accuracy of both these accounts (by Aristotle and Plato) can be questioned. Heraclitus may have really asserted something else, and there are some striking similarities between this alternative version and the passages from Kepliński and Schrödinger quoted above (as well as, apparently, Aristotle’s philosophy). Here is Daniel Graham’s explanation of what Heraclitus may have really maintained: “some things stay the same only by changing. One kind of long-lasting material reality exists by virtue of constant turnover in its constituent matter. Here constancy and change are not opposed but inextricably connected. A human body could be understood in precisely the same way, as living and continuing by virtue of constant metabolism – as Aristotle for instance later understood it. On this reading, Heraclitus believes in flux, but not as destructive of constancy; rather it is, paradoxically, a necessary condition of constancy” (Graham 2011).

“the core Buddhist doctrine of the impermanence of all things” (Mortensen 2012).

Going back to Western tradition, one could also mention the Latin proverb “Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis” which, notably, links change with both time and human life.

A very important example of reflection on the subject of change in the Judeo-Christian tradition is *The book of Ecclesiastes* with its exploration of impermanence, epitomized by the repeated use of the word *hebel* (appearing in the book 38 times – see e.g. Murphy 1991, Miller 1998: 437). In English translations, in the opening and closing sections (1:2 and 12:8) the word has traditionally been rendered as “vanity” – though there are other possibilities, as *hebel* seems to take on various shades of meaning depending on the context (see Miller 1998: esp. 440)⁴.

Reflection on change is thus present in religious thought. It plays an important part in Christian tradition. One might read in that light St. Paul’s contention that “this world as we know it is passing away” (*New Jerusalem Bible*, 1 Corinthians 7: 31). The impermanence of creation may be contrasted with God. Saint Thomas Aquinas writes (echoing Saint Augustine): “solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo modo est mutabilis” (Aquinas 1888: I^a q. 9 a. 2 co.). This can be found in the Bible: “with him there is no such thing as alteration, no shadow caused by change” (*New Jerusalem Bible*, James 1:17; see also Toner 1909).

Change and the problems of change are an important subject of human thought and are present in human existence. From the point of view of the notion of story it is perhaps most important to note how the idea of change is deeply linked with some other concepts: identity, motion, causality and temporality (see Mortensen 2012). The two last terms on this list are especially pertinent to dis-

⁴ E.g. the Tagged Tanakh and The New Jerusalem Bible both have “futility” here.

cussions of story and it may be reasonable to check if the notion of change isn't involved whenever they are mentioned in that context.

One should also note that the questions of "Cambridge change" (see Crane 2005, Mortensen 2012) seem relevant to the issues of change in stories: it is quite apparent that stories can involve both "intrinsic" change, the change of entities "in themselves", as well as a sort of "relational" change, where only the "position" (in either a literal or metaphorical sense) of entities is involved. Of course, a conflation of both types of change is possible as well, and probably common. However, in the present article I do not intend to go further into these problems.

THE IMPORTANCE OF STORY

Now we come to the problem of story. This, of course, is another ontological plane, a different level of abstraction. While change (or at least some kinds of change) can be construed as a type of relation in the physical world, independent of human existence (though it deeply touches that existence, and though it is also *experienced* and reflected upon by human beings), stories, at least as they are commonly understood, do not exist in a world of inanimate material objects (though stories *about* such a world are possible).

This much we can tell without even producing a precise definition of story. And yet, before we proceed, one thing has to be noted. Modern-day narratology knows at least one other term that seems very similar to story: narrative. However, different narratologists seem to hold different views on what exactly consists either story or narrative. Therefore it is rather difficult to grasp what the exact difference between story and narrative may be. A common-sense approach would suggest that narrative is the more technical term⁵. But it is not the object of this essay to discuss the specific

⁵ Indeed, in the Corpus of Contemporary American English the fre-

differences between the uses (and meanings) of these two words. In what follows, I will treat them as related closely enough to warrant discussing them together, and in one case, I will include the term “plot” into this set as well. I realize this is problematic, but believe that from the point of view of reflection on the notion of “change”, it is permissible.

Let us go back to the subject of the meaningfulness of stories (and/or narratives): for most human beings stories are important, almost indispensable. Here is a suggestive passage from Elinor Ochs: “Imagine a world without narrative. Going through life not telling others what happened to you or someone else (...) Imagine not even composing interior narratives, to and for yourself. No. Such a universe is unimaginable, for it would mean a world without history, myths or drama; and lives without reminiscence, revelation, and interpretive revision.” (Ochs 1997: 185).

I am not sure if I entirely agree with the above statement, but I do feel Ochs is right in emphasizing that narrative (or story) is important, and it also seems appropriate to me that she should devote so much attention to what I would call the social aspects of narrative (even more so in the parts that I have excised from the above quotation).

I think we can safely assume that human life and human society would not be quite what they are without narrative (story). But at the same time I am also quite certain that one can be at once fully human and not partake at all in the world of stories. I do not imagine, however, that there are or ever were entire narrative-less

quency of “story” is about 9 times higher than that of “narrative”. A quick comparison of the top 5 collocates – within 4 words – of both of these words shows that “narrative” tends to appear with more “technical” terms such as “structure”, “form”, “historical”, “voice”, while “story” co-occurs with various forms of the word “tell” and the journalistic-sounding “cover” (search performed using Davies (2008-)). This shows that the terms are indeed distinct.

societies. So perhaps, while not being a necessary prerequisite to being human, narratives could be considered a founding element of human culture or human society. Or maybe, while significant, narratives are not indispensable in that area either. Whatever the case may be, I think the quotation from Ochs rightly emphasizes that narrative is important and, indeed, quite ubiquitous in ordinary human experience.

DEFINING STORY (OR NARRATIVE)

In the previous section we touched on the subject of defining what narrative or story is. Augustine famously wrote about time: “What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; but, if I want to explain it to a questioner, I do not know.” (Augustine 2008: 343). Couldn’t the same be said of story (or narrative)? The following quotation from Thomas Leitch has a similar sense, though it pertains to story, not time (of course, there is a relation between the two notions, but we’ll come to that later). It can, I believe, serve as a very appropriate introduction to the problems of defining story (or narrative): “Everyone knows what stories are – fortunately; for it is excessively difficult to say just what they are. Despite the recent efflorescence of work in narrative theory, the problem of formulating a rule which shall distinguish things that are stories from things that are not, a rule which would establish what makes a story a story, has remained unresolved” (Leitch 1986: 3). And further on: “it is almost impossible to establish a definition which includes all stories but excludes everything else” (Leitch 1986: 4).

Almost 20 years later Gerald Prince remarked on a similar issue (“narrative” this time, or rather: “the boundaries of narrative”): “As we know, nothing like a consensus has been reached on that subject. Some theorists and researchers believe that everything is narrative; others maintain that everything can be; and still others

contend that, in a sense, nothing is (because narrativity is culture-dependent and context-bound).” (Prince 2003: 1–2).

The problem, then, is not really a lack of definitions but rather an overabundance of them. What Prince’s recapitulation points to is that the difficulty is not in devising some sort of definition but in finding what may be called a consensual one. This does not conflict with the passage from Leitch. We could say that as regards the issues of defining, the problems enumerated by Prince are “extrinsic”, they do not enter that sphere. Whereas Leitch’s remarks are concerned with a more basic and “intrinsic” problem (intrinsic to the defining).

Constructing a classical Aristotelian definition of anything always involves overcoming the difficulty of getting just the right scope. Let me point out here two specific problems in delineating the field of inquiry when defining story. First of all, “story” (or “narrative”) can be thought of in purely linguistic terms – as a word, a meaning, an extension. But then, it can also be thought of as a situation, a psychological, cultural, social phenomenon. Can an adequate description of the word be constructed without mention of this wider plane?

The other issue is this: when talking about story (or narrative) from a narratological perspective, do we want to achieve a knowledge of what stories are as understood by their ordinary users, or do we want to posit a certain technical meaning of the term and study stories as defined that way? There is often a distance between the use of words in their colloquial and scientific meanings (see Wierzbicka 1985: 311–312), and this may call for employing differing methods of research (scientific vocabulary is usually explicitly conventional). Do we study the meaning of the word “story” (as it appears in a specific, ethnic natural language, e.g. English, in colloquial use) – and then, possibly, the object it refers to, or do we explicitly construct an “artificial” definition that will form part of our strict scientific vocabulary (one that, ideally, other “profession-

als” will agree on) and then study the object we have thus defined? And if the latter is the case, how do we come to the definition?

Despite these difficulties, there exist certain important points of convergence between various theorists. Indeed, Prince accompanies one of his own proposals of a definition with a comment about “widely held views about the nature of narrative” (Prince 2008: 373). We will look at some of them in the following sections.

STORY AND PROTOTYPES

It has been argued that narration (Jannidis 2003: 40) or narrativity (Wolf 2011: 162) could (or even should) be defined (or described) in terms of prototype semantics (the idea of prototype features also in Fludernik 1996). A similar notion is that of a “scalar conception of narrativity” (Ryan 2006: 7; also, according to Prince, Didier Coste “presented what can be called a scalar view of narrativity” Prince 1999: 46). I believe that the attempts by Marie-Laure Ryan show what such a definition could look like (see Ryan 2005: 4 and elaborated versions: Ryan 2006: 7–8 and Ryan 2007: 28–29).

It might be worthwhile to mention at this point that prototype semantics (not to mention the more general term cognitive semantics) may mean more than one thing. Georges Kleiber (Kleiber 1990/2003) has argued for the existence of two distinct models of prototype semantics: the “standard” model where meanings are centered around prototypes, and the “extended” model where prototypes play a secondary role, and family resemblance becomes the main principle of organization of meanings (or rather: uses). In the latter case, one can hardly speak of definitions – “the notion of category loses its basic feature of serving to define notions” (Kleiber 1990/2003: 169) and “the same term can refer to different categories” (Kleiber 1990/2003: 178). This is further complicated by the possibility (also discussed in Kleiber) of two interpretations of the term “prototype”: either it could be understood as the “best

instance” of a category or, in a slightly more abstract way, as a set (list) of typical qualities (which a particular instance may embody more fully than another one). Kleiber also points out that the “extended” model in fact encompasses the “standard” one (one could refer to the “standard” as a special case of the “extended”).

Based on Kleiber, we can also point to two other issues, specifically linked to problems of defining narrative. The first of these is that narrative may be a polysemous term (not homonymous) and therefore not render itself to a description in terms of the “standard” version of prototype semantics (it may not have a single prototypical semantic “center”). If that is the case, then a description in terms of the “extended” version would be in order: where similarities between various types of story would be emphasized without singling out one type as *the most* “storylike”.

The second issue is that story might not be a concept from the basic level of categorization – it may be more abstract, and therefore more difficult to describe in terms of prototype semantics, as there is no single mental image that could represent it.

GENERAL OUTLINES OF FEATURES

Detailing the consequences of all these considerations falls outside the scope of the present essay. This section will give an overview of some of the feature lists that can be found in the literature, followed by a discussion of the place of the notion of change in these lists.

Monika Fludernik and Greta Olson cite a very useful list of criteria of narrativity taken from Vera and Ansgar Nünning: “the representation of a temporal sequence of events (...); the presence of a mediating instance, or what would according to traditional terminology be called a narrator (...); the dynamics between story and discourse” (Fludernik, Olson 2011: 14). Separately (though still citing Nünning and Nünning) they also name “experientiality”.

Another feature list comes from Jannidis: “the story is (...) a meaningful structure. It gathers the totality of events, characters, and regions into an organized and meaningful whole. The most important components of this meaningful structure are chronology, causality, teleology, and intentionality.” (Jannidis 2003: 43, footnote omitted; similar wording also on p. 51)

A particularly detailed list is given by Werner Wolf (Wolf 2004: 88–91)⁶. I will give here an account of a shortened version that can be found in Wolf 2011. Wolf divides the features into three groups. The first is a “general” category and consists of “representationality, experientiality and meaningfulness (in particular with reference to the explanation of events in time)” (Wolf 2011: 163). The second are features related to content: “most obviously setting, characters, and action” as well as “disnarrated elements” – “unrealized alternatives which nevertheless have been taken into consideration in the story” (Wolf 2011: 163)⁷. And finally, Wolf describes “syntactic” features: “chronology, causality and teleology” (Wolf 2011: 163).

But Wolf’s 2011 article contains two lists: an account at the beginning of the text is slightly different to the one just quoted. Wolf starts with the familiar contention that there is no agreement on what narrative is and then ventures to give examples “of some convergences concerning major issues in influential contemporary

⁶ Wolf calls the elements of this list “narratemes”, borrowing the term from a paper by Prince (1999). However, Prince’s use of the word seems different – Prince quite explicitly refers to narratemes as “predicates” (“out of twenty predicates, say, fifteen are narratemes” Prince 1999: 46). In applying the term, Prince is in turn quoting a book by Didier Coste which contains the following definition: “narrative discourse is the genre of discourse whose minimal unit, the NARRATEME, (re)presents an EVENT” (Coste 1989: 36).

⁷ Wolf takes this notion of “disnarrated elements” from another Gerald Prince article, but it is also present in Prince 1999, where these are defined as “representing what did not happen but could have” (Prince 1999: 46).

narratologies” (Wolf 2011: 159). According to Wolf, these include: “the fact that narratives are world-building representations that permit the recipient to (re-)experience possible worlds”, the belief that narratives “are centred around anthropomorphic beings who are capable of conscious choices, plans and activities, and experience emotions and desires”, and finally that they “emphasize temporal and causal (...) changes and explain them in terms of causality and teleology” (Wolf 2011: 159).

We can now try to sum up this short overview. It is striking that only one element seems to be present in some form on all four lists. This element is temporality (in both its Latin and Greek etymological guises: as the adjective “temporal” and the noun “chronology”). Another element that is prominent is that of eventfulness, since it is present in some form in all three authors: Nünning (as related by Fludernik and Olson) and Jannidis mention “events”, while Wolf mentions “action” (which I take to presuppose eventfulness). All other features are only mentioned by one author or two authors at most, though among these there are some that can be counted three times (in the case of those which Wolf places on both lists). These are: representationality and experientiality (Nünning-Fludernik-Olson and both of Wolf’s lists), the presence of characters (Jannidis and Wolf twice), causality and teleology (Jannidis and Wolf twice). Let us also list those elements which appear two times, in two different authors: meaningfulness and setting (Wolf 2011: 163 and Jannidis), intentionality (Wolf 2011: 159 and Jannidis). The features that are mentioned only once are: a mediating instance (Nünning-Fludernik-Olson), dynamics between story and discourse (Nünning-Fludernik-Olson) and Prince’s “disnarrated elements” (in Wolf 2011: 163).

The concepts of temporality and causality figure in leading positions in this overview. I have mentioned earlier that the presence of the notion of change can be suspected whenever these appear – both have links with it. Mortensen (2012) argues that those

of causality are quite weak. However, temporality would often be difficult to separate from the idea of change. In fact, it could be argued that in narrative, in the absence of other changes, temporality itself might “become” change, as in sentences describing the passing (changing) of time, such as “Time passed on.”, “A week went by.”, “Five minutes elapsed.”, or even: “For an hour, nothing happened”. Change happens in time but the flow of time itself can be construed as a change (time as the “thing” that changes).

This, however, does not mean that the presence of the notion of temporality in descriptions of story or narrative necessarily implies the presence of the notion of change – because it can be argued that the element of temporality is present or at least could be present in even those forms of representation that most definitions would strive to “keep out” of narrative. As Tzvetan Todorov pointed out (referring here specifically to a story in Boccaccio’s *Decameron*): “Both description and narrative presuppose temporality that differs in nature. (...) the time of pure duration is opposed to the sequential time of events.” (Todorov 1971: 38).

The mention of duration may bring Bergson to mind, but this is not solely a question of philosophical concepts of time. What is mentioned here is indeed pertinent to discussions of temporality in narrative. According to Todorov, description, even when it appears rather static, presupposes some kind of temporality (personally, I don’t know if this is always the case). Temporality is a basic quality of human experience, therefore whenever that experience is somehow referred to (even indirectly), temporality may be present (incidentally, I would not want to claim that all human experience is temporal). Thus the above quote from Todorov shows that while temporality *may* imply change this does not have to be a necessary connection.

Another element that features prominently in the lists discussed above is eventfulness. This notion too is linked with the idea of change (the word “event” appears in one of the Schrödinger

quotes in the introductory section of this essay). The following passage from an article by Teun van Dijk encompasses both the idea of change and of event: “A (*state*) *change*, then, is a binary relation over states. Intuitively, a change *takes place* or *occurs*, if one or more objects are added to or removed from the state or if one or more objects acquire or lose certain properties or mutual relations. Thus, moving my arm, the falling of leaves, and a rise in temperature are state changes. State changes will be called *events*.” (Dijk 1975: 278).

Peter Hühn gives definitions of two types of events in narration, at the same time linking eventfulness to narrativity itself: “The term ‘event’ refers to a change of state, one of the constitutive features of narrativity.” (Hühn 2009: 80)⁸.

Both these accounts construct the notion of event in such a way that it is inextricably connected with change. Both of them essentially equate change with event by stating that it is simply another word for the phenomenon (Dijk: “State changes will be called *events*.”, Hühn: “The term ‘event’ refers to a change of state”). We can find a similar equation in Seymour Chatman’s *Story and discourse*: “Events are either *actions* (*acts*) or *happenings*. Both are changes of state.” (Chatman 1980: 43–44). Based on these findings, we can probably assume that whenever a definition of story or narrative mentions “event” as a constitutive factor it implicitly treats “change” the same way.

⁸ Hühn also writes: “A type I event is present for every change of state explicitly or implicitly represented in a text.” (Hühn 2009: 80). I will not discuss here, but would like to point out, the notion of implied change that is present in this account. A similar thought can be found in Wolf Schmid’s book: “For narrativity, it is sufficient that the change is implied, for example through the representation of two mutually contrasting states.” (Schmid 2008/2010: 3). In the next section I will also quote a definition from Gérard Genette that contains a notion of implied eventfulness.

CHANGE IN DEFINITIONS

Having discussed the implicit presence of the notion of change in several lists of features of narrativity, let me now turn to examples of specific definitions.

In an overview such as this, it is certainly Aristotle who should have pride of place as the first to be discussed. A passage in his *Poetics* incorporates the idea of change into a discussion of plot:

...so also with plots: they must have a length such as can readily be held in memory. The limit of length is established in one sense by [the conditions of] the [dramatic] contexts and [the scope] of [human] perception; (...) But the limit [set] by the very nature of the work itself [is this]: in every case, the longer [the action], provided it is perfectly clear [as a whole], the more beautiful [it is] in terms of size; or, to give a general definition, the largest size in which, with things happening according to likelihood or necessity and in [due] order, a change can occur from bad fortune to good, or from good to bad – that is a just limit to the size [of a tragedy]. (Aristotle 1997: 79 (1451a))

The term Aristotle is using is not story or narrative, but “plot” – yet I have decided to present this quote because the understanding of plot is often close to the understanding of story. The part of the quotation I would like to concentrate on is the ending, where Aristotle gives his “general definition”: according to him, a well-constructed plot should be of such a length that the action would contain a shift (a change), in whatever direction, between bad and good fortune.

There are some things that I would like to point out in Aristotle’s formulation. First, that it can be treated as (roughly) “cognitive” and not “Aristotelian”. If looked at this way, the prescriptive, normative element appears much less prominent. A

prototype is a “best” instance, therefore it seems that it would be entirely acceptable to describe a prototype in the terms that Aristotle uses. The “cognitive” component consists also in the fact that the definition is not quite as abstract as some of the ones that we will quote further on. According to Aristotle, plot should not just encompass any change at all, but a very specific change: from bad fortune to good or vice versa – thus the definition includes a semantic element.

I should emphasize that, strictly speaking, this is neither a definition of story, nor narrative, nor even plot. It is rather an attempt at outlining the “limit of length” that should be attained for a play to be “beautiful (...) in terms of size”. If it is a definition, then it is a definition of the “desirable length” of a plot, rather than of plot itself. Aristotle’s way of approaching this problem is very modern: he contemplates human cognitive abilities (“perception”), considers the practical aspects (the fact that plays are staged), and also attempts to set the definition in terms of story elements – emphasizing meaning and thus meaningfulness. Each of the three elements that comprise the definition has a part to play and introduces important restrictions.

A change from bad fortune to good or vice versa could easily be rendered in a single sentence, as well as in a gigantic multivolume literary cycle. What precludes the “one sentence” interpretation is our being told that “the longer [the action]” the better. The appeal to the limits of human perceptive capability (the plot has to be “perfectly clear”, has to be of a size that enables a human being to retain all of it “in memory”) and practical considerations (we are talking about plays and they have to be staged) serves to reduce the risk of excess at the other end of the spectrum. And the notion of “change of fortune” deals, in general terms, with the overall semantics of the content.

Let us now move on to another author. Roughly two millennia and two and a half centuries later we find Boris Tomashevsky offer-

ing the following succinct phrasing: “A story may be thought of as a journey from one situation to another.” (Tomashevsky 1925/1965: 70)⁹. What is striking is the similarity of this formulation to Aristotle’s: a change “from bad fortune to good, or from good to bad” (Aristotle) is, after all, a more specific variant of “a journey from one situation to another” (Tomashevsky). Tomashevsky is simply more abstract and casts the net wider (but then his objectives are different).

This is not the last time we can encounter this type of formula. Here is what we can find in Gerald Prince’s *A Grammar of stories*:

“A minimal story consists of three conjoined events. The first and third events are stative, the second is active. Furthermore, the third event is the inverse of the first. Finally, the three events are conjoined by three conjunctive features in such a way that (a) the first event precedes the second in time and the second precedes the third, and (b) the second event causes the third.” (Prince 1973: 31 (1.2.5); a similar definition, put in slightly more accessible terms can also be found in Prince 1987: 53; further reworkings are in Prince 2003: 5–6 and Prince 2008: 373 – the latter of these two is an almost word-for-word repetition of the former).

While there are some additional constraints added, the core of this definition is that of a process of change (the second “event”) between two static states (the first and third “events”). The rough framework, the skeleton of this definition is very similar to what was said by Tomashevsky. And since Prince notes that “the third event is the inverse of the first”, his formulation seems even closer to Aristotle’s “shifts of fortune” concept.

Another author who practically equals story with change is

⁹ A note on links between texts: this phrase first came to my attention as a quotation in Todorov’s Introduction to poetics (Todorov 1973/1997: 49). And the editors’ footnote to the English edition of Tomashevsky suggests that “Thematics” could be read “as Aristotle’s Poetics brought up to date.” (Tomashevsky 1925/1965: 71 note 8).

Gérard Genette. His definition starts off as a rather minimalistic model and is then elaborated: “For me, as soon as there is an action or an event, even a single one, there is a story because there is a transformation, a transition from an earlier state to a later and resultant state. ‘I walk’ implies (and is contrasted to) a state of departure and a state of arrival. That is a whole story, and perhaps for Beckett it would already be too much to narrate or put on stage.” (Genette 1983/1990: 19). Genette goes on to discuss, briefly, attempts (by others) at including additional constraints in similar definitions, and concludes: “In any case, to my mind these forms that are specified and therefore already complex are those, let us say, of the *interesting* story. But a story need not be interesting to be a story.” (Genette 1983/1990: 19).

While the first section of Genette’s definition is reduced to a minimum, to “pure change” so to speak, in the latter part he does mention the notion of “an earlier state” and “a later and resultant state”. It is quite striking how all these formulations conceptualize story or plot as something tripartite, something that has a beginning (stasis), middle (change), and end (stasis) – which, of course, is again reminiscent of Aristotle, as well as reminiscent of some of the ideas described in the introductory part of this essay (the link between permanence and change).

This notion of a certain completeness can be found in Todorov too, when beside *succession* he singles out the principle of *transformation*, giving as a sort of exemplary model the structure of the tale *The Swan-geese* (analyzed also by Propp), with its starting point defined as “1) the situation of equilibrium at the beginning” and its ending point as “5) the re-establishment of the initial equilibrium” (Todorov 1971: 39)¹⁰.

¹⁰ It is worth pointing out that Todorov’s model of “The 2 principles of narrative” has the features of a prototype model. In fact, when referring to “narratives” that are not characterized by these “principles”, Todorov calls them “in some sense of the word, marginal” (Todorov 1971: 39).

Patrick Colm Hogan, in *Affective narratology*, is even more specific. According to his classification “the minimal units of emotional temporality” (Hogan 2011: 32) in a story are “incidents”. These form “events”, and these in turn form “episodes”: “An ‘episode’ in this sense is a series of events that begins and ends in temporary normalcy. Above the episode, we have stories. A story begins and ends in permanent normalcy.” (Hogan 2011: 33). Therefore, we can say, the change that constitutes story is something that (at least prototypically) falls “in between” two states, is encapsulated by the relative stasis of beginning and end. And this isn’t just any kind of stasis: it is “normalcy”, an initial and final state of order (with the chaotic situation falling in between).

Where Todorov had “equilibrium”, Hogan has “normalcy”. For Schrödinger, equilibrium meant death. But here it seems rather to imply order (life). Such a structure seems reminiscent of Schrödinger’s assertion, quoted earlier, that “the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive” (Schrödinger 2006: 71). If we read Hogan’s model through Schrödinger, then the change would have something to do with countering (metabolism) a threat to life (entropy), while the two static points would represent order, the preservation of life. Thus the basic structure of narrative would be a reflection of the “dialectic of change and permanence” (Kępiński 1992: 9).

What is additionally striking in Hogan’s account is the similarity of structure between at least two levels of narrative: both episodes and stories are encapsulated by states of “normalcy”. In other words, a story as a whole is structurally similar to each of the elements that it is made up of. In “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative,” Roland Barthes writes: “it is most reasonable to postulate a homologous relation between sentence and discourse, assuming that a similar formal organization encompasses all semiotic systems, whatever their substances or dimensions.

Discourse would then be a large 'sentence' (whose units do not necessarily have to be sentences) in the same way that a sentence, allowing for certain specifications, is a small 'discourse.'" (Barthes 1966/1975: 240).

So it appears that, at least as far as the notion of change is concerned, one can indeed detect a certain homology between various levels of story. This is evident in Hogan's model, where episodes and stories share a similarity of structure, but it can also be noticed in Genette's theory. In *Narrative discourse* we read: "Since any narrative (...) is a linguistic production undertaking to tell of one or several events, it is perhaps legitimate to treat it as the development – monstrous, if you will – given to a *verbal* form, in the grammatical sense of the term: the expansion of a verb. *I walk*, *Pierre has come* are for me minimal forms of narrative, and inversely the *Odysee* or the *Recherche* is only, in a certain way, an amplification (in the rhetorical sense) of statements such as *Ulysses comes home to Ithaca* or *Marcel becomes a writer*." (Genette 1972/1983: 30). This homology would explain certain striking similarities between the definitions of event quoted in the preceding section and the definitions of story (or narrative) quoted here above: structurally, a story and an event would be very similar, would share the same general blueprint.

This feature, this homology of narrative, may be a consequence of the structure of events (or of change) – or perhaps a consequence of how we conceptualize them. Genette's understanding of "minimal forms of narrative" may not coincide with Prince's – the passage above can be read to mean that, for Genette, "minimal forms of narrative" are not instances of the minimal "units" that narrative is made up of, but rather reductions of the narrative as a whole (one-sentence summaries). This ambiguity is possible because of the homology.

Events (and therefore stories) seem to be divisible. If they are infinitely divisible, this could be called the narrative equivalent of

Zeno's "Dichotomy" paradox (see Huggett 2010): every event can be divided into stages and these stages in turn can be treated as separate events which can then be divided into stages etc.

However, I suspect there might be a (fuzzy) cognitive limit that does not permit an indefinite procedure of division. We do perceive reality in chunks, and certain of these chunks would seem indivisible. Consider for instance a bird flying from branch to branch. We may divide this single event into three stages (separate events): the take-off, the flight, and the landing. But is there anywhere further we could reasonably go from there? Would it make any sense to divide the take-off into three separate events? Perhaps it would, in some special cases, but I suspect that generally, cutting up events beyond a certain point would render them meaningless and unidentifiable. These limits are probably set by our perception and perhaps they are embodied in language too. But I am just guessing here, I am not certain. Maybe there are no limits to these divisions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This concludes our exploration of the links between the notion of change and the notion of story (or narrative, or plot, or event, or narrativity, or narration). We have come full circle and returned to human reflection on change (for what is movement, the subject of Zeno's paradoxes, if not a form of change?).

The purpose of this essay was not to prescribe a place for change in definitions of story, but rather to see how it is already present in those definitions that contain it (whether explicitly or implicitly). The overview was not designed to lead to some preconceived conclusion. I can only repeat some of the observations I made along the way.

One of those observations is that among the elements that various narratologists name as constitutive of story (or narrative etc.),

three appear to be closely linked with change. These are: causality, temporality, and eventfulness. Of these three, eventfulness appears to have the closest connection with the notion of change – to the extent that the theorists quoted here – Dijk, Hühn, and Chatman – seem to equate the notion of event with the notion of change.

The second observation is that Aristotle's account of the presence of change in plot is very modern, in that it incorporates the notion of human perception, an awareness of the pragmatics of literature (plays are staged), and a description of a prototypical semantic content of plots (thereby introducing the element of meaningfulness into his model).

The third observation is that definitions of story (or plot etc.) often suggest an elementary structure: two states linked by a change. This is characteristic of definitions of story "in general," as well as definitions of "minimal story," and even of definitions of event. We can therefore speak of a homology: a structural similarity between various levels of story (the structural outline is similar, whether we look at a story as a whole, or at its specific smaller segments). Several events can be encompassed in a sentence-long summary, but a single event can also be analyzed into a series of smaller "particle-events".

The central part of these elements is change. This shows the importance of the notion of change in thinking about story.

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IV.

IDENTITY
OR SIMILARITY IN ARTS

MAGDALENA SZCZYPIORSKA-MUTOR

“... AGAIN THE SAME GREY DOLL,
WITH ITS EYES AVERTED”
PHOTOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND DIFFERENCE
IN IVAN TURGENEV’S *CLARA MILITCH*¹

[...] the person or thing photographed is the target, the referent, a kind of little simulacrum, any eidolon emitted by the object, which I should like to call the Spectrum of the Photograph, because this word retains, through its root, a relation to ‘spectacle’ and adds to it that rather terrible thing which is there in every photograph: the return of the dead.²

“The same *grey doll*, with its eyes averted” is Clara Militch³, the character of Turgenev’s short story. Or, in fact, the Clara-Militch-photographed; Clara as portrayed in the photograph.

“The same *grey doll*, with its eyes averted”⁴ is a phrase from the

¹ This essay is a part of the author’s doctor dissertation written under direction of prof. Wincenty Grajewski.

² Roland Barthes, *Camera lucida. Reflections on Photography*, translated by Richard Howard, *New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981, p. 9.*

³ Orig., Клара Милич; also transliterated as ‘Milich,’ ‘Milič’. [Translator’s note.]

⁴ All quotations of the English version after: Ivan Turgenev, *Dream*

inner speech of Yakov Aratov as he watches a photograph of Clara: “He got up, went to the stereoscope . . . again the same grey doll, with its eyes averted.” The situational context gives Aratov’s observation varied shades of reflexion, and references, of essential importance, to the occurrences preceding the scene in question.

“The same *grey doll*, with its eyes averted”, as a formula taken out of the context, framed, is divisible into three elements that not only sketch the image of Clara-photographed but also outline the image of photography as an art related to the categories of identity and difference.

‘The same’, ‘*grey doll*’, ‘its eyes averted’: these three elements of the expression uttered by Aratov watching the photograph can be referred to three opposition pairs: *similar–other*, *alive–dead*, *present–absent*: the oppositions that in the history of photography lose their clarity and unambiguousness, contrast and depth of focus or field, whilst gaining meanings where the sequences *similar–alive–present/other–dead–absent* come closer to one another, intersect, merge, and untangle in a dynamic, unstable coexistence that is peculiar to photography.

I. PHOTOGRAPHY: IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE

Photography, moreover, began, historically, as an art of the Person: of identity, of civil status, of what we might call, in all senses of the term, the body’s formality.⁵

The reflexion regarding identity and difference, as developed in theory, philosophy and aesthetics of photography, has a rich

tales and prose poems. Translated from the Russian by Constance Garnett, eBooks@Adelaide, The University of Adelaide Library, University of Adelaide, <http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/t/turgenev/ivan/dream/index.html> [last uptd. Nov. 13, 2012]; passim.

⁵ Roland Barthes, op. cit., p. 79.

repertoire of takes and conceptualisations, with the notions themselves being defined in a variety of ways and referring one to multiple areas of meta-photographic studies and considerations. In the concepts closer connected with temporality of photography and its relation with memory and oblivion, photograph has a status of document or, sometimes, piece of evidence, whereas photography, being a record of what has once been, becomes an instrument of building an identity, one's own and social; of an individual and collective biography – through its function of constructing and reconstructing the past, history, one's personal reminiscences or recollections. The concepts closer to the issues of look/gaze, vision, anthropology of visibility, the categories of identity and difference often appear where the creative aspect of photography is problematised, with divergences and distance occurring between the photographed and as-photographed universe and thematised in a variety of ways. This much simplified distinction, which, on the one hand, does not extend to a number of phenomena and issues of photographic philosophy, whilst, on the other, dissecting and somewhat artificially partitioning certain disciplines (as e.g. new sociology of photography), all the same heuristically depicting a valuable map of possible meanings of 'identity' and 'difference' referring to photography, its philosophy and theory.

At the contact point of these two currents, or methods of pursuing meta-photographic reflexion, of which – in a crude generalisation – one would problematise photography as a copy of the world and the other, as a creation of the world, another field of research is situated where documentary and fiction, calque and fabrication, chemistry and alchemy of photography encounter and blend with one another. In this current, photography as an art of identity and difference, or rather, identity and change, poses questions about the status of the photographed entity; about the possibility of finding in a picture of what has been lost, the imaginary wanderings 'to the other side' of the frame, life,

photography. The basis for this photographic philosophy current is a tangle of issues related to a discussion, dating back to the nineteenth century, on photography as an art of vivification and mortification; to the concept of photography as a figure of life-and-death – a figure that is taken advantage of, also in its literary uses, where a photograph becomes an object of meditation over what is lost, a tool with which the identity of what is lost is determined and constructed, which is also true for one's own identity after the loss – wherever a photograph is an element of the labour of mourning, a work of art of deprivation; wherever in a photographic portrait opportunities and consequences of encountering face to face (eye to eye) what is photographically *similar–other, alive–dead, present–absent*.

II. “THE SAME GREY DOLL, WITH ITS EYES AVERTED”. CLARA MILITCH AND YAKOV ARATOV

In Turgenev's story, the motif of photograph, situated at the borderline of two universes: the world of the living and the world of the dead, appears in the function of a portrayal-rebellion, an image that reverses the course of events, changes the order of things and the order of the world of Aratov, the central character, for whom a photograph becomes the instrument of cognition, with respect to the individual portrayed within the frame and himself as well. The photograph of dead Clara is not so much an end of the characters' history as it reopens it, becoming its other beginning, corrected version that leads to a final in which, as in a photographic inversion, Clara, revived, encounters Aratov as he is dying.

1. *Clara–Aratov, a positive – a negative*

Who is Clara?

Clara is a young actress with a talent for music (as a close ac-

quaintance of Aratov has put it, “We cannot make out quite yet whether she is to be a Rachel or a Viardot . . .”). She is spontaneous and straightforward, her reactions to the world strong and vivid, whilst direct and indirect descriptions of her personality emphasise strength, ‘fierceness’ (“She was all fire, all passion . . .”), individualism, and no inclination to compromise, evident in trifle things and in essential choices of her life (“She used to say sometimes, ‘Such a one as I want I shall never meet . . . and no other will I have!’ ‘Well, but if you meet him?’; Anna would ask. ‘If I meet him . . . I will capture him.’ ‘And if he won’t let himself be captured?’ ‘Well, then . . . I will make an end of myself. It will prove I am no good.’”). At sixteen, Clara refused to espouse a candidate her father had chosen for her, and fled from home with an actress she had coincidentally met (“your cage is too small . . . it cramps my wings!”)

Who is Aratov?

A “young hermit”, he; “Of late he had taken a great fancy to photography.” In his relations with the world, in comprehending life and his own place amidst it, he is a opposition of Clara: retreating, cautious, shy, he avoided his own ideas being confronted with the reality, preoccupied with his photographic make-believe life. His interest in women focuses on their images: “He [...] especially held aloof from women, and lived in great solitude, buried in books. He held aloof from women, though he had a heart of the tenderest, and was fascinated by beauty. . . . He had even obtained a sumptuous English keepsake, and (oh shame!) gloated adoringly over its ‘elegantly engraved’ representations of the various ravishing Gulnaras and Medoras. . . . But his innate modesty always kept him in check.”

A twenty-year old, Yakov lived with his aunt, “without whom he could not stir hand or foot”, in a house furnished by his father, and “used to work in what had been his father’s study [...] and his bed was the very one in which his father had breathed his last.”

Clara, with her life, or wings, that would be cramped by any

cage, and Yakov, leading a secluded life in a “humble little house in Shabolovka”, form a pair of characters contrasted like fire and water, like a positive and a negative. They meet three times; the history of these meetings is a game of attraction and repulsion, misunderstandings and understatements. It is a game of glances: glances-recognitions and glances-disillusionments.

2. Clara and Aratov: a history of glances

Aratov has not memorised his first meeting with Clara – or perhaps has memorised it not quite markedly. Of the literary soirée at a Georgian princess, which Clara attended too, he would only “bear away in his heart a vague, painful impression; across which, however, flitted something incomprehensible to him, but grave and even disquieting”.

That he had already seen Clara, Aratov would remind himself during the second meeting, also at the princess’s. “Aratov, who from the very moment of Clara’s entrance had never taken his eyes off her, only at that instant recollected that he really had seen her at the princess’s; and not only that he had seen her, but that he had even noticed that she had several times, with a peculiar insistency, gazed at him with her dark intent eyes.” Clara’s eyes disturb and seduce Aratov at that second meeting again, and he finds her powerful gazes disruptive: “It seemed to him that her eyes, through the drooping eyelashes, were again turned upon him.” “He thought that she moved and held herself like one hypnotised, like a somnambulist. And at the same time she was unmistakably . . . yes! unmistakably looking at him.”

After the concert, he is being haunted by the reminiscence of Clara gazing at him:

He was agitated by strange sensations, incomprehensible to himself. In reality, Clara’s recitation, too, had not been quite to his taste . . . though he could not quite tell why. It disturbed him, this

recitation; it struck him as crude and inharmonious. . . . It was as though it broke something within him, forced itself with a certain violence upon him. And those fixed, insistent, almost importunate looks — what were they for? what did they mean?

Their first meeting is preceded by a letter Clara writes to Aratov. The letter is prefigured, anticipated, by Tatyana’s letter to Onegin, recited by Clara during the second meeting at the princess’s; the dissimilarity of Clara’s letter is emphasised through its comparison against Tatyana’s letter, which makes Clara’s letter abysmal (“[...] Aratov took down Pushkin, read Tatiana’s letter, and convinced himself again that the ‘gipsy girl’ had not in the least understood the real force of the letter.”)

In the course of their third meeting, on a boulevard, Clara’s ‘features’ are ‘hid’ under a thick veil, and Aratov sees her the way someone could see her if “walking by her side, a little behind her”. The moment Clara turns towards him is the first moment Aratov consciously receives and accepts her glance: “Clara suddenly turned to him, and he beheld such a terrified, such a deeply-wounded face, with such large bright tears in the eyes, such a pained expression about the parted lips, and this face was so lovely, that he involuntarily faltered, and himself felt something akin to terror and pity and softening.”

3. Clara and Aratov: a journey for a photograph

The history of the three meetings between Clara and Aratov, when read no more through the play of glances but as a train of events that will eventually turn the moment at the boulevard, the characters’ first co-glance, into their last moment-and-glance, can be recounted as follows:

During the second soirée at the princess’s, Clara appears on stage, reciting and singing; Aratov, who rather offhandedly com-

ments on her performance, is gripped neither by her talent nor her prettiness. Much unlike Clara: he writes a letter to him, offering him to meet. Aratov turns up at the fixed place, full of anxieties and angst, arrogant and disdainful. Clara, humiliated, regrets her decision, the letter and the idea to meet him. She commits suicide soon after, on the stage, during a spectacle, of which Aratov learns from a press announcement.

Obsessed with the thought about the dead Clara, he sees her appear in his dreams: a phantom figure, of whom he knows so little, and whose identity, decisions, and motivations are alien and unknown to him.

“If you want to know what I am, come over here!”, says Clara to Aratov in the last flash of a dream, just before he wakes up with a firm will to go “Here! [...] ‘Here!’”, which is, to Kazan. The dreamy spectre, the form assumed by the reappearing dead Clara, sends Aratov on a journey – to learn more about the ‘Unhappy Clara! poor frantic Clara!’ who took her life, probably from her love to Aratov.

“If you want to know what I am, come over here!”, Aratov sets off for Kazan, talks to the dead woman’s sister, reads Clara’s memoirist records. He is given a photographic portrait of her – and here is where part one of the story of Clara and Aratov ends, if measured and weighed, placing in the centre not the protagonists’ meeting, or Clara’s death, or the moment Aratov learns of her suicide – but the moment he looks at her photograph for the first time. This moment possibly commences another, better meeting between Clara and Aratov, originating their mutual relationship in a corrected, retouched version, in which Clara, dead then, marks her presence stronger, appears more expressly active and more efficient than her once-living counterpart.

4. *Photograph of Clara – costume, depth, medium, phantom*

Aratov is back from Kazan with a photograph of Clara, and with fragments of a history, facts, and images, as recounted by his sister. The photographic image of Clara attracts Aratov, and is messing with his head, becomes his fetish and obsession, an axis around which Aratov’s dreamy world begins to revolve, and accelerate ominously.

What, in specific, is known about the photography of Clara? It has two important traits. One of them is that Clara has been photographed in a stage costume, when acting: thus, it is her and not her, at the same moment. This effect of uncertain, unclear, double identity is reinforced by the specific pose of a model who “was looking away, as though turning from the spectators”. This shot is a replica of Clara-in-the-boulevard, as Aratov saw her, simultaneously, behind her and at her side.

The other peculiar aspect of Clara’s photograph is not really about what is contained within the frame but about how the photolithograph has been technically modified: soon after he returned home, Aratov fit the photograph to the stereoscope.

The photographic image that in Turgenev’s short story becomes an axis of the relationship between the characters, which resembles a revolving stage, is, therefore, a three-dimensional and thus, a particularly realistic effigy of a figure costumed as somebody else, is a stereoscopic portrait of an actress playing her part; an actress posing in a theatrical costume.

This uncommon image, in whose construction the effect of realness is, on the one hand, reinforced by three-dimensionality whilst being blurred, on the other hand, by the costume and the role, becomes a medium between the universe of Clara and that of Aratov, between the world of the living and the world of the dead; it becomes a contact point between the two universes that could have only met in this way – through photography.

The photograph of Clara, around which the narrative unfolds of life and death, of interpenetration of the two worlds, of their illusory negative-positive inversion, can be the reason and a pretext for posing questions about the essence of photographic image, the status of the subject photographed, the sense of photography as an art of identity and difference. This photograph is also a prop, whose powerful presence might suggest that the Turgenev short story be read through the filter of philosophy of photography; through the motif of ‘the same grey doll ... its eyes averted’; through *similar–other, alive–dead, present–absent*, in a double reference: to ‘Clara Militch’ and to the reflexions of Barthes, Belting, and Freedberg.

III. ‘THE SAME’ – ‘GREY DOLL’ – ‘ITS EYES AVERTED’: SIMILAR–OTHER, ALIVE–DEAD, PRESENT–ABSENT

1. *Similar–dissimilar*

“But resemblance is a nebulous concept and one that has found new meaning since the invention of photography”.⁶

“It was not she, and yet it was no one else”⁷, Roland Barthes wrote in his essay *The Light of Image*. After the death of his mother, looking through pictures featuring her, he tried to find one that would most completely render the essence of her being, he would ask himself if he could actually recognise her (“And here the essential question first appeared: did I *recognise* her?”).⁸

I never recognised her except in fragments, which is to say that I missed her being, and that therefore I missed her altogether. It

⁶ Hans Belting, *An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body*, transl. Thomas Dunlap, Princeton University Press, first publ. 2001, p. 62.

⁷ Roland Barthes, op. cit. p. 65.

⁸ Ibidem, p. 65.

was not she, and yet it was no one else. I would have recognised her among thousands of other women, yet I did not ‘find’ her. I recognised her differentially, not essentially. Photography thereby compelled me to perform a painful labour; straining toward the essence of her identity, I was struggling among images partially true, and therefore totally false. To say, confronted with a certain photograph, ‘That’s almost the way she was!’ was more distressing than to say, confronted with another, ‘That’s not the way she was at all.’ The almost: love’s dreadful regime, but also the dream’s disappointing status – which is why I hate dreams.⁹

In Turgenev’s short story, Aratov does not deal with a whole collection of photographs among which he could look for a Clara of his own; but there is no history they would have shared to now enable such a search, one that would diversify the degree of similarity between a portrait and the inner image developed in Aratov’s memory with reminiscences, trivialities, the time experienced together with Clara. Aratov’s response to the photograph of Clara is, thus, quite an immediate ascertainment: seeing a photograph of her for the first time, he takes a closer look at it and finds that there is a resemblance: “In the photograph she was looking away, as though turning from the spectators; her thick hair tied with a ribbon fell in a coil on her bare arm. Aratov looked a long time at the photograph, thought it like [...]”.

What does this mean? What is similarity, or resemblance, in photography? Who is *almost*-Clara?

Writing about the anxiety ensuing from an ‘outline of the truth’ discovered in a photograph, Barthes concludes:

This is what happens when I judge a certain photograph ‘a likeness’. Yet on thinking it over, I must ask myself: Who is like what? Resemblance is a conformity, but to what? to an identity. Now this

⁹ Ibidem, pp. 65–66.

identity is imprecise, even imaginary, to the point where I can continue to speak of 'likeness' without ever having seen the model.¹⁰

And, he continues:

All I look like is other photographs of myself, and this to infinity: no one is ever anything but the copy of a copy, real or mental [...]. Ultimately a photograph looks like anyone except the person it represents. For resemblance refers to the subject's identity, an absurd, purely legal, even penal affair; likeness gives out identity 'as itself', whereas I want a subject – in Mallarmé's terms – 'as into itself eternity transforms it'. Likeness leaves me unsatisfied and somehow sceptical [...].¹¹

This 'un-satisfaction', or want, drives Barthes toward looking for the only, the most important photograph of his mother – the one in which he could recognise the 'essence' or the fullest expression of her; once he discovers that "It is her! For certain, it's her!", his desire to "finally *get to know*" pushes him toward more photographic manipulations:

I want to enlarge this face in order to see it better, to understand it better, to know its truth [...]. I believe that by enlarging the detail 'in series' [...] I will finally reach my mother's very being. [...] I live in the illusion that it suffices to clean the surface of the image in order to accede to what is behind: to scrutinize means to turn the photograph over, to enter into the paper's depth, to reach its other side. Alas, however hard I look, I discover nothing [...].¹²

Aratov, whose desire can also be described using the Barthesian formula: "finally *get to know*", makes an attempt to handle in

¹⁰ Roland Barthes, op. cit., pp. 100–102.

¹¹ Ibidem, pp. 102–103.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 99–100.

his photographic laboratory the eluding, looking-away Clara; with use of some technical tricks, he attempts at rendering her closer to him – not only metaphorically but quite literally too: “He took up her photograph, he began reproducing it, enlarging it. Then he took it into his head to fit it to the stereoscope. He had a great deal of trouble to do it . . . at last he succeeded. He fairly shuddered when through the glass he looked upon her figure, with the semblance of corporeal solidity given it by the stereoscope.”

At last, when Clara appears before Aratov, in a manner that leaves no serious doubt as to her identity, she resembles an animated doll from a stereoscope: “What was that? On an easy-chair, two paces from him, sat a woman, all in black. Her head was turned away, as in the stereoscope. . . . It was she! It was Clara!”

Aratov’s conscious and uninformed efforts to render Clara-as-photographed similar to the real Clara, to enlarge, embody, and retrieve her through the photograph, are part of a long process, in which Aratov passes from rejecting the living Clara to desiring to regain a Clara who is dead; the process takes its course not only through his direct contacts with Clara or her spirit but also in constructing and deconstructing the images or concepts of Clara, in a series of resemblances and negations, fittings, and failed attempts at adjusting Clara to the conventions known to Aratov, and determining her identity in a version that would not be a threat to Aratov. Clara alive, compared – whether directly or in a slightly oblique manner – to women being ‘safe’ to Aratov, to women immobilised in graphic or literary images, is still, obstinately, dissimilar to them – not only in a visual sense. First of all, she would not resemble Aratov’s mother, but rather (this being another woman’s portrait of importance to the story), to a watercolour portrait of the mother (and yet there ‘should have been’ a resemblance, for this is the only type of woman Aratov would be inclined to come to love). She does not resemble the ‘Gulnaras and Medoras’ from his album; she is not similar to Tatiana; Aratov calls into question even

her similarity to ‘a Rachel or a Viardot’ (as far as describing the talents is concerned). And, she is not similar to the image Aratov has created for himself on the basis of their three meetings (a representation that has been frustrated owing to the story told by Anna). Clara is different, and her otherness is unacceptable to Aratov; the moment he has decided he can and is willing to accept it comes is too late. This simple diagnosis ought however to be expressed otherwise: Aratov will acknowledge that he is willing to accept her *exactly because* it is too late now. Clara’s otherness is only acceptable in irreality, illusion, dream, progressive insanity, and only when Clara is not alive – for it was, indeed, the life of Clara, a surfeit or excess of life in Clara, that Aratov was afraid of.

Who is it that Clara, as photographed, embodied in the stereoscope, resembles? That emancipated photographic phantom, of whom Aratov says, ‘It’s her! It’s Clara!’. Repeating after Barthes, “Photograph makes an image of an individual ‘as s/he is’, whereas I would like him/her there to be ‘as s/he really is, inside him/her’”, the statement can be risked that ‘It’s her! It’s Clara!’ most of all resembles Aratov’s image-idea wherein he has managed to accept and accommodate Clara’s otherness and ‘dissimilarity’ – no more threatening, but such which appears controllable: in the imagination, in visions, and dreams. Clara’s photographic phantom is not a Clara ‘as she really is, inside her’: it is, instead, a Clara of Aratov, ‘as he really is, inside him’, tailored, or framed, to his format. Resembling Clara and different than her; photographically identical and photographically different; ‘it’s Clara’ and ‘it’s her’.

2. *Alive–dead*

We fear the lifelike because the dead substance of which the object is made may yet come alive.¹³

¹³ David Freedberg, *The power of images. Studies in the History and Theory of Response*. The University of Chicago Press 1989, p. 231.

Clara's death is a fragment of a performance, of a spectacle; is an occurrence illegally made part of the script. Clara drank a poison before act one of the play he took part in, and she continued playing her role. “And directly the curtain fell, she dropped down there, on the stage. Convulsions . . . and convulsions, and within an hour she was dead!” Clara's death, her suicidal death, is not only part of her acting on the stage; on a different plane, it is an element of the game Clara plays with Aratov. Rejecting Clara the living one, Aratov is helpless and defenceless against Clara the dead one, who after her death is back in the world of the living, in an image. The image of Clara, the photograph of Clara, is a medium between the world of the dead and the world of the living; a medium – that is, intermediary, and a medium in the basic meaning, of which Belting wrote:

“The use of pictorial media can be traced back to funeral cult (...). In cult usage, the dead exchange their bodies for an image that remains present. In order to give that image a presence, to make possible the re-presentation of the lost body, a medium becomes essential. We may speak of it as a medium between death and life. For such archetypal images, presence was far more important than likeness to the person represented. A relative latecomer to this tradition of death rituals was the modern “medium”, of nineteenth-century spiritual séances. A living person offered his or her body to a dead person as a “medium”, who would transmit the voice of the departed. Here the ancient notion of giving embodiment to the dead (not in an image, but in a living person) returned in a hybrid form.”¹⁴

After her death, Clara returns in an image, but her desire to ‘remain amidst the living’ is but a means, not an objective. Aratov is the goal, ‘winning’ Aratov (whatever this should mean from Clara's otherworldly perspective), and Clara pursues this goal with iron

¹⁴ Hans Belting, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

consistency. Aratov, alive or dead, is the target. But who is the returning Clara? How much of life, and how much of death one finds in her?

A photographic image, Clara's photograph being one such, comprises a tangle of life and death, discernible in the earliest stage of reflexion on photography; a tangle Belting thus wrote about:

“A modern brand of archaism shows itself in our effort to banish death. For banishing death was the original goal that mankind hoped to achieve through the image, but now, in spite of all, the image leads us to a new experience of death. The subject, in the moment when his lighted image is frozen by the camera, is like a living dead person. The new picture that gives such abundant evidence of life, can in fact only produce a shadow. One can no longer escape ones own image: it drives the very life that it records out of the body.”¹⁵

In Turgenev's plot, the problem of photographic 'life-and-death'¹⁶ goes to another level: the photographic phantom of Clara gets emancipated, her spirit leaves the stereoscope and begins living its own life. Clara negates, transcends the frozen, lifeless immo(va)bility of the photograph, splits away from her own, photographically put to death, effigy. This is no more merely a negation of death (for Clara returns, eludes the nether world): now it extends to negation of photographic death (as Clara evades photographic freeze and immobility).

From the standpoint of spiritist contexts of photography, the living, though spectral, presence of the photographed Clara is, in Turgenev's story, an element that breaches the borderline between

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 121.

¹⁶ Cf. Ренате Лахмани «Медиум: Фантазматизация фотографии – 'Клара Милич' Тургенева» (Пер. Г. Потаповой). «Дискурсы фантастического», Москва 2009, pp. 233–270.

the world of the living and the world of the dead. Clara's spectre has an unclear identity, undefined status: Clara, the one Aratov has met three times, is doubtlessly dead, but her ambiguous activity in the world of the living challenges not only the sharpness and impermeability of the limits between the universes but also the legitimacy of the spatial arrangement of their residents: the dead Clara seems more alive and intense than Aratov, the living man, has ever been. In line with the distribution of roles, quite clearly determined from the beginning of the plot, according to which Clara is active and Aratov remains passive, also the otherworldly provenance and understated astral consistency are not an obstacle for Clara to play the role of a creator of the consecutive occurrences, although it could seem at moments that Aratov was the driving force. Clara's ghost, emerging out of dream, photography, and Aratov's feverish visions, operates actively and efficiently; given the strength of Clara's spirit, the strength of her desire, the borders between the worlds become not only blurred but also benignantly open.

Clara's photograph is not only a medium with use of which the girl is persistently present in the lives of the living (at least, in Aratov's life); not only is it a gateway, a passage, open to the two worlds (two sides of the world): it is also the axis of a revolving stage on which the characters appear and disappear, crossing the borders of the world of the alive and the world of the dead. Clara returns from the otherworld not only in order to demonstrate her presence to Aratov; not only does she return *to* Aratov – she is back there *to fetch* him.

Initially taking a sceptical stance toward his own visions, feels ravished, conquered, and defeated as his contacts with Clara the phantom develop – or perhaps, as his own sickness develops. He believes he is in love with Clara, and is willing to be with her.

‘But what next? We cannot live together, can we? Then must I die so as to be with her? Is it not for that she has come; and is it not

so she means to take me captive?

‘Well; what then? If I must die, let me die. Death has no terrors for me now. It cannot, then, annihilate me? On the contrary, only *thus* and *there* can I be happy . . . as I have not been happy in life, as she has not. . . .

In the final section of the story, Clara once again proposes her own version of ‘life-and-death’, as she breaches the borderline between the universes in a double motion: not only is she back with ‘this world of here’ as a photographic spectre, but also takes Aratov with her to ‘that other world’.

The game played between the two worlds, their unclear interpenetration, becomes a sort of inversion: Clara, dead and photographed, and living Aratov meet at the outset, whilst a spectrally enlivened Clara and Aratov – dying, planning a happy otherworldly future he has never experienced in his life, meet again at the end destination.

3. *Present–absent*

“Presence and absence are inextricably intertwined in the riddle of the image”.¹⁷

In Clara and Aratov’s history, the metaphorical presence of the photographed entity consistently unfolds into a literal, though ambiguous, presence. On the one hand, in Aratov’s visions, Clara appears as a visible figure; on the other, only Aratov meets her from time to time. The narrator’s suggestions situate Clara’s presence in the sphere of dreams, delusions and hallucinations; the only possible proof of her existence-coming-true, a cowlick of her hair in the dying man’s tightened hand, immediately loses the status of piece-of-evidence as the narrator suggests that it was perhaps Clara’s sister that had slid the lock in between the records Aratov took away.

¹⁷ Hans Belting, *op. cit.*, p. 19–20.

Since the day he was back from Kazan, Aratov feels “in the power of another life, another being”; the stereoscopic image, with its freshly acquired corporeality, seems to be leaving the viewer and haunt Aratov when asleep and when awake, with a whole repertoire of means of expression typical to phantoms: thus, Clara is seen whispering, playing the upright piano, making noise, stealthily sneaking by the walls. Aratov responds with a blend of fear and rationality, curiosity and irritation; he checks what about the photograph: “He got up, went to the stereoscope . . . again the same grey doll, with its eyes averted”: this calms him down – and irritates him at the same time. In a dream, which seems to be reality, and in consciousness which resembles a dream, Aratov, uncertain as to what a being he is dealing with, appears hesitant: “Either it’s all nonsense . . . or she is here.”

The figure of a phantom of unclear identity, a ghost, shadow, lookalike, whose photographic emanation upsets the clear distinction between the world of the living and the world of the dead, is an important motif in Turgenev, an important literary topos, and it moreover is a metaphor strongly present in the currents of photographic philosophy that stress a magical aspect of the phenomenon of photograph. The sources of this afterthought are rooted in the beginnings of photography, in the variously rationalised fear of photographic camera, which *takes* something *off* the world being photographed, in order to render it in the picture. Fundamental for this current of reflexion on photography is the question about the photographic phenomenon of presence of what is actually absent, as well as about the connection between the photographed individual and his/her effigy, about their identities and difference; about the existence and character of emanation of the photographed life; about the motives and type of emotional transference, of bestowing a photograph with the power of an amulet, a replacement object. These questions have been posed by Barthes, Bazin, Morin, or – most expressly, perhaps – by Edouard

Pontremoli, who thus wrote on the presence of the photographed subject: “A flawless film loaded with life. Is it what the alchemical secret of photography is about? Every sensible granule on this substratum turns into an organic particle.”¹⁸ In Pontremoli’s view, the photographic fixing of an image, the grasp of the presence of the photographed model is a “peculiar biological penetration”, “infiltration through the granulation’s molecules”. In this poetic vision, the human face in the picture is still alive – “not because it has been impressed like a shadow on a white sheet but because it has enlivened an inert matter”.¹⁹

The case of Clara and Aratov, the poetic vision of a spectre’s return from the otherworld – the return that is accomplished through photography, seems to be a deft literary exemplification of the major motifs of the current in the theory and philosophy of photography which John Tagg has described as alchemical.

The issue of identity of the photographed subject and its ambiguous presence has been analysed, from a somewhat different perspective, by David Freedberg, who observes that:

Photographs of living beings have the same potentiality as realistic wax images, even though it may be less frequently fully realised. [...] The imprisonment of presence in representation gives the fixed image its potentiality; then it may be cherished or become a fetish. At the very least it remains unchanged and ever ready for reconstitution, and that takes us unawares. Reconstitution begins even before we deny and suppress it.²⁰

Clara’s presence is a hallucinatory or spectral one. She appears and disappears; her (re)appearances have to do with peeping

¹⁸ Edouard Pontremoli, *La photogénie ou l’excès du visible. Un essai sur l’apparaître du photographié*, Ed. Pontremoli, 1995, p. [].

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 32.

²⁰ David Freedberg, op. cit., pp. 234–235.

into the stereoscope: when Aratov does not look into his viewer, his world is closer to reality and rationality; when he stares at the three-dimensional picture, Clara gives notice.

Clara's photograph is a specific representation, and this owing to its 'corporeality', as Aratov put it, which is due to its three-dimensionality. By processing the picture into the stereoscopic version, Aratov reinforced the effect of presence of the subject photographed; using Freedberg's language, he offered himself the guidelines making it possible to directly sense this effect:

Almost every image provides its beholders with clues to the organic presences registered upon it. When those clues are so abundant and exact that they combine to form what is regarded as an unusually lifelike image, then responses to it are predicated on a sense of its living reality [...]. Response to all images, and not only ones perceived as being more or less realistic, is predicated on the progressive reconstitution of material object as living.²¹

The ambiguous status of Clara's phantom provokes Aratov to search for evidence of her identity and presence; in Aratov's doubtful (metaphorical and literal) revolving around the phantom, the motif of glance, eyes, looking face to face reappears once again – so clearly evoked in anthropological concepts of relationships of image and death:

“The sense we have of a presence is the result of an exchange of facial signs, our face addressing that of the image, whose life is most powerfully felt in its gazing eyes. The eyes, then, are to be understood as symbol and not simply as an aspect of the reembodiment of the figure.”²²

²¹ Ibidem, p. 245.

²² Hans Belting, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

For Aratov, Clara *is* when she looks at him; with time, as his obsession develops, Aratov *is*, and exists, if (and only if) Clara looks at him. The first glances into the stereoscope, albeit astonishingly realistic owing to the three-dimensionality of image, end up in disillusionment – Clara’s sight is averted:

But the figure was grey, as though covered with dust . . . and moreover the eyes — the eyes looked always to one side, as though turning away. A long, long while he stared at them, as though expecting them to turn to him . . . he even half-closed his eyelids on purpose . . . but the eyes remained immovable, and the whole figure had the look of some sort of doll.

In order to finally determine the phantom’s identity, to prove its presence to himself, Aratov invents his own test of reality, proof of existence, gauge of presence, which Clara passes propitiously:

‘Clara,’ he began, in a faint but steady voice, ‘why do you not look at me? I know that it is you . . . but I may fancy my imagination has created an image like *that one* . . .’ — he pointed towards the stereoscope — ‘prove to me that it is you. . . Turn to me, look at me, Clara!’

Clara’s hand slowly rose . . . and fell again.

‘Clara! Clara! turn to me!’

And Clara’s head slowly turned, her closed lids opened, and her dark eyes fastened upon Aratov.

He fell back a little, and uttered a single, long-drawn-out, trembling ‘Ah!’

The ‘Ah!’ Aratov utters is not a mere ‘Ah!’; it is not simply a signal of recognition, confirmation, but it also indirectly heralds his forthcoming death: this “half-whispered ah!” was a silent “habitual exclamation”; Aratov’s father “even died with this exclamation on

his lips, two years after his removal to Moscow”.

The photographic and spectral presence of the absent Clara is in Turgenev’s short story something more than a phenomenon of photographic presence of what is really absent. Clara exceeds the restrictions of photograph: she moves her sight from an unknown point within the frame’s emptiness and redirects it toward Aratov, exchanges gazes with him, looks into his eyes. This is the moment of ultimate recognition, determination of presence and identity, as well as the moment death stares Aratov in the face.

IV. CLARA-AND-ARATOV:
“*SEEING ONESELF, IN THE IMAGE, AS SOMEONE
ELSE*”

Reading Clara Militch through the filter of photography, a filter that sharpens what is like–other, living–dead and present–absent, outlines the repertoire of problems and questions regarding the figure of photography as an art of identity and difference, or rather, identity-and-difference, for this opposition can also be apparent in photography. Where the sequences *similar–living–present* and *other–dead–absent* get entwined and untwined in series of photographic transformations, in the dynamics of photographic ‘and–and’ decisions, coming at times in place of the reductive ‘or–or’, photography blends the designs, confounds, plays with inversion.

The photographic history of Clara and Aratov, or rather (since Aratov’s death), of Clara-and-Aratov, can be read not only as a story on love and ghosts; not only as a literary illustration of reflexions on photographic image and its position in the history of effigies, philosophical connotations and consequences of peculiar properties of photographic record, but also as a study of photographic illusions and photographic phantoms and fallacies:

“From the perspective of anthropology, we are not the masters of our images, but rather in a sense at their mercy; they colonize our bodies (our brains), so that even if it seems that we are in charge of generating them, and even though society attempts unceasingly to control them, it is in fact the images that are in control. Images both affect and reflect the changing course of human history. They leave, for example, no doubt about how changeable human nature is. (...) Instead of reinventing themselves, people reinvent the images they live with. Uncertainty about themselves creates the desire to change the images of their self-representation.”²³

Seen from such a perspective, Turgenev’s photographic story poses one more question – the one about the game of identity and difference played between the photographed subject and the gazing subject; about an attempted reading where Clara disappears halfway through the story. There is nothing of Clara – what is, is “the same grey doll, her eyes averted”; there is Aratov, with his desire, and a literary variation anticipating Roland Barthes’s formula: “For the Photograph is the advent of myself as other: a cunning dissociation of consciousness from identity.”²⁴

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²³ Hans Belting, op. cit., p. 9–10.

²⁴ Roland Barthes, op. cit. p. 12.

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MIRYANA YANAKIEVA

IDENTITY AND INTERPRETATION
IN THE “IMMATERIAL” ARTS
(LITERATURE AND MUSIC)

Every object, which supposes multiple interpretations is an object whose identity is rather problematic. Every particular interpretation creates a different representation of the interpreted object and this is exactly the difference between the interpretations that justifies and makes meaningful their multitude. On the contrary, the notion of identity is determined by the sameness. Because of that, every new interpretation is a kind of test for the ability of the interpreted object to remain identical with itself and to keep the features guaranteeing its recognizability. In fact, the main problem in regards to the definition of identity is to determine the nature of this kind of features, and to answer the question whether they have to belong to the material side or to the meaning of the work of art, without forgetting, of course, that the distinction between matter and meaning is rather artificial.

The tension between the possibility of multiple interpretations, on the one hand, and the possibility of an immutable identity, on the other hand, is most typical for the “immaterial” arts such as literature and music. I call them “immaterial” in order to underline the obvious fact that the identity of the literary work as

well as that of the musical work do not coincide with their material side – the black notes or letters on the white pages of the book or of the score. This peculiarity of music and literature determines them as *allographic* arts and distinguishes them from the *autographic* arts, according to the well-known Nelson Goodman's terms. The difference between these two categories of arts lies in the possibility or the impossibility of counterfeiting. Even the most accurate reproduction of a painting does not and cannot have a statute of authenticity, while the multiple copies of a novel or a symphony partition are also exact copies of the same work. According to Gérard Genette in his commentary of Nelson Goodman's theory, it is impossible to make a forgery to the allographic works because of the fact that these works possess two types of properties: *constitutive* properties and *contingent* properties. The second type of properties entirely depends on the interpreter's freedom.

The application of allographic regime, Genette explains, comes about "as the result of a mental operation that does not depend, a priori, on any established notation, and that is, indeed, by no means restricted to artistic practices".¹ The peculiarity of this kind of mental operation lies in the fact that it is accompanied by a "physical act of repetition", through which a given material object is "reproduced" in some way other than by mechanical imprint. In order to illustrate his idea Genette proposes several examples related to different arts. Here I will refer to only one of them, which concerns a musical reproduction:

If I sing the first eleven notes of *Au clair de la lune* and ask my volunteer assistant to do the same, nothing he produces in his voice will be identical to the sound I have emitted, apart from the musical entity "do-do-do-re-mi, etc."²

¹ Genette, G. *The work of art*, t. 1. Cornell University Press, 1997

² Ibid.

As Genette emphasizes, the object produced in such an act, is itself a singular physical object, which, because it is not exactly re-iterable, belongs to the autographic regime. So, the mental operation and the accompanying physical act, both presented with the example above, require to be placed under certain conditions in order to can move towards the allographic regime. More precisely, the two repetitions of *Au clair de la lune* must be considered with respect to what they have in common with some abstract model of the song they reproduce. For instance, this might be a *particular tempo*. In this case the act of iteration would no longer be regarded as a “second occurrence” (I sing first and other person sings the same notes after me), but rather as a more or less “faithful imitation” of an abstract model. The conclusion is that the difference between the first case (the autographic mode) and the second one (the allographic mode) “does not depend on the degree of similarity between occurrences but, rather, on the status assigned the first occurrence”³.

Allographic situations, Genette goes on, always comprise certain instruments of specific identification that autographic situations very well do without; and exactly these instruments relate to the type of properties Genette defines as contingent. For instance, *words* and *tone* are constitutive features, while *timbre*, *accent* and so on, are contingent features “of the verbal or musical object”⁴.

I think we have a reason to conclude that exactly the fact that the allographic works of art possess contingent properties makes more visible the difference between reproduction and interpretation. Only constitutive properties could be a subject of reproduction, while this is the act of interpretation, which creates the contingent properties.

No act of interpretation would be necessary or even possible if the interpreted object was self-sufficient or if it did not carry in

³ Ibid., p. 84

⁴ Ibid., p. 85

itself the tendency to “overflow” (*déborder*). This tendency is on the base of two modes of existence, which are characteristic for the works of art: *immanence* and *transcendence*. As Genette argues, the immanence is defined by the mode of being, in which the work *is*, the transcendence is defined by the ways in which the work *overflows*. In the context of these reflections it seems rather appropriate to define the interpretation as one of the possible modes of overflowing of the work of art.

In an article, written in collaboration and entitled “Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World?”⁵ the two authors Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin deduce their observations on the conflict between the singularity of the text and the multiplicity of the interpretations of a literary work from their own answer of the question *how* two contradictory statements, concerning a same subject, could both be true. According to them, the solution is the following: conflicting statements, if true, are true in different worlds. A world, in which the earth is in motion, is not one, in which the earth is at rest.

So, if two contradictory statements concerning a same subject can be true only in two different worlds, is the situation with the irreconcilable interpretations of the same literary text analogical? According to Goodman and Elgin, such an analogy would be misleading. As they say, the analogy between works and worlds neglects an important difference: that while conflicting versions cannot describe the same world, conflicting interpretations may interpret the same text. The text, unlike the world, does not dissolve under opposing accounts. Moreover, no matter where the identity of a literary work is located, disagreement among interpretations differs significantly from disagreement among versions. Opposing

⁵ Goodman, N. and Elgin, C. “Interpretation and Identity: Can the Work Survive the World?” In: *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Spring 1986), pp. 564–575. Published by: The University of Chicago Press. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343542>

interpretations concern a single text, whereas opposing versions have no common ground.

The conclusion is that *the text* remains the most reliable support of the identity of literary works. The text is always syntactically **identifiable** without taking into account anyone of its possible semantic interpretations. But this undeniable fact doesn't revoke the necessity of asking questions like these: Whether the availability of multiple right interpretations of a single text in a single world gives rise to multiple works associated with that text? Is a work to be identified with the text or with an interpretation of it? If the work is identical with one of its multiple interpretations, how do you know which of these is the best because it is clear that even if we have a very certain information about the author's intention, to understand what the author meant and to understand the work are two different things?

According to Goodman and Elgin, if we accept that the different interpretations of the same text are different works, we lose the very important distinction between a single work with multiple interpretations and a multiplicity of works – the distinction, roughly, between *Ulysses* and the complete works of Agatha Christie. Here they refer to the proverbial example of Pierre Menard. The two authors do not share the well spread opinion according to which the Borges' story is an illustration of the idea that two completely different works can correspond to one text. They contend, however, that the supposed two works are actually one. Perhaps, Menard can be credited with two achievements: having produced a replica of the text without copying it; and having formulated a new interpretation of the work – a way of reading it as a contemporary story in an archaic style with a different plot. But neither singly nor jointly do these amount to creating a new work. What Menard wrote is simply another inscription of the text. More precisely, it is the same text and is open to all the same interpretations as the instances consciously inscribed by Cervantes, Menard, and the various unknown

copyists, printers, and typesetters who produced instances of the work. Questions of the intention or intelligence of the producer of a particular inscription are irrelevant to the identity of the work. Any inscription of the text, no matter who or what produced it, bears all the same interpretations as any other. Menard may in some way have proposed or inspired a new interpretation of the text, but no more than any other admissible interpretation offered before or since, or by others.

These reflections lead both authors to the following conclusion: **the identity of a literary work is located in the text, that is to say it is syntactically determinable.**

Another identity mark of the literary works as allographic ones relates to their history of production. The issue of authorship is, in any way, less important in allographic arts than in autographic ones. For the very identity of a painting, etching or sculpture turns on the question who produced it and by what means. Nothing but a particular product of Botticelli's hand can satisfy the identity conditions of *La Primavera*. The identity of a literary or musical work, however, does not depend on the answers to such questions. It simply does not matter to the identity of *Don Quixote* who wrote it or when.

After the observations presented above I would like to ask the following question: could we claim, by leaning on the similarities between literature and music as allographic arts, that the partition relates to the identity of the musical work of the similar way the text relates to the identity of the literary work? Here I would like to recall the words of Roman Ingarden who claims that the musical work is not identical neither with a someone's experience – that of the composer or of the listener, nor with the partition, nor with a concrete performance. As Ingarden says, it is like that because every concrete performance is an element of the daily reality, which is accessible to us, and which, somehow or other, depends on the surrounding conditions, while the musical work in itself, at the time

of its creation, depends not at all on the reality, which surrounds it. (I have to specify that Ingarden had in mind only the pure music without words.)

The idea that the identity of the musical work does not consist in any material level, including that of the concrete interpretation, is crucial in the conceptual framework of the contemporary musical Platonism. According to its followers, for example Peter Kivy, the musical works are universal sound structures and they are not created but discovered like theorems in mathematics. The opponents of this view like Jerrold Levinson for example retort that the musical work cannot be universal because it possesses perceptive properties. P. Kivy answers back that only the concrete performances have such properties. But the properties of a musical work are not reducible to those of its performances then musical work is not identical to its performances. The real distinction between the musical work and its performances rests on the distinction between a species and its examples. Thus, the relation between the work and its exemplifications is not symmetric: the last ones depend on the first one and not conversely. Indeed, the work of music exists independently of all its possible performances while these depend on it (ontologically and semantically). As Peter Kivy says, a lion is not a substitute or a double of the species, but its instance. In the same way, the performance is an instance of the work, not a substitute of it.

When Peter Kivy insists that the work of music is a kind of discovery or invention and not of creation, he gives the example with Wright brothers. According to him, the main reason for saying that what they made is an invention lies on the fact that what they invented (the airplane) had not existed before. But Gödel has discovered the theorem carrying its name and Mozart has discovered its music rather than he has created it. If Mozart was a creator, he was rather like the demiurge of Plato, than like Yahweh who has created the world *ex nihilo*. In short, the musical Platonism claims

that the works of music as structural types exist before any composition. Jerrold Levinson answers back that they do not exist before the activity of the composer and are brought to the existence by this activity.

The brief review of ideas I made above shows that the question about the identity of literary and musical work is one of the most intricate and it does not have an unambiguous answer. I am convinced that one of the most important premises for the difficulty of this question lies in the specific role of the interpretation for the existence of both arts. Of course, there are authors like Arthur Danto who claims that in all arts, not only in literature and music, interpretations constitute the works of art, so that you do not, as it were, have the artwork on one side and the interpretation on the other⁶. However, every art depends on the interpretation in a different way. This way is not the same for literature and for music. The social existence of the musical works is impossible if they are not performed or interpreted, but the situation with the literary works is not the same. As Nelson Goodman says, a not recited poem is not so abandoned that a not sung aria. Adorno, in his turn, underlines the fact that to interpret a musical work means to perform it, while to interpret a literary work means to understand it.

However, the practice to call 'interpretation' the musical performance is relatively recent. It dates about the half of the 19th century. But regardless of the name that we would like to choose for the action of the interpreter, instrumentalist or singer, without the

⁶ Arthur Danto believes that artworks are constituted by their interpretations; that what makes this artwork *this* one and not *that* one is that *this* one means one thing and *that* one means something else. The art-critical project, on this view, is crucial to the metaphysical one, for if one's interpretation of an artwork is wrong, one has wrongly identified it. In fact, one is not actually talking about *this* artwork at all. "If interpretations are what constitute works, Danto writes, there are no works without them and works are misconstituted when interpretation is wrong."

intermediation of this action, the listener could not perceive any musical work. But the reader of literary text does not need such an intermediation. So that the literary work passes from a state of potentiality to a state of realization or concretization, if we prefer the term of Ingarden, it just has to be read, while the musical work has to be interpreted. But as we cannot enter twice into the same river, a musical work cannot be interpreted twice in the same way (absolutely the same). It is not possible even for the same interpreter. Moreover, the performer can never reproduce completely one of his/her own previous interpretations. He/she cannot make a total imitation of him/herself. In other words, even if every performance follows generally the prescriptions of the score, it is impossible to repeat completely any musical interpretation. Of course, by saying it, I think only of the live performance and not of that one, which can be reproduced any number of times thanks to the modern technical means.

This unrepeatability of the musical performance determines the impossibility to find the identity of a musical work among its multiple interpretations. There are many different theories, which give different answers to the question what the work of music is: a mental entity, an ideal object, which exists only in the composer's mind, a universal and eternal structure of sounds or a combination of signs between which there are definite syntactical relations... All these models are incompatible with each other but there is something common between them: all of them try to place the musical work in some dimension, in which the existence of the work might be thought as independent of its interpretations.

In that case, what would be the influence of the interpretations on its identity? Do we have a right to exclude this influence from the definition of the work of art as music, the existence of which depends on the interpretation in the highest degree?

We can formulate the question otherwise. The formulation I propose here is suggested by a well-known idea in the field of

the literary theory in the early 20th century. I talk about the idea that the meaning of the literary work depends on the history of its readings, and that the work has its own means to “remember” and to recall its various interpretations, which join its semantic field and change it. We can say that in the following way: the interpretations make changeable the identity of the literary work nevertheless the paradox, which hides in the expression “changeable identity”.

Is it valid for the interpretations of the musical work also?

I propose to start the reflection on this question with the following observations:

The memory about the readings of the literary work is recoverable to the extent, in which written records of these readings are preserved. But it could not be the situation in regards to music, especially before the era of the technical reproducibility. Hence, a controversial questions arise concerning the authenticity of musical works, especially that of the old music. Another no less important question is whether the tentative to recreate this authenticity is feasible and desirable. In this case, the authenticity – a concept that, without being a synonym of identity, in some ways is close to it – depends on the quality of the musical instruments, the specific acoustic conditions of the age, the habits of performers and audience in a given historical period. It depends also on the guidelines the composers have left, and on many other specific and very often completely unattainable conditions.

Below I will focus on some of the reasons, for which the recovery of the authenticity of a musical work is not only problematic but also not always desirable. As the contemporary French specialist in philosophy of music Louis Allix notes in his article “The authenticity as standard of interpretation of music”⁷, the desire of relatively complete and accurate reconstruction of the musical works of the

⁷ Allix, L. “L’authenticité comme norme de l’interprétation musicale”. *Savoirs En Prisme* | 2012 | N° 2, pp. 173–198

past is a new phenomenon. This fact raises series of changes of the previous practice: reducing the size of the orchestra, return to the original form of musical text, excluding the later transcriptions, as well as a return to ancient instruments.

According to the same author, this tendency has led to a real new ideology of musical interpretation. Performers and audience discover that music can sound very differently compared with their habits. For example, Wanda Landowska⁸ reveals Bach as a composer in a very different and unexpected light, performing his works on harpsichord. The success with the baroque breeds a desire for authentic presentation of music from later periods, such as classic and romantic.

From the 1980s they began to record the complete symphonies of Mozart and those of Beethoven on historical instruments; they began also to play Chopin on pianos and fortepianos typical for the 1840s (Pleyel, Hammerflügel, Ducommun Girard), etc. Thus, authenticity became gradually for many musicians, musical critics, and part of more and more of the public, a central quality criterion.

However, the total authenticity, that is to say the most accurate reproduction of what the listeners heard in the context where the works were played for the first time, quickly proved to be a chimerica. For example, to play in our days Bach's Harpsichord Concertos as they were performed originally requires not only to have old instruments restored to their original condition, but require also the ability of the musicians to play these obsolete instruments, often having an insufficient specific information. Besides this, the reconstruction of the authentic sounding supposes the acoustic

⁸ Wanda Alexandra Landowska (1879–1959) was a Polish harpsichordist whose performances, recordings and writings played a large role in reviving the popularity of the harpsichord in the early 20th century. She was the first person to record Johann Sebastian Bach's *Goldberg Variations* on the harpsichord (1933).

conditions of music halls in 18th century to be replicated in the contemporary orchestral halls.

But this is not all. Louis Allix has a right to recall that, if the aim is to attain absolute authenticity, the music must be played – which is obviously absurd – by musicians who are worse than the contemporary ones. As he notes, the instrumentalists of the past were in fact less able than the current musicians, and they were doing much more wrong notes.

There are other reasons that urge us to accept that a completely authentic representation of musical works of the past is not desirable, and they are related to the quality of the instruments. The sound of the instruments of the past was weaker than the sound of the contemporary instruments, and they were also less consistent in tone and more restricted in range.

Such factors persuade us that the task of reproducing the original experience of the first listeners is rather impossible. **The ideal of complete authenticity is unattainable.** What is feasible is only to recreate the typical sound for the epoch by playing with historical instruments and by reading the original partition, adopting the interpretative style of the time. However, even these reduced ambitions are not easy to realize. First, because the set of notes constituting the work, which have to be reconstructed, is not always perfectly specifiable. Even without going back to the Middle Ages, where the *neumes*⁹ did not indicate a specific pitch or a particular rhythm, in the Baroque time the imprecision also remains high. There is no, or little, indications of phrasing or dynamics on scores, the duration of notes in music for singing is not always fixed at its true value, chromatic alterations are often missing and instrumen-

⁹ The *neume* is a sign for one or a group of successive musical pitches, predecessor of modern musical notes. Neumes have been used in Christian (*e.g.*, Gregorian, Byzantine) liturgical chant as well as in the earliest medieval polyphony (music in several voices, or parts) and some secular monophony (music consisting of a single melodic line).

tation is often vague. For instance, Bach says only in the dedication of his *Brandenburg Concertos* that they are “concerts with several instruments”.

The problems described above are strongly related to the problem of the identity of the musical work in general, with which the present article deals. They show in what extent the authenticity in music is a problematic concept. For example, there are many examples, which prove that what is normally considered as a guarantee of authenticity of a performance, namely to follow strictly the instructions on the score given by the composer, cannot be treated as absolute. As Louis Allix emphasizes, it is difficult to say that in the past the composers have required from the performers to follow severely their instructions as they often have agreed willingly to change elements of the score because of the reactions of the public or the performers. For example, it is known that even a composer like Stravinsky, who demanded greatest punctuality in the performance of his works and often complained that musicians, especially conductors, deformed his works, ultimately have made some changes in his scores because of the criticism of some performers. Another example is that of Tchaikovsky who revised sharply twice his famous Piano Concerto No. 1 in B flat minor, op. 23 on suggestions of the pianists Edward Dannreuther and Alexander Siloti.

So, we might say with certainty that when the composers write the score, they do not propose a standard or an unsurpassable fixed point, but rather a set of elements that can change because an author can always learn from his interpreters. Furthermore, very often the composers, when they perform their own compositions, do not respect strictly the instructions they have made themselves.

Therefore, as L. Allix says, “musical performer can transmute the musical object to the way a painter transforms the subject he paints. A partition is no longer *opus perfectum et absolutum*, which must be followed literally, but only the written record of sound

discoveries that may be modified, enriched, more complex or simplified”.¹⁰

Conclusion: The brief and superficial review of ideas made so far confirms the inability of the theory to give a clear and definitive answer to the question what could be the reliable criteria for determining the identity of literary and musical works. Only the finding that these works do not coincide with their material carriers seems unquestionable. Their social existence absolutely depends on multiple acts of interpretation, and interpretation, as we know, is always a kind of intervention into the autonomy of the work of art. At the same time, even if the various interpretations create different, contradictory, and mutually exclusive representations of a given work, something I would call **recognizability of the work** always remains. My hypothesis is that the support of this recognizability is not the very material carrier – black letters or musical notes on the white sheet, but a kind of mental imprint in the audience’s memory the work has left during the first meeting of the reader or listener with it.

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¹⁰ Allix, ... p. 194

V.

PERSONAL
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

ГАЛИНА ГЕОРГИЕВА

СКРЫТОЕ/РАСКРЫТОЕ
(КОНСТРУИРОВАНИЕ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ В
АВТОБИОГРАФИИ ВЕРЫ МУТАФЧИЕВОЙ)

Этот текст ставит перед собой несколько целей, которые можно объединить в одном направлении, а именно: исследование способов презентации сложной структуры, названной *автобиографическим Я*, в мемуарной литературе одного из самых популярных болгарских интеллектуалов эпохи социализма – Веры Мутафчиевой. Эти цели, короче говоря, связаны с анализом трех тем, вытекающих из специфики мемуаров: 1) рефлексивная позиция интеллектуала в ситуации репрессивного режима, 2) наличие жизненного интегритета и когерентности Я, 3) этическое и политическое измерения конструированной интеллектуальной целостности.

Здесь нужно уточнить, что анализируемый мемуарный текст охотно использует темпоральную дистанцию. Он появляется в исторический период, радикально отличающийся от периода, о котором повествуется – появляется в начале двадцать первого века, после падения коммунистического режима в 1989 году. Темпоральный интервал между событием и повествованием реабилитирует мемуары и гарантирует их возмож-

ное появление. Темпоральная дистанция является инструментом объективизации личной истории. Автобиографический рассказчик описывает свою личную историю, ретроспективно, возвращаясь назад во времени и вырабатывая вторичную темпоральную структуру рассказа. Опираясь на это разграничение, а также и на множество расщеплений между *Я, который рассказывает*, и *Я, который является продуктом рассказа* в автобиографическом нарративе, наш текст будет использовать концепт о *вторичном автобиографическом Я*.

Еще одно уточнение. Оно связано с фактом, что биографический нарратив хорошо знаком и пользуется (даже тенденциозно и манипулятивно) обычной внутритекстовой ретроспекцией. Текст не линейен, он совершает ретроспективные и проспективные прыжки по темпоральной оси, которые обосновывают логику его заключений и направляют читательские ориентиры в законы мира, созданные биографическим рассказчиком.

Так, мемуарная техника не использует внелитературно положенную настоящую идентичность, а перерабатывает ее, моделируя *вторичное автобиографическое Я*, обслуживающее цели мемуарного сочинения. Это, кстати, наблюдается и в других мемуарах, посвященных социализму (напр. у Бориса Делчева, Любомира Левчева). Они вырабатывают проекто-Я и вторичное Я, которое является результатом сложной констелляции между собственным пониманием Я-идентичности (идеальным Я) и читательским ожиданием определенной реалистической роли по отношению к достоверности событий. При вырабатывании этого Я роль взаимодействия личной и коллективной памяти, представляется существенной, равно и принадлежность Я к реальным социальным и политическим кругам, его историческое сознание и понимание моральной ответственности.

Итак, позвольте мне напомнить некоторые важные эпизоды биографии Мутафчиевой. С тысяча девятьсот пятидесятого года (1950) по тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят пятый год (1955) она работает ассистентом в Восточном отделе Национальной библиотеки. С тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят пятого (1955) по тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят восьмой (1958) год она учится в аспирантуре в Болгарской академии наук и защищает кандидатскую диссертацию по османской истории. С тысяча девятьсот пятьдесят девятого (1959) по тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят третий (1963) год она работает в Институте изучения истории Болгарской академии наук; а потом в Институте изучения балканской истории и культуры, с тысяча девятьсот восьмидесятого года (1980) она работает в Институте литературы. Затем руководит Центром древних языков и культур и Болгарским исследовательским институтом в Австрии (1980–1982). Три года подряд является секретарем секции беллетристики Союза болгарских писателей (1982–1985). После перемен она занимает должность заместителя председателя Болгарской академии наук (1993–1996), а до конца жизни является почетным членом Академии. Вера Мутафчиева – автор множества научных исследований, более тридцати пяти художественных книг, среди которых «Случай Джем», который издавался на болгарском языке 10 раз и был переведен на 12 языков. Она – сценарист самой масштабной продукции во времени социализма, исторической эпопеи «Хан Аспарух».

Если сфокусировать внимание на стратегиях конструирования биографического вторичного Я в мемуарной литературе Мутафчиевой, можно утверждать, что налицо усердное выработывание образа специфической скрытой жизни. Мутафчиева осмысливает себя в категориях интеллектуальной, классовой и идеологической маргинальности, посредством нарративных операторов и фигур замкнутого, невидимого, беспартийного. Эта скрытая жизнь, это специфическое место в интеллектуаль-

ном процессе находит устойчивость и основание в собственном переживании как носителя и выразителя высокого экспертного интеллектуального познания: Мутафчиева владеет османистикой – узким (даже эзотерическим) научным познанием. Это познание – ее собственное дело. Повествующее Я исходит из позиции знания, которое он сам приобрел, почти всегда вне системы; знание, которое не является идеологическим, а наоборот «настоящим» «исконным», «надтемпоральным». Сидя в своем кабинете в здании Национальной библиотеки, занимаясь как раз османистикой – полем, находящимся не только далеко от научных приоритетов дня, но и как бы в разрез с ними, поскольку феодальное средневековье по марксистско-ленинской доктрине является самым мракобесным периодом мировой истории (не говоря уже о противоречивом и невыясненном до конца режиме отношении Партии к турецкому вопросу!), она иронически комментирует официальную доксу. Рассказывая в историческом плане о мировых революциях, в том числе и об Октябрьской, делая попытку проследить «революционный ход истории» по Марксу, в конце она как бы непринужденно заключает: *«Простите меня за это отклонение, оно должно было проиллюстрировать ум беременной двадцатилетней женщины, которая работает османистом, а в жизни – беспартийная»* (Мутафчиева 2001: 118).

К образу интеллектуала можно добавить и следующее. В самом начале второй части Мутафчиева пишет: *«Я не знаю с чего начать. Я слишком поздно поняла, когда и как была подвергнута систематическому образованию – той разновидности, которая не охвачена школой. В детстве я не понимала, что мое существование в университетском доме (весь мир впрочем) было моим первым факультетом»* (Мутафчиева 2001: 7). Еще здесь вводятся два основных для выработки фигуры Я топоса. Первый топос связан с тем, что знание молодой субъект приобретает через пространства и сферы, являющимися неинсти-

туциональными. Перед нами деинституционализированное знание, притом знание, которое, бесспорно, является ключом к формированию субъекта. Если школа является «силовой» институцией, которая вводит и сохраняет догму и идеологию, тогда, то, что находится вне ее (улица, частные уроки, дом), обеспечивает «настоящее» знание молодой девушки. Намечается диада *институция – настоящее познание, университет как учебное здание – настоящий университет жизни*. Второй топос в цитате – это топос дома. В данном случае это не просто дом, т.е. пространство приватного, частного, замкнутого, но и университетский дом, иначе говоря, дом, который сам по себе генерирует и производит знания. Бесспорно, в пространстве этого дома отец – крупнейший болгарский исследователь истории Петр Мутафчиев – является символом, хранителем и генератором знания. На самом деле, образ отца неоднократно будет появляться в работах Мутафчиевой в качестве ключевой фигуры сдвига, но и приобщения. Сложным и комплицированным является осмысление биографического Я по отношению к фигуре отца – он источник настоящего знания, но он – как бы тень того, что будет долгие годы причиной страдания для молодой Веры как представителя «буржуазной» классы.

И еще акцент. Сам будучи педантичным в отношении употребления языка и человеком, настаивающим в семье на правильности высказывания, Петр Мутафчиев завещает дочери три правила, которые оставят прочный след в ее формировании: 1) «Подумай, прежде чем сказать!», 2) «Говори по возможности кратко», 3) «Не спеши отвечать, лучше промолчать». Так, знание языка – не просто высший закон отца, но это и сам язык, поскольку язык – социальная сущность, средство выражения знания, существует в сфере репрессивного. Язык может выражать, скрывать, промалчивать, сокращать, оформляя таким образом альтернативное пространство продуманного, невысказанного, сокращенного, даже промолчан-

ного. Перед нами вырастает не только фигура отца-авторитета, но и фигура угнетателя, цензора.

Анализ текста мемуарного произведения «Былицы»¹ (болг. «Бивалици») фиксирует в качестве центрального противопоставление – публичное-частное, официальное-неофициальное, сопутствующее весь рассказ о жизни автора. На страницах текста оно разворачивается и выступает в разных модификациях как скрытое-открытое, партийное-беспартийное, видимое-невидимое, гласное-безгласное. Убежищем самой Мутафчиевой, ее вторичным автобиографическим Я является второй член этих оппозиционных пар – пространство частного, скрытого, беспартийного, невысказанного. В этом специфическом пространстве маргинального действует и сам маргинал – позиция, с которой Я Мутафчиевой активирует свое повествование о прошлом.

Здесь я позволю себе сразу перейти к зрелой Вере Мутафчиевой времен уже зрелого социализма – к Я и к контексту третьего тома «Былицы». В нем однозначно проступает фигура скрытого, не нашедшего себе места и среды высокого экспертного интеллектуала. Мутафчиева меняет три института и в каждом из них чувствует себя «не в своей тарелке». Роль ученого, пришедшего «с другого места», находившегося как бы «у себя дома, но не совсем» усиливается. Вырисовывается картина *Я против остального мира* – чужого, враждебного, непонятного. Ее везде поджидают препятствия в отношении карьерного роста, а многочисленные враги всегда позиционируют себя как «идеологически правильные». Всю профессиональную карьеру, собственную реализацию и успехи автор описывает как сопротивление бесконечным трудностям, запретам, закулисным интригам и унижениям, которые она вынуждена переносить. Единственное утешение и счастье Я находит в написании фикциональных сочинений. Их она обособляет как исполненная удовлетворенностью и покоем отдельная сфера.

¹ Авторский окказионализм от *небылицы*.

И именно из-за своих творческих «замашек» она остается не принятой и не понятой своими коллегами-учеными. Фигура маргинала, но уже не по причине своего классового происхождения или специфического знания, но по причине необъяснимого влечения к сочинительству, повторяется. Биографическое Я вырабатывает новую форму, которая наполняется собственным постоянным содержанием – содержанием отстраненного, маргинализованного, ходящего «по острию лезвия», а иногда полностью выброшенного из сферы социальной и профессиональной нормы индивида: *«Как-то раз утром в ноябре я сказала маме, что начинаю писать роман, она мне ответила: «теперь ты совсем пропадешь» ... как будто это не так – проворчала я»* (Мутафчиева 2001: 206).

Короче, Мутафчиева создает образ самой себя, охотно надевает одежду жертвы, изолированного субъекта, который везде сталкивается с преградами, препятствующими его интеллектуальному труду и реализации, но на чьей стороне безусловно находятся силы истины и добра. Оппозиция частное-публичное превращается в оппозицию добро-зло. Проще говоря, у Я есть вера в то, что оно является ипостасью добра, в то время как весь остальной внешний мир – это ипостась зла, фальши, демагогии, интриг, закулисных игр, идеологии. И именно с ними оно находится в постоянной борьбе. Как бы весь личный мир этого сконструированного Я, несмотря на его рефлексивную «сделанность», состоит из агентов публичного. Сам личный мир отсутствует, поскольку он сведен к реализации ученого и писателя Мутафчиевой в публичной социальной жизни.

Заключение. Может быть, все сказанное не было бы столь интересным, если бы много лет спустя после выхода книги «Былицы» не появились в публичном пространстве сведения об агентурном прошлом Веры Мутафчиевой. В июне 2008 года Комиссия по рассекречиванию материалов персональных дел оповестила, что она была агентом болгарских спецслужб и,

точнее, Шестого управления под псевдонимом Атанас (имя ее первого мужа). Ее вербовали в 1969 году, а попала она в список агентов в качестве председателя Государственного агентства болгар за границей. Об этом жизненном эпизоде мемуары Мутафчиевой – всего четыре тома – умалчивают. Новое, совершенно иное измерение приобретает, однако, участие автора в научной и политической жизни при попытке осмысления ее агентурного прошлого. Новое звучание приобретают и упорно сконструированные автобиографией оппозиции скрытое-раскрытое, тайное-явное, маргинальное-публичное. Это – оппозиции, в которых нарративно смоделированное Я, приучившееся с самого детства к скрытности, отстраненности, невысказанности, находит весьма уютный способ чувствовать себя невиновным.

Здесь я не буду касаться большой, сложной и противоречивой темы об агентах и сотрудниках тайных спецслужб, как не буду касаться и большого вопроса: возможна ли моральная оценка таких случаев? Только скажу, что каждый случай (по предложению болгарского исследователя социализма Александра Кеосева) надо рассматривать индивидуально, с учетом знания и аккуратного подхода к оценке контекста. В сожалению, в данном случае этот контекст трудно можно восстановить. Персональное дело Веры Мутафчиевой, состоящее из 4-х томов, уничтожено еще в начале 90-ых гг. из-за «отсутствия интереса к нему». Этот контекст можно частично восполнить единственно по воспоминаниям ее знакомых, что придаст ему субъективный характер. Этот характер вряд ли найдет свои публично легитимные корреляты.

БИБЛИОГРАФИЯ

Мутафчиева, Вера. «Бивалици»/ «Небивалици». С. 2001

KALINA ZAHOVA

EXPECTATIONS, REQUESTS, DEMANDS.
EXAMPLES OF RECEPTION CONDITIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE.

As a starting point for my text I would like to use a very interesting example from the EURO 2012 football championship, which took place in Poland and Ukraine in June 2012. At that time I was living and working in Poznań, one of the host cities of EURO 2012.

There are numerous extremely curious observations that could be made during such a massive sport event. One of the most interesting things to observe, perhaps even much more than the football itself, were the fans. Contrary to the exaggerated bloody images all over the media, showing fights, spite and hate, the whole championship was predominately peaceful, friendly, and positive, with fans from different countries mixing their colours, sharing drinks and thoughts, socializing, arguing and then hugging each other, laughing and crying together.

I would like to briefly outline three examples of fan behavior, 3 different types of fan reactions to the matches in the group stage of EURO 2012.

Group Stage

1. Italy 1 – 1 Croatia → dissatisfied unhappy Croatians
(group C, 14.06.2012, Poznań)

On 14th June 2012 the team of Croatia succeeded to steal a 1:1 draw from visibly better standing Italy. One would expect that the fans would be satisfied and relieved, as their team nearly lost. Instead of this logical reaction though, the streets of Poznań were full of numerous grumpy, frowning, gloomy Croatian faces – not a single smile could be seen all night – only after hours of alcohol consuming finally some Croatian songs timidly echoed in the streets. The fans obviously wanted victory and nothing less, the draw saving them from loss was unanimously considered as loss anyway.

2. Poland 1 – 1 Russia → satisfied proud Poles
(group A, 12.06.2012, Warsaw)

On 12th June 2012 the team of Poland also experienced a 1:1 draw, against huge rival Russia, in a game considered important not only because of football itself, but also for various historical, political, and cultural reasons. After the game, not only the host city Warsaw, but all Poland was singing, drinking, cheering, and proudly enjoying the success of their team. In this case the draw was perceived as victory, one could say even national victory, and it was not until the early morning of the next day that silence came back to the Polish towns.

3. Ireland losing all matches → happy proud Irish
(group C, Poznań & Gdańsk)

The team of the Republic of Ireland made a catastrophic performance on the EURO 2012. They left the tournament right after

the group stage (so did Croatia and Poland), going through the fiasco series of 1–3 against Croatia, 0–4 against Spain, 0–2 against Italy. One could hardly believe the reaction of the Irish fans – all the time they remained the happiest people in the world, they never stopped smiling, drinking, laughing, singing, they demonstrated an amazing combination of national pride, party spirit and good nature – a combination that everybody fell in love with. In this case heavy losses were perceived nearly as victory.

Now, the easiest possible direction of explaining those three completely different attitudes and reactions is of course the field of the so-called **NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY**. One could choose to interpret the reactions of the fans through some generalized national characteristics of “the Croatian people”, “the Polish people”, and “the Irish people”. This direction would lead to somehow problematic notions like “national character” and “national identity”, and for sure would suggest reinforcing of stereotypes and generalizations.

For example, comparing the behavior of the Croatian fans who presented themselves as “never happy”, with that of the Irish looking “always happy”, national psychologists would easily conclude that those are national characteristics.

“Those who suggest we Irish are infatuated with our image as good-natured party-goers had plenty of evidence to substantiate that claim during the last ten days.” [Doyle 2012]. There is hardly a single person in Poznań who would not agree to such a statement. The affection of the host city for the “boys in green” has been seen on every level (even to this very day), from the sincere goodbyes, through the special visit of Poznań’s mayor Ryszard Grobelny in Ireland to express his gratitude to the Irish fans, to the numerous events, as well as headlines, videos, posts on the subject of “thanking” and “missing” the “Kings of the Craic”¹. Not the team (that

¹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yw9IwVOeNd4>; <https://www>.

no one could actually remember), but the fans (that no one could forget).

Not a trace of joy, happiness or good nature on the faces of the Croatian fans though. And it turns out that they are always like that. As Elvir Islamović writes, “When it comes to football, Croatians have incredibly high expectations – especially when the national team are playing in a major competition like UEFA EURO 2012. Slaven Bilić could have taken a school team with him to Poland and Ukraine and still thousands of fans would have followed, willing them on to a place in the final.” [Islamović 2012]

The keyword here seems to be **expectations**. I suggest the direction of national psychology to be left out, as well as conclusions such as “Croatians are gloomy, grumpy, and never satisfied” – statements that actually are often being applied to all Balkan nations and that are as a rule quite problematic.

During the discussion of my initial presentation of these observations on the *Similarity and Difference (The Problem of Identity)* international conference in September 2012 some quite relevant remarks were made in reference to the following important factors: 1) the factor of probability that suggests that some teams have better chances than others (in this case Croatia); 2) the factor of historical, political, social context (already mentioned regarding Poland and Russia); 3) the factor of football history (e.g. an opponent associated with significant victories or losses, former higher or lower rankings, etc.).

The importance of these three factors could be accurately illustrated by the Croatia national football team. The historical and political context could not be ignored when it comes to a team (and for that matter a country) that for 45 years was dissolved as part of SFR Yugoslavia. After the war and the inde-

pendence in 1990 the football success of Croatia “has exceeded all expectations” [Lukanov, Bozhinov, Dimitrov 2004: 56]: not only the club team Hajduk Split had big success, but the national team qualified a few times for the EURO finals, even winning the third place in 1998. Those facts could partly explain the expectations (and even the demands) of the Croatian fans, just as well as the fact of their team being unbeaten by Italy since independence could partly explain their perception of the draw on 14th June 2012 as a tragic loss.

All three factors mentioned by the Polish and the Bulgarian colleagues during the discussion of my initial presentation apparently affect both the collective perception of sport events and the individual one.

As a second possible direction after the national psychology we could choose a more individual one – the direction of **INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY** in the light of **SOCIOLOGY**.

One could suggest that the three different types of fan reactions are rooted in different types of perception of the world. Such a perspective would interconnect the expectations with the reality and would suggest interpretations in the direction of the perception of the reality being the reality itself.

The obvious example here is the complex process best condensed in Robert Merton’s 1948 term “self-fulfilling prophecy” [Merton 1948] that describes “a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true” [as cited in Biggs 2009: 294]. I am far from suggesting that the mistrust of the Croatian fans failed their team or that the positivism of the Irish fans brought their team any luck, but in terms of the individual and collective predispositions for fun having (or not having), i.e. for enjoying the championship (or not), the initial beliefs could definitely contribute to the construction of reality. In the words of the Irish commentator Garry Doyle:

“You’ll never beat the Irish!’ Off the pitch, that is true. On it, Croatia, Spain and Italy did beat them. How inconsiderate of a game of football to interrupt the fun.” [Doyle 2012]

In terms of expectations placed upon the individuals, two opposite effects need to be mentioned. The first one, known as the Golem Effect, is a certain form of self-fulfilling prophecy, according to which lower expectations become a reason for poorer performance on behalf of the individual subjected to them. The opposite effect, known as the Pygmalion Effect, suggests that the higher expectations placed upon the individual leads to his/her better performance.

The reverse theory exists too – most visibly on the level of popular psychology, as a warning towards “the danger of positive thinking” and as an appeal to “(l)ower your expectations and success will follow” [Chuurch]. A good example of this certain attitude to life comes from episode 19, season 1, of the successful American television sitcom “Modern Family”, in which the character Phil Dunphy expects a great Birthday from his family and ends up disappointed in every single way. His satisfaction with his special day gets accomplished only after he had already accepted the day as ruined. Hence his conclusion: “Key to a good birthday... Low expectations.” [Modern Family 2010], later cited from his “Philosophy” book of advices for his daughter Haley in the version of: “The most amazing things that can happen to a human being will happen to you if you just lower your expectations.” [Modern Family 2012]

As a matter of fact, such controversial comprehension of the function of expectations can be observed not only in popular psychology, but also in **SPORT PSYCHOLOGY**. Sport coaches and motivational gurus basically get to choose between “two competing theories of motivation”:

high expectations		low expectations
improve performance,	Vs	improve performance,
nothing succeeds like optimism		excessive expectations
		bring disappointment
		(Green 2012)

Without being statistically exhaustive, by going through the vast motivational and sport psychological literature in the process of the present text's preparation, I would conclude that the first approach is still much more common. Most methods, as well as the most famous of them – the Silva Method, are built on the basis of positive thinking, defined most simply as “thinking about what you want and not thinking about what you do not want” [Silva 1999: 39]. Thus, the future winners are taught that “[t]he choice is yours – so choose to win” [Waitley 1993: 47], and their leaders are instructed that “[w]hen a child is convinced that he or she has the ability to fulfill high expectations, he or she will very likely live up to those expectations as an adult. To be a real leader with your children, regardless of their ages, teach them that winning is the result of effort, much more than ability.” [Waitley 1993: 151–152].

On the other hand, the objects of those high expectations in many cases consider them rather a harmful burden. Some of the most important psychological factors that sportspeople (especially young ones) emphasize as reasons for losing include: “I usually lose when too much is expected from me”, “when I am too scared not to lose”, “when I am too eager to win” [Yancheva 2000: 28].

There is an even more general direction that could be taken from here: an attempt to consider the extent to which our reception is conditioned by certain invisible factors, and predetermined by our **expectations**, **requests** or even **demands**. It is obvious that one could never perceive any cultural artifact or phenomenon from point zero, it is also obvious that there is no unburdened mind that

could isolate itself from certain pre-conditions. This interconnection of all cultural texts is of course the fruitful direction of the intertextual theory, yet it is also fruitful when examining the point of view of the reception.

The main questions that seem to emerge when thinking about **THE DIRECTION of RECEPTION CONDITIONS:**

- *Could it be that our reception of cultural elements is entirely and inevitably conditioned by our **expectations**?*
- *Could it be that the evaluation of the "quality" of the work of art depends on the preliminary created conditions of reception?*
- *Is it possible to develop a system to control our pleasure and never get disappointed?*

There are certain factors that seem to guarantee and prove the good quality of the work of art, such as: awards, popularity, media presence, recommendations from the side of people recognized as authorities, trust in the ability of the author, et al. If a book, say a novel, is doing well in terms of those factors, 1) its chances to be read are way bigger, and 2) the way it will be read more likely will be more attentive, patient, even more active. Personal taste will not be the leading factor – how can you not like a novel with prestigious awards? Or how can you not like a novel recommended by your mentor or a significant other? As a preliminary condition, for sure this book is GOOD, so your reception is obliged to appreciate this quality, not to focus on possible weaknesses or personal dislike. Expectations pre-condition the reception and produce appreciation. Naturally, the opposite is also true – it could be that the reception is pre-conditioned by negative expectations. Or mixed cases – high expectations could lead to disappointment, or low expectations could lead to satisfaction. For example, a film with a number of Oscar awards from which you expect a lot, could surprise you as being nothing special; a film recommended by someone whose opinion you trust could also mean nothing to you. Or the other

way around – a film or a book you expect to be mediocre might unexpectedly blow your mind.

I will not go through all types of reaction, the point is that just like in the case of the football fans, also in many other parts of contemporary culture, preliminary attitude undoubtedly affects the reception.

The cultural industries (if we accept the gradual pluralisation of Adorno & Horkheimer's term²) seem well aware of that mechanism. In order to fulfill their market goals, they are specialized in creating expectations, requests, and demands.

Some quite obvious examples include all types of voting configurations: charts, diagrams, games, TV shows, awards, websites, radio charts, bests and tops – all formats based on voting (or liking, sharing, etc.) – all of them combining the seemingly democratic stimulation of the expression of requests and demands with the refined mechanism of formation of those requests and demands. Same could be said also about the radio stations and the music televisions in general.


From here the topic could be opened to the vast topic directions of market supply and demand; popularity and novelty; the proper combination of familiar and new; public, audiences, fans, fandom; etc. etc. Instead of that, for the present I would like to simplify the direction of reception conditions into four basic types:

- 1) high expectations that produce appreciation
- 2) low expectations that produce negative reception
- 3) high expectations that produce disappointment
- 4) low expectations that produce satisfaction

Or, if put in a simple scheme:

² For a brief sum up of the transition of the term “Culture Industry” into “cultural industries” see [Hesmondhalgh 2013: 23–25].

Expectations pre-conditioning Reception



The two options on the left are the predictable ones, the ones that follow the logic of conformity and acceptance. Those two options could be used by anybody who functions as a significant other to another person, or by any person/institution that has any authority capital to anyone.

The two options on the right though hide the potential of being strong individual mechanisms of using the expectations as a tool capable of pre-conditioning reception (in terms of aesthetical value, pleasure, appreciation, dislike, rejection, etc.). I have been experimenting with both configurations upon my own individual reception of various aspects of contemporary culture, proving them both functioning quite well under certain psychological circumstances. Furthermore, as a lecturer at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan as a brief experiment I have tried offering my MA students literary works for analyses along with deliberately creating certain expectations in them before reading the texts. The group to which I offered a short story by a popular contemporary Bulgarian author, laying particular stress on his hipness and mass appeal in Bulgaria, reacted with a critical analysis of the short story in question and overall with disappointment that it/he did not live up to the hype,

whereas the group to which I offered a poem by a contemporary Bulgarian poetess, without explaining anything about her, but by treating the poem as almost random and non important, reacted with positive analysis and overall acclaim of the work and its ideas. In both cases I spared them my own opinion (that is, did not use the authority of the teacher in any way) and worked only with the mechanisms of creating certain expectations, and in both cases the two schemes on the right proved efficient. All this said, I am in no way making propaganda for manipulation of any kind, especially at the university. I am rather thinking of ways in which our own personal pleasure and disappointment could be under our own individual control, for the best of reasons of course. Come to think of it, following the simple scheme of option 4) instead of option 3), the Croatian fans could have appreciated and even enjoyed their draw match (like the Polish did) and could have ended joyfully drinking in the same Poznan pubs in which the Irish fans happily celebrated all their cosmically insignificant losses.

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VI.

AN ABUSE OF SIMILARITY

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1 INTRODUCTION

This paper aims to present some applications of frequency analysis to automatic comparisons of texts and detection of plagiarism in Polish academic theses. It is based on [9], [10], [11] and mainly deals with a mathematical model and basics of a computer system for comparisons and detections.

Comparison of texts and similarity evaluation is a simple task if a low number of texts is involved in the process. However, the task becomes more and more complicated when the number of texts increases. Without computer-aided methods, comparison of a text to thousands of potentially similar texts in a reasonable amount of time is practically impossible. Even with a support of computers, the task is not trivial, in addition obstructed by the morphological complexity of Polish language.

This paper aims to present most frequently encountered difficulties in the process of automatic text comparison. We present a mathematical model for information gathering and processing, which is a base for similarity evaluation. We show that inherent properties of text enable narrowing down similarity search to a small part of reference texts database.

Based on the model we created a computer program to test considerable number of texts with varied complexity, extent and subject. This led us to constructing a software prototype of the *Open System for Antiplagiarism* meant to support identification of similarities between diploma theses or other works. Before publishing this paper the software has been significantly enriched with the natural language processing tools developed by the Institute of Computer Science at the Polish Academy of Sciences. By the time of final revision of this article 30 Polish universities have used the system, see [15].

2 FREQUENCY ANALYSIS

We present methods of similarity search based on partial information about given texts. In this section we focus on obtaining this information and explain how it is possible to effectively pick up similarities on the basis of frequency analysis. We stress that the information is fairly partial and there is no based on it algorithm allowing to reconstruct the original text.

2.1 Terminology and notation

For the sake of exactness let us introduce some definitions.

Definition 2.1

By a language we mean any subset J of set Σ^* of all words over an alphabet Σ . By a text we understand finite sequence of words, empty or not empty. Empty word and empty text are denoted by the symbol \emptyset .

Definition 2.2

For a text T consisting of the words w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n the symbol T_* stands for continuous fragments of T , i.e., T_* is a set of all subsequences

$$w_i, w_{i+1}, \dots, w_j, \text{ where } 1 \leq i \leq j \leq n,$$

completed with the empty word \emptyset .

Definition 2.3

Let B be a finite set of texts and let $T \in B$. Assume that $f: B \times B \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ is a fixed function and r is a nonnegative real number. Here, $\mathbb{N} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$ is the set of all natural numbers. The set

$$Odb(T) = \{T' \in B : f(T, T') \geq r\}$$

is called the *projection* of T on B . The number r is referred to as the *radius of accuracy*, and f as the *comparison function*.

Definition 2.4

Let J' be a set of keywords, i.e., a fixed subset of the language J . Any function $g: J \rightarrow J'$ is called a *skeleton transformation*. If t is a text consisting of the words w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n the text created from sequence $g(w_1), g(w_2), \dots, g(w_n)$, by eliminating empty words, is denoted by the symbol $g(t)$. For example, if J stands for English and

$$t = \{There, is, nothing, here\}, \quad g(There) = \emptyset,$$

$$g(is) = Nothing, \quad g(nothing) = is, \quad g(here) = here,$$

then

$$g(t) = \{Nothing, is, here\}.$$

More detailed examples of skeleton transformation is presented in the Section 4.

3 NAIVE COMPARISONS

Comparing two original texts as they are is the most intuitive method. To be precise, in this method we verify if possible continuous fragments of one text repeat in the other.

The comparison function, which measures the level of similarity between texts T and T' , can be defined in two standard ways, described below.

If we examine the number of appearances of repeating continuous fragments consisting of at least d words, the comparison function can be defined as

$$f_1: B \times B \rightarrow \mathbb{N},$$

$$f_1(T, T') = \text{card}\{t \in T_*: |t| \geq d \ \& \ \exists_{l \in T'_*} t = l\},$$

where $\text{card}(X)$ stands for the number of elements in the set X and $|t|$ is the *length* of the text t , i.e., the number of nonempty words in t with the convention that $|\emptyset| = 0$.

The comparison function f_1 returns the number of fragments with length at least d which appear in both examined texts. In this case the radius of accuracy r determines the minimum number of continuous fragments with length $\geq d$ in the text $T \in B$, which must also appear in the text T' to guarantee that T' belongs to the projection of T on B . Therefore

$$f_1(T, T') \geq r$$

means that texts T and T' are similar with accuracy r .

The greater the value of r , the more identical fragments must be found in examined texts, to claim that they are similar. Assuming too high value of r may cause that texts, which similarity to the examined one can be noted in a blink of human eye, are not in the projection.

If we focus on the longest repeating fragment of at least d words, the function f can be chosen as

$$f_2(T, T') = \max\{|t|: |t| \geq d \ \wedge \ \exists_{l \in T'_*} t = l\}.$$

It returns the number of words in the longest continuous fragment, existing in both examined texts $T, T' \in B$. The radius of accuracy r determines its minimum value needed for the text T' to belong to the projection of T on B . In this case the value of radius r can depend on the length of T (for example, r can be a fixed percentage of $|T|$).

In both approaches presented above we compare texts without any pre-processing, which results in serious problems listed below. That is why we call these comparisons “naive”.

Ill-chosen values of the radius of accuracy may cause taking into account so-called typical or colloquial phrases. For example, in mathematical papers and theses, phrases “if and only if” or textbook definitions are natural and commonly accepted borrowings.

Another difficulty involves permutation resulted from creating a document by changing the order of words in the text T . In the examples below we assume that T consists of n different words, $n > 1$,

$$T = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n\}.$$

We choose two different numbers $k_1, k_2 \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and define the transposition $T \rightarrow Z(T)$ changing order of words x_{k_1} and x_{k_2} ,

$$\begin{aligned} Z(T) &= Z(\{x_1, \dots, x_{k_1}, \dots, x_{k_2}, \dots, x_n\}) \\ &= \{x_1, \dots, x_{k_2}, \dots, x_{k_1}, \dots, x_n\}. \end{aligned}$$

The resulting text differs from the original one only with the order of two words. We define *text permutation* as a composition of finite number of such transpositions.

We are now in a position to consider the following examples.
Example 3.1

Let us consider a text T with the length $n > 4$ and let us assume, that the similarity detection is based on the lookout for continuous fragments of the length $d = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$. Using the function f_1 and comparing text T to itself we obtain

$$f_1(T, T) = \sum_{j=1}^{n-d+1} j = \frac{(n-d+1)(n-d+2)}{2}.$$

By assuming that $k_1 = \lfloor n/3 \rfloor$, $k_2 = 2k_1$ and $T' = Z(T)$, we obtain

$$f_1(T, T') = 0,$$

which means that the function f_1 do not lead to detecting similarity between texts T and T' . Needless to say, the meaning of Polish sentences is not very sensitive to the order of words.

Example 3.2

If in a text T with length $n > 1$ words x_{k_1} and x_{k_2} are transposed to obtain a new text $T' = Z(T)$, then for $d = 0$ we get

$$f_2(T, T) = n,$$

$$f_2(T, T') = \max\{k_1 - 1, k_2 - k_1 - 1, n - k_2\}.$$

When this method of comparison is applied to texts with different words we can easily observe that multiple use of transpositions, with appropriate values of parameters k_1 and k_2 , lead to further reduction of the f_2 value.

Let T be a text with length $n > 1$ and x_k be its k -th word. Let $Z_{x_k} = \{z_1, z_2, \dots, z_m\}$ be a finite set of words such that $x_k \in Z_{x_k}$. We use the symbol S_z to denote the operation of substituting the word x_k for an element z of the set $Z_{x_k} \setminus x_k$,

$$S_z(T) = S_z(\{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{k-1}, x_k, x_{k+1}, \dots, x_n\})$$

$$= \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{k-1}, z, x_{k+1}, \dots, x_n\} = T'$$

We call the set Z_{x_k} the synonyms of x_k . Elements of $Z_{x_k} \setminus x_k$ are called x_k -*substitutes*.

The next example illustrates the problem with synonyms in naive comparison.

Example 3.4

Let us consider a text T in which k -th word has been replaced by its substitute to produce the text T' . We assume that $n = |T|$ and $d = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$. Then

$$f_1(T, T') = \sum_{i=1}^{k-d} i, \text{ if } k \geq d,$$

and

$$f_1(T, T') = \sum_{i=1}^{n-k-d+1} i, \text{ if } k < d.$$

Assuming that $k_1 > d$ for $k < d$ and $k_1 < d$ for $k \geq d$, we replace the word x_{k_1} in text T' by its substitute. With this special choice of k_1 we get

$$f_1(T, T'') = 0,$$

which means that the comparison function f_1 do not lead to detecting similarity between texts T and T'' .

Example 3.5

Let T and T' be as in the previous example, and let T'' be obtained from T' the same way as above with $k_1 < k$. Then for $d = 0$ we get

$$\begin{aligned} f_2(T, T) &= n, \\ f_2(T, T') &= \max\{k - 1, n - k\}, \\ f_2(T, T'') &= \max\{k_1 - 1, k - k_1 - 1, n - k\}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly to permutations, multiple use of substitution leads to further reduction of those values.

Transformations presented in the examples are often used to camouflage other author's passages. They are easy to accomplish and hard to detect in any rich morphology language (e.g., Polish).

Verifying similarity of texts T and T' by comparing fixed length continuous fragments using "each to each" method is very ineffective due to the high computational cost, since the minimal number of comparisons involved is proportional to $|T||T'|$.

4 TEXT MODEL

Years of academic work with Polish students led us to the conclusion that most common ways of using illegal borrowings from other author's works in master or bachelor theses are based on coping some passages:

1. without any changes,
2. with slight changes, usually by changing word order in some sentence and/or replacing some words with their substitutes,
3. making serious changes in borrowed text structure and content arrangement and replacing many of words with their substitutes.

This observation motivated us to design a computer system supporting plagiarism detection and being cost-efficient and resistant to the camouflage mentioned above.

4.1 Forming term frequency vector

In this section we explain the mechanism of converting the original text T into a special digital form, called *term frequency vector*, which is well suited for comparisons to reference texts. A database of reference texts (or their frequency vectors) is crucial in this process.

We begin with forming so-called *skeleton of T*. It is accomplished in the following four steps.

1. Preliminary conversion which replaces all capital letters with the corresponding small letters and eliminates all non-alphabetic symbols from the text.
2. Inflectional unification which brings all words to their basic (lemmatic) forms.
3. Synonymic unification which changes all substitutes to their basic forms.

4. Final conversion which eliminates redundant words and all expressions (single words and/or phrases interpreted as single words) belonging to the so-called *list of exclusions*.

More detailed presentation of those steps is given bellow.

4.1.1 Preliminary conversion

- Aim: The conversion aims to eliminate non-alphabetic symbol and convert all letters to lower-case in the input text T .
- Operation description: The conversion reads one symbol at a time and returns a text of single spaced words eliminating all non-alphabetic symbols and additional spaces, changing all capital letters to the corresponding small letters.
- Notation: The result of this conversion of a text t is denoted by $B(t)$.
- Comment: In Section 4.1.2 we assume that the input text is of the form $t = B(T)$.

4.1.2 Inflectional unification

- Aim: The unification aims to bring each word of the input text to its basic form.
- Operation description: The unification reads one word at a time and converts each to its basic form taken from a dictionary \mathcal{S} being representative for the language, producing a single spaced text of those forms. Unidentified words (i.e., those not found in \mathcal{S}) are eliminated. The basic forms of particular parts of speech are indicated by the sign \mapsto in the list below.
 - Noun \mapsto nominative singular noun (if it does not exist, we assume nominative plural noun).

- Verb \mapsto infinitive.
 - Adjective \mapsto nominative singular adjective.
 - Numeral \mapsto nominative numeral in masculine form.
 - Pronoun \mapsto accordingly to grammar rules for the substituted part of speech.
 - Immutable parts of speech \mapsto without change.
- Notation: The result of this conversion of a text t is denoted by $F(t)$.
 - Comment: For implementation various data structures can be used. With appropriate methods the cost of unification can linearly depend on the length of the input text.¹ Ambiguities may arise due to homographs. For fully automatized conversion we use the dictionary developed in the morphological analyser *Morfesusz*, see [7] and [14], treating each word a unique way, regardless of the context.² In Section 4.1.3 we assume that the input text is of the form $t = F(B(T))$.

4.1.3 Synonymic unification

- Aim: The unification aims to replace each input text word with its basic synonymic form.
- Operation description: The unification works as the previous one, according to the dictionary of words substitutes and their basic forms.

¹ Such a cost can be achieved by using hash table as a dictionary. It is important to take into account additional space cost and a method of this data structure implementation in the programming language, (see [8]).

² Unidentified words are stored and play an auxiliary role in the system. As the dictionary is representative for the Polish language, too many unidentified words may indicate that there is something wrong with the input text, for instance some Polish letters have been replaced with the same looking elements of the Cyrillic script.

- Notation: The result of this unification of a text t is denoted by $S(t)$.
- Comment: We disregard homographs treating each word a unique way, regardless of the context. When $S(F(B(T)))$ is formed, information about frequencies of its words can be gathered. In the Section 4.1.4 we assume that the input text is of the form $t = S(F(B(T)))$.

4.1.4 Final conversion

- Aim: The conversion aims to remove redundant and irrelevant words from the input text.
- Operation description: The input text is read one word at a time and an auxiliary text (initially empty) is created gradually. Each word read either becomes the last word of the auxiliary text or is ignored if it has already been read or belongs to the so-called list of exclusions. After processing the last word of the input text, the auxiliary text is converted to lexically ordered single-spaced output text.
- Notation: The result of this conversion of a text t is denoted by $K(t)$.
- Comment: We shall comment on the list of exclusions in the sequel.

4.2 Term frequency vector

The skeleton $T' = K(S(F(B(T)))) = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_k\}$ is a lexically ordered set of unique words s_i in their basic forms taken from the dictionary \mathcal{S} . Let $f: \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \{1, 2, \dots, \text{card}(\mathcal{S})\}$ be a fixed bijective function. We call it a *numeration of \mathcal{S}* .

We are now in a position to form the *term frequency vector* $\text{tfv}(T)$. It is built as an ordered pair of equal length sequences $Zs = \{f(s_1), f(s_2), \dots, f(s_k)\}$ and $Tf = \{t_1, t_2, \dots, t_k\}$, where each t_i is the number of appearances of the word s_i in the text $S(F(B(T)))$,

$$\text{tfv}(T) = \langle Zs, Tf \rangle.$$

Example 4.2

If $Zs = \{123, 1044, 109011, 45899, 234579\}$ and $Tf = \{1, 5, 6, 5, 2\}$, then the text $S(F(B(T)))$ consists of one word $f^{-1}(123)$, five words $f^{-1}(1044)$, six words $f^{-1}(109011)$, five words $f^{-1}(45899)$ and two words $f^{-1}(234579)$.

The number of appearances of a word x in the text $S(F(B(T)))$ is denoted by $\text{tfv}(x, T)$. We assume that $\text{tfv}(x, T) = 0$ if x does not appear in $S(F(B(T)))$.

Words in skeletons are not equally relevant in the lookout for similarities between texts. This why we tie them with ranks. The rank of a particular word $w \in T$ depends on how often w appears in the skeletons of other texts to which T should be compared. The set of these skeletons is denoted by B . Of course, we may have many B 's, but we focus on a fixed one. Let us note that the set $W(B) = \bigcup_{s \in B} s$ consists of all unique words appearing in skeletons from B . We assume it is lexically ordered. We now consider the ordered triple

$$\text{BoW}(B) = \langle Bs, Bdf, Br \rangle$$

with the components Bs, Bdf, Br being sequences with $\text{card}(W(B))$ elements defined below.

- Bs_j (i.e., the j -th entry of Bs) is the numeration of the j -th word in $W(B)$.

- Bdf_j (i.e., the j -th entry of Bdf) is the number of the skeletons from B in which the word $f^{-1}(Bs_j)$ appears.
- Br_j (i.e., the j -th entry of Br) is given by the formula

$$Br_j = \log\left(\frac{\text{card}(B)}{Bdf_j}\right).$$

The number Br_j is said to be the *rank of the word* $w = f^{-1}(Bs_j)$. The more frequently w appears in different skeletons the less relevant it is. The use of logarithm smooths differences between arguments $IDF_j = \frac{\text{card}(B)}{Bdf_j}$, see [3].

Example 4.3

Assuming that $\text{card}(B) = 100$ we get

$$\log\left(\frac{100}{1}\right) = 2, \log\left(\frac{100}{2}\right) = 1,69, \log\left(\frac{100}{60}\right) = 0,22,$$

$$\log\left(\frac{100}{61}\right) = 0,21.$$

Differences between low frequencies (1 versus 2 appearances) are relatively big compared to differences of high frequencies (60 versus 61 appearances), see [4].

Given a word w appearing in a skeleton of B_j , its rank is denoted by $Br_j(w)$. The triple $BoW(B)$ is said to be *the bag of words*.

4.3 Lists of exclusions

Bags of words are used in two ways. Firstly, globally, in reference to whole database D of gathered texts. Secondly, locally, in reference to its disjoint parts D_j . More precisely, if \mathfrak{B} and B_j are sets of the corresponding skeletons of texts in D and D_j , respectively, we assume that

$$\mathfrak{B} = \bigcup_{k=1}^n B_k, \quad \bigwedge_{i \neq j} B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$$

and make use of $BoW(\mathfrak{B}), BoW(B_1), \dots, BoW(B_n)$. The sets B_k are called *domains*.

Let us note that for a word which appears in every skeleton of \mathfrak{B} , the *IDF* factor is 1, and consequently the word's rank is zero in \mathfrak{B} , and in any domain containing a skeleton the word belongs to. The collection of such words is called the *global list of exclusions*. In reference to a given domain B_k we form its *local list of exclusions* by collecting the words which appear in every skeleton of B_k .

Lists of exclusions can be extended by additional words, for instance by words with rank at most τ , where τ is a small positive number, but, for the sake of simplicity, in what follows we assume that no extension is made.

We are now in a position to define *global* and *local keywords*. A word w which appears in at least one skeleton of \mathfrak{B} and does not belong to the global list of exclusions is said to be a *global keyword*. Similarly, a word w which appears in at least one skeleton of B_k and does not belong to its local list of exclusions is said to be a *local keyword of B_k* .

4.4 Classification

In what follows we assume that the division of \mathfrak{B} into domains B_k has already been done and it reflects the intuition that usually there is no need to compare a given text T to each element of the whole database D , and a better solution is to compare it to reference texts dealing with the same or similar subjects as T . For instance basically there is no need to compare a text in mathematics to reference texts other than those in exact sciences. We now formally describe how to point out the most

appropriate domain for T . The procedure is based on the Rocchio algorithm, see [1]. Its departure point is the following definition. Given a word x appearing in the skeleton $t \in B_k$ of the text T , the number

$$w_{k,t}(x) = \text{tfv}(x, T) * Br_k(x),$$

is said to be the *weight of x in B_k* . Here we assume that $B_0 = \mathfrak{B}$ and $k = 0, 1, \dots, n$. Moreover, if x does not appear in t , we set $w_{k,t}(x) = 0$. For each domain B_i , $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$, we define its *centroid*

$$C^i = \{c_1^i, c_2^i, \dots, c_{\text{card}(W(B_i))}^i\}$$

by the formula

$$c_j^i = \alpha \frac{1}{\text{card}(B_i)} \sum_{t \in B_i} w_{0,t}(f^{-1}(B_i s_j)) - \beta \frac{1}{\text{card}(\mathfrak{B} \setminus B_i)} \sum_{t \in \mathfrak{B} \setminus B_i} w_{0,t}(f^{-1}(B_i s_j)),$$

where $j = 1, 2, \dots, \text{card}(W(B_i))$ and the factors $\alpha = 16$ and $\beta = 4$ have been experimentally set, see [6].

Example 4.4

Let us assume that \mathfrak{B} contains 4 skeletons t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 divided into two domains $B_1 = \{t_1, t_2\}$ and $B_2 = \{t_3, t_4\}$. To determine the centroid C^1 we assume that a word s_j does not appear in t_4 and appears in each skeleton t_1, t_2, t_3 and has the weights $\frac{7}{10}, \frac{4}{10}$ and $\frac{1}{10}$, respectively. Then

$$c_j^1 = \frac{16}{2} * \left(\frac{7}{10} + \frac{4}{10} \right) - \frac{4}{2} * \frac{1}{10} = 6 \frac{3}{5}.$$

For a given word x let $j^i(x) \in \{0, 1, \dots, \text{card}(W(B_i))\}$ be the value such that either $j^i(x) = 0$ or

$$c_{j^i(x)}^i = \alpha \frac{1}{\text{card}(B_i)} \sum_{t \in B_i} w_{0,t}(x) - \beta \frac{1}{\text{card}(\mathfrak{B} \setminus B_i)} \sum_{t \in \mathfrak{B} \setminus B_i} w_{0,t}(x).$$

We use centroids for classification. Skeleton t is classified to a class B_j such that the maximum

$$\max_i \frac{\sum_{s \in t} w_{0,t}(s) c_{j^i(s)}^i}{\sqrt{\sum_{s \in t} (c_{j^i(s)}^i)^2} \sqrt{\sum_{s \in t} (w_{0,t}(s))^2}}$$

is attained for $i = j$. Here, we assume that $0/0 = 0$. If the maximum is attained for more than one values of j , t can be classified to any, but only one, domain corresponding to these values. Fraction in the last formula can be interpreted as the cosine of the angle in $\left[0, \frac{\pi}{2}\right]$ formed by the vectors w and c with the coordinates $w_{0,t}(s)$ and $c_{j^i(s)}^i$, respectively. So, the smaller angle, the bigger its cosine.

4.5 Comparison

After qualifying skeleton t to a domain B_k we search for similarities between t and elements y in B_k . To this end, we use quantities $I(t, y)$, $C(t, y)$, $R(t, y)$ motivated by those used in the *SMART* system, see [1], [2], [4], [5]. We assume that $t \cap y$ stands for the lexically ordered set of those local keywords, which simultaneously appear in both skeletons t and y . We define

$$I(t, y) = \frac{\sum_{s \in t \cap y} w_{k,t}(s) w_{k,y}(s)}{\sqrt{\sum_{s \in t \cap y} (w_{k,t}(s))^2} \sqrt{\sum_{s \in t \cap y} (w_{k,y}(s))^2}},$$

$$C(t, y) = \frac{\sum_{s \in t \cap y} \min(w_{k,t}(s), w_{k,y}(s))}{\min(\sum_{s \in t \cap y} w_{k,t}(s), \sum_{s \in t \cap y} w_{k,y}(s))}.$$

In order to define $R(t, y)$ we assume that $t \cap y = \{s_1, s_2, \dots, s_m\}$ and

$$ind(t, y) = \{i(s_1), i(s_2), \dots, i(s_m)\}$$

is the text consisting of the words 0, 1, 2 formed according to the rule

$$\begin{aligned} i(s) &= 0, & \text{if } w_{k,t}(s) &= w_{k,y}(s), \\ i(s) &= 1, & \text{if } w_{k,t}(s) &\neq w_{k,y}(s) \wedge \Phi, \\ i(s) &= 2, & \text{if } w_{k,t}(s) &\neq w_{k,y}(s) \wedge \Psi, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi &= true & \text{iff } w_{k,t}(s) &= \min\{w_{k,t}(s), w_{k,y}(s)\}, \\ \Psi &= true & \text{iff } w_{k,y}(s) &= \min\{w_{k,t}(s), w_{k,y}(s)\}. \end{aligned}$$

For $e \in \{1, 2\}$ we consider the text $ind(t, y, e)$ created from $ind(t, y)$ by eliminating all appearances of e . We now set

$$R(t, y) = \frac{2\max\{|ind(t, y, 1)|, |ind(t, y, 2)|\}}{\text{card}(t \cap y)} - 1.$$

To measure similarity between t and y we can use any mapping $\varphi: [0, 1]^3 \rightarrow [0, 1]$ which is an increasing function of each argument when two other arguments are fixed. The skeletons t and y (and the corresponding texts) are considered to be similar if

$$\varphi(I(t, y), C(t, y), R(t, y)) > p,$$

where p is a fixed number from the interval $(0, 1)$. In extensive tests and simulations we obtained very good results for $p = 0.5$ and

$$\varphi(x, y, z) = g(\max\{x, yz\}),$$

where

$$g(u) = 1 - \left(1 - \left(1 - 2 * \frac{\arccos(u)}{\pi}\right)^q\right)^{\frac{1}{q}}$$

with $q = 1.9$.³

The following table presents results of computer simulation over a set of 200 texts initially composed of 4 randomly selected passages of randomly selected different reference texts. Each passage has a volume of 15 up to 25 percent of the corresponding reference text. Then 100 random phrases, 20 word length each, were permuted in each of the resulting texts. We carried out 4 variants (A – D) of the simulation dividing each texts into 4, 6, 8, 10 non-overleaping fragments consisting of an equal number of words, up to one word. The reference text remained undivided. The goal of each variant was to detect for each fragment at least one reference text used in the composition. We considered the goal to be achieved if the list of the reference text skeletons y satisfying

$$\varphi(I(t, y), C(t, y), R(t, y)) > p,$$

contained a text used in composing the text represented by the skeleton t . Here, φ and p are as specified above. The reference texts consisted of Polish-language 650 writings: 154 authentic (but anonymous) diploma theses and 496 pieces selected from Wikipedia. The number of characters per text was between 60,000 and 120,000, for the theses, and between 1500 and 5500, for the Wikipedia entries.

Variant	Number of fragments	Percentage of successful detections
A	4	~ 51
B	6	~ 87
C	8	~ 99
D	10	= 100

¹ The novelty of this approach lies in the specific definitions of the measures I , C , R and function φ .

See [12], [13] and [15] for more information.

SUMMARY

This paper show that frequency analysis combined with text fragmentation lead to very effective and robust indication of similarities between Polish-language documents which is crucial in plagiarism detection. The methods presented can be easily adapted to other languages by a proper modification of the procedures described in Section 4.

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RAYA KUNCHEVA

PAUL DE MAN AND MARIONETTE –
THE PLAY OF DIFFERENCE

Heinrich von Kleist's short essay *Über das Marionettentheater* (*On the Marionette Theatre*), written in 1810, some months before his suicide, has received a tremendous amount of attention in XX century. It exercised a peculiar fascination on writers as Rilke, Kafka, Tomas Man, Hofmannsthal, Beckett. Kleist expressed some of the deepest aesthetic aspirations of modern thinking. It was the one of first inspirations for the interest and obsession with the marionette in the theory and practice of the European theatrical avant-garde.

The essay contains a dialogue, equipped with stage directions, between the narrator, a semi-fictional 'I', and the dancer, his acquaintance (Herr C.). It contains also two framed anecdotes, and structurally important use of metaphoric paradox in the assertions such as this:

We see that in the organic world, to the same degree that reflection gets darker and weaker, grace grows ever more radiant and dominant. But just as two lines intersect on one side of a point, and after passing through infinity, suddenly come together again on the other side; or the im-

age in a concave mirror suddenly reappears before us after drawing away into the infinite distance, so too, does grace return once perception, as it were, has traversed the infinite – such that it simultaneously appears the purest in human bodily structures that are either devoid of consciousness or which possess an infinite consciousness, such as in the jointed manikin or the god. (*Von Kleist 2010: 272*)

In this very short text, a few pages, thematic subject-matter is changed from the aesthetics to theology, from mechanics of marionette to the self-reflections. A correspondence between the physical and the moral world is frequently method in the Kleist's thinking and in the essay Herr C. explains to the narrator principles governing the movement of marionettes with the law of gravity:

I inquired as to the mechanism of these figures, and how it was possible, without myriad threads attached to fingers, to direct the motion of each limb and its pauses as prescribed by the rhythm of the movement or the dance? He replied that I must not picture it as if each limb were individually posed and tugged at by the machinist during all the different moments of the dance. Each movement, he said, had a center of gravity; it would suffice to control this point from the center of the figure; the limbs, which are, after all, nothing but pendulums, would follow mechanically on their own without anything else needing to be done. He added that this movement was very simple; that each time the center of gravity is moved in a straight line the limbs trace curves; and that often, when merely shaken in a haphazard fashion, the entire mechanism slipped into a kind of rhythmic motion that resembled dance. (*Von Kleist 2010: 265*)

And because in the marionette the moving force and the center of gravity are in strict coordination the puppet has more grace than

a human dancer. The marionette has two decisive priorities which in the argumentation of Herr C. obtains a metaphysical meaning with a reference to the third chapter of the book of Genesis, the story of the Fall of Man Fall:

The advantage? First of all, a negative one, my fine friend, namely that it never strikes an attitude. For attitude, as you well know, arises when the soul (*vis motrix*) finds itself twisted in a motion other than the one prescribed by its center of gravity. Since, wielding wire or thread, the machinist simply has no other point at his disposal than this one, all the other bodily articulations are as they should be, dead, pure pendulums, and merely follow the law of gravity; an admirable quality that one may seek in vain among the vast majority of our dancers. /.../ “Such missteps,” he added as an aside, “are unavoidable ever since we ate of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. But Paradise is bolted shut and the cherub is on our tail; we are obliged to circle the globe and go around to the other side to see if perhaps there’s a back way in. (*Von Kleist 2010: 269*)

The second advantage in Herr C.’s explanation is following:

The puppets, moreover, have the advantage in that they are gravity-defiant. They know nothing of the inertia of matter: for the force that lifts them into the air is greater than the force that binds them to the ground. What wouldn’t our worthy G . . . give to be sixty pounds lighter, or if a weight of this magnitude were to aid her in her entrechats and pirouettes? The puppets only need the ground, as do the elves, to graze it, and thereby to reanimate the swing of their limbs against the momentary resistance; we need it to rest on it and recuperate from the strain of the dance: for us the moment of contact clearly plays no part in the dance and we have no other recourse but to get it over and done with as quickly as possible. (*Von Kleist 2010: 269*)

These and other passages from Kleist's essay have been subjected to almost every kind of the critical approach throughout the twentieth century. The body of criticism on it has reached such a variety of mutually exclusive views standing against each other. However much it is difficult to systematize this heterogeneity, but yet with the advent of radical approaches like the deconstruction it is possible to distinguish two kinds of explanations of Kleist's marionette – as a symbol (ideal for internal integration in achieving of the self) and as an allegory (as a machine). If in the puppet-symbol we can see some thesis of European existentialism during the thirties of the last century when the superiority of inner feeling is a guarantee for authenticity over the claims of the rational intellect and also the challenge of the rationalism in favor of the irrationalism of German Romanticism, the puppet-allegory functions in the thinking of the psychoanalytic and deconstructivist theoretical views appeared as challenging totalization, whether in politics or in art. Whereas earlier critics have, by and large, accepted Gerhard Fricke's thesis (*Fricke 1929*) that the superiority of the most inner feeling over and above the rational intellect is the key for the Kleist's work, after the late 1960s critics have been inclined increasingly to see first of all the elements of ambiguity, substitutions and irony.

We are told that "Forever bound to reformulate a knowledge and espouse a beauty which is neither the text's nor his own, the critic writing on the "Marionetten theater" ...can neither say what he means nor mean what the text says, neither achieve transfiguration through its grace, nor grace it with his transfiguration." (*Ray 1979: 545*) Deconstructing is to disclose what the text does not say and in the play of the sameness and difference the reading in the deconstructive strategy, with his "overturning" and "reinscription" of the built binary opposition becomes a suspension." Or, as Paul de Man goes on to inform us: the distinctive nature of literary language . . . but not by way of direct statement, as the explicit assertion of a knowledge derived from the observation or understand-

ing of literary works. It is necessary ... to read beyond some of the more categorical assertions and balance them against other much more tentative utterances that seem to come close, at times, to being contradictory to these assertions. The contradictions, however, never cancel each other out, nor do they enter into the synthesizing dynamics of a dialectic. No contradiction or dialectical movement could develop because a fundamental difference in the level of explicitness prevented both statements from meeting on a common level of discourse; the one always lay hidden within the other as the sun lies hidden within a shadow, or truth within error. (*De Man 1971: 102–3*) So, in this manner of vision there is not any difference between truth and error and there is only constantly split, disjointed, engaged in incessant conflicts – aporia is the aim and the result of this description. Deconstructivist reading disrupts any stable connection between language, meaning and reference and thus disrupts any aesthetic response in so far as such a response, to written texts at least, depends upon a connection between language and phenomena.

Man's *Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist's Über das Marionetten-theater* is published in *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* (1984) but we can find his statement about allegory-machine in the *Allegories of Reading* (1979) when he says that the excuse is not only a fiction but a machine:

There can be no use of language which is not, within a certain perspective thus radically formal, i.e. mechanical, no matter how deeply this aspect may be concealed by aesthetic, formalistic delusions" (*De Man 1979: 294*). By saying that the excuse is not only a fiction but a machine

"One adds to the connotation of referential detachment, of gratuitous improvisation, that of the implacable repetition of a preordained pattern. Like Kleist's marionettes, the machine is both "anti-grav," the anamorphosis

of a form detached from meaning and capable of taking on any structure whatever, yet entirely ruthless in its inability to modify its own structural design for nonstructural reasons. The machine is like the grammar of the text when it is isolated from its rhetoric, the merely formal element without which no text can be generated. (*De Man 1979: 294*)

Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist's, Über das Marionettentheater is significant work because here Kleist is interpreted by de Man in relation with what he called in the later essays "aesthetic ideology". "In the lexicon of de Man and others (e.g., Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in *The Literary Absolute*) aesthetic ideology refers to a longing for wholeness, reconciliation, and formal integrity.... In its reconciliation of antagonisms and its suppression of difference, the drive toward aesthetic totalization, whether in politics or in art, betrays an essential violence." (*Wolin 1994: 11*)

The main target is Friedrich Schiller and his concept about gracefulness. "It is in a beautiful soul, therefore, that sensuality and reason, duty and inclination, are harmonized, and grace is its expression in appearance." (*Schiller 1967*)

The later essay *Kant and Schiller* de Man concludes by saying that Schiller's misreading of Kant is comparable to the Goebbels misreading of Schiller. This comparability suggests sameness between Nazi ideology and Humanism, suggests instrumentalism in the thinking of Humanism. Goebbels misreading of Schiller's aesthetic state is a popularization and in this context the statesman is an artist. The artist is the person able to express the feelings. "The people are for him what stone is for the sculptor" – can say Goebbels in his novel *Michael, Ein deutsches Schicksal in Tagebuchblättern* (1933).

Paul de Man does his statement on the base of unacceptable tautology, denying the differences in the cognitive and pragmatic aspects – the education becomes popularization of philosophy and as such it is on the site of the art and belongs to the masses.

“...it belongs to culture, and as such it belongs to the state. To aesthetic state, and it justifies the state...” (*De Man 1996: 154*) Schiller’s concept of “aesthetic education” i.e., the theory of moral and political betterment through art is viewed as a forerunner of the totalitarian state. In *Aesthetic Formalization: Kleist’s Über das Marionettentheater* he claims: “The aesthetic, as is clear from Schiller’s formulation, is primarily a social and political model, ethically grounded in an assumedly Kantian notion of freedom; despite repeated attempts by commentators, alarmed by its possible implications, to relativise and soften the idea of the **aesthetic state** (Aesthetischer Staat) that figures so prominently at the end of the *Letters on Aesthetic Education*, it should be preserved as the radical assertion that it is.” But Schiller does not use the word “state”, but only the word “society”, also “aesthetic formalization” is not found in Schiller. “In citing a letter from Schiller to his friend Körner regarding the English dance as a model for society, de Man takes extensive textual liberties. First, instead of citing the original German text, he cites the translation offered in the commentary to the massive edition of Schiller’s letters *On the Aesthetic Education of Man* by Elizabeth Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, and he then appends tersely to his first footnote: “translation modified.” Falsified would be a better term: in place of Schiller’s phrase “ideal of social conduct” (Ideal des schönen Umgangs) de Man substitutes “ideal of a beautiful society,” thus implying the presence of a repressive political structure where it is not present in the original. Second, de Man has taken the citation out of its context—a lengthy meditation on beauty by Schiller which appeared in the center of the so-called Kallias letters – ignoring other remarks in that letter and elsewhere, including political ones.” (*Jones 1999*) There are also other “textual liberties”.

The idea of formalized “dance” taken by de Man to illustrate his view of the totalitarian state is inadequate in aspect of the puppet theater in the Kleist’s essay. It begins with these phrases:

One evening in the winter of 1801 I met an old friend in a public park. He had recently been appointed principal dancer at the local theatre and was enjoying immense popularity with the audiences. I told him I had been surprised to see him more than once at the marionette theatre which had been put up in the market-place to entertain the public with dramatic burlesques interspersed with song and dance. He assured me that the mute gestures of these puppets gave him much satisfaction and told me bluntly that any dancer who wished to perfect his art could learn a lot from them. (*Kleist 2010: 264*)

The narrator compares marionette theater with the gander pictures by famous painter: “He asked me if I hadn’t in fact found some of the dance movements of the puppets (and particularly of the smaller ones) very graceful. This I couldn’t deny. A group of four peasants dancing the rondo in quick time couldn’t have been painted more delicately by Teniers.” (*Kleist 2010: 265*)

This is very different from the image of dancing in Schiller text, quoted by de Man:

I know of no better image for the ideal of a beautiful society than a well executed English dance, composed of many complicated figures and turns. A spectator located on the balcony observes an infinite variety of criss-crossing motions which keep decisively but arbitrarily changing directions without ever colliding with each other. Everything has been arranged in such a manner that each dancer has already vacated his position by the time the other arrives. Everything fits so skilfully, yet so spontaneously, that everyone seems to be following his own lead, without ever getting in anyone’s way. Such a dance is the perfect symbol of one’s own individually asserted freedom as well as of one’s respect for the freedom of the other. (*Schiller 1967*)

Utopian view of the beautiful soul, the ideal society are interpreted by de Man as the ideology of the totalitarian state, and Kleist's essay as revealing its nature, such as dropping its mask. Behind the mask there is only violence and mutilation. Stanley Corngold already pointed continued presence of the topic of violence in view of de Man. (*Corngold 1989*)

These topics received new reading after disclosure of Paul de Man's wartime journalism in 1940–41 and his support of the Nazi regime.

As far as deconstruction claims to spell out the consequences of our thinking from the pitfalls of Western metaphysics, the direct involvement of one of its most prominent representatives with the anti-democratic ideology has raised questions about the relationship between deconstruction and fascism, between young de Man and what he wrote in his later texts about aesthetic ideology.

Some defenders of Paul de Man attempted to examine later texts as a criticism of his collaborationist texts. Cynthia Chase's – *Trappings of an Education toward what we do not yet have* will be explore here as a good example. The debate raised the issue about the interpretation of European modernism in de Man's wartime journalism. In the context of this controversy, the following points appear related:

How de Man distorts the original text of Kleist; how the puppet like a machine becomes an allegory of the text with implications for violence; how Paul de Man removes subject and in his reading of Kleist the difference between human being and marionette is erased; how he excludes any social aspect; how intersubjective relations are reduced only to the dominance, and education to the instruction.

Another point relates to the theme of the modernism and de Man. There are aspects in theories of the avant-garde and in particular of the Bauhaus, inspired by Kleist's essay. I think that this can give a new context of de Man's Kleist reading.

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SUMMARY / РЕЗЮМЕ

Гжегож Гроховски

ПОСЛЕ ПАРАДИГМЫ ТОЖДЕСТВА.
СХОДСТВО, ПОВТОРЕНИЕ.

Настоящий очерк представляет собой попытку показать роль, которую играют в современных гуманитарных науках категории „сходство” и „повторение”. Значительную популярность данных понятий мы считаем реакцией на многочисленные критики, направленные на познавательное верховенство категории тождества, а также на модель мышления, основанную на методологическом принципе идентификации. Успех вышеуказанных понятий связан, по нашему мнению, с воздействием двух влиятельных направлений, то есть когнитивизма и постструктурализма (оба направления сложились как продолжение двух конкурирующих традиций в европейской философской мысли, соответственно эмпиризма и рационализма). В представленном сравнительном описании автор пытается указать на главные предпосылки, а также на возможные последствия постулируемого высокого статуса вышеуказанных понятий.

Радосвет Коларов

ПОДОБИЕ И РАЗЛИЧИЕ КАК СИММЕТРИЯ И
АСИММЕТРИЯ: БИ-ЛОГИКА МАТТЕ-БЛАНКО

Настоящая статья вводит в теорию чилийского психоаналитика Матте-Бланко, известную под названием «би-логика» и обсуждает возможности ее применения в литературоведении. В основе этой теории находится диалектика понятий «симметрия» и «асимметрия», затрагивающих отношения между двумя предметами или

явлениями, которые при своем инверсировании, соответственно, сохраняют/изменяют свою идентичность. Сознание, руководствуясь соображениями целесообразности, отправляет обширные пространства симметрий в бессознательное, в глубокие фонды эквивалентностей и классов, где границы между индивидуальностями сняты и мыслительная деятельность протекает не под формой пропозиций, а в их аббревиатуре, в пропозициональных функциях. Применяя понятие «симметризация», посредством простой и мощной абстракции, Матте-Бланко интерпретирует многие из основных понятий и идей в психоаналитической теории Фрейда. Симметризирование применительно к фигуративному плану художественного текста, а также к взаимоотношениям между литературоведческими терминами, раскрывает логику, которая находится за пределами непосредственной видимости, выявляя теневые стороны явления.

Еньо Стоянов

ТЕОРИЯ ФИКЦИОНАЛЬНЫХ МИРОВ И УСТОЙЧИВОСТЬ МИМЕСИСА.

Теория фикции всегда была узко связана с идеями подобия и различия под знаком понятия мимесиса. Еще со времени романтизма современная литературная теория с относительным успехом пытается многократно прорвать эти связи. Одна из последних попыток в эту сторону является „теорией фикциональных миров“, развернута учеными как Любомир Долежел и Тома Павел, которые пытаются приложить семантику возможных миров, разработанную аналитическими философами как Сол Крипке и Дэвид Льюис, по отношению к исследованию литературы. Акцентом в этом подходе (конкретно для Долежела) является то, что модель семантики возможных миров можно оказаться решительным препятствием перед коллапсом фикции в мимесисе. Настоящая статья предлагает внимательный анализ на настаивание Долежела на то, что его проект иммунизирован миметическими понятиями. Она пытается продемонстрировать что это настаивание по сути свергнуто

специфическим способом по которому он прилагает идею о возможных мирах к литературе и вместо этим предлагает иное приложение этой идеи, но посредством концептуального аппарата Жюлья Делеза.

Тереза Добжиньска

СХОДНЫЕ ИЛИ РАЗЛИЧНЫЕ? К ВОПРОСУ ОБ ИДЕНТИФИКАЦИИ ПРЕДМЕТА В ВЫСКАЗЫВАНИИ

В настоящей статье рассматривается возможность/невозможность выразить неповторимую природу вещей с помощью стандартных языковых средств. Отправной точкой рассуждений является положение, согласно которому зафиксированные в языке понятийные категории навязывают принятую в данном обществе перспективу восприятия человеком вещей и явлений. Носители языка, особенно поэты и писатели, пытаются создать образ действительности, соответствующий их интуиции, однако испытывают при этом ограничения, навязываемые самим кодом. Ощущаемое расхождение между категориальным содержанием слов и индивидуальным способом восприятия вещей и явлений иногда в конечном счете отрицает или ставит под сомнение успешность языка как средства сообщения истинных суждений.

В статье приводятся высказывания писателей, подтверждающие их осознание этой трудности, а также описываются избранные языковые приемы, ставящие под сомнение адекватность языкового знака. Мы имеем в виду, в частности, метаязыковые оговорки (к примеру, ‘что-то наподобие’, ‘вроде’, ‘как будто’), а также кавычки, применение которых внушает приблизительный характер предикации и наряду с этим придает высказыванию слегка ироническую окраску. Обращается внимание на то, что метаязыковой комментарий иногда обнаруживает лживость употребляемых слов (к примеру, „лже-выборы”, „лже-депутат”).

Способом найти выход из тупика является поиск средств для наиболее адекватного выражения неповторимой природы вещи и богатства явлений. Один из приемов заключается в добавлении к

исходной категоризации предмета целой серии определений, обогащающих его описание и позволяющих уловить его индивидуальные признаки (например, серия эпитетов). Иным эффективным методом выражения уникальных признаков предмета является его сравнение с другими, известными вещами, и впоследствии перенос связанных с ними коннотаций (область сравнений и метафор).

Regina Koycheva

OLD BULGARIAN LETTERS AND THEIR BYZANTINE MODELS – SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

By applying three disciplines – history, linguistics and literary theory – the article outlines the significant presence of the similarity/difference dichotomy in several key points along the scale of “alphabet – written language – literature”. Some of Roman Jakobson’s views on these issues are highlighted, as are also the similarities and differences between his views and the concepts accepted in Bulgarian Medieval studies. The following questions about the Slavic letters from IX–X centuries are answered: 1. Why quite soon after St. Constantine-Cyril had created the Glagolitic alphabet, which drastically differs from almost all known writing systems in the world, in Bulgaria a second Slavic alphabet, which, on the contrary, follows the model of the Byzantine uncial, appeared? 2. Why stress marks are missing in the Old Bulgarian written language, when they are typical of the Greek language from which the first translations into Slavic are made? 3. How the similarity/difference dichotomy is manifested in Old Bulgarian literature and in its theological foundations?

Эва Шценна

ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ ЗНАКА И ТЕКСТА В ДИГИТАЛЬНОМ ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ

В настоящей статье представлено воздействие цифровых технологий на формирование новой идентичности текста и знака. Дигитальный текст, с одной стороны, уходит корнями в традиционный мир текста (используя при этом сложившиеся формы, жанры, а также конкретные произведения), а с другой – формируется в результате ремедиации. Его новый онтологический статус адекватно описывают такие понятия как полисемиотичность, полидискурсивность, интерактивность, гетерогенность, постоянная реконтекстуализация, нестабильность, исчезновение формальных рамок, взаимопроникновение текстового и дискурсивного порядков. В основу изменения идентичности текста легла новая идентичность цифрового знака, а именно его нематериальная природа, общая для всех форм проявления знака в плоскости изображений, а наряду с этим – его функция. Вышеназванные признаки предопределяют новое строение знака (как и надстроенного над ним текста), то есть его двухуровневый характер (уровень программирования и уровень пользования), а также многослойность и многоаспектность каждого уровня.

Alexander Panov

THE IDENTITY OF FICTIONAL DISCOURSE AS A PROBLEM OF LITERARY THEORY

During the second half of the 20th century literary theory used to concentrate its efforts mainly on the study of the principles upon which textual structures are built. Everything surpassing the framework of the text was considered irrelevant as subject of theoretical study. This tendency was stopped by the simple question “What is literature used for?”. In other words, the turn came along due to the problem of the social func-

tion of literature. The text-oriented literary theory couldn't provide a sufficient answer to this question. That is why it was adopted as a major issue to solve by the schools preferring to view literary phenomena as events or acts. Hence the concept of discourse appeared as a chief opponent to the concept of text. According to one of the most prominent representatives of the newly founded reception aesthetics, Karlheinz Stierle, the difference between text and discourse is that a text has no identity, while a discourse has. Hence the importance the problem of fictional discourse identity has for the more adequate conceptualization of the problem of the main subject of literary research.

The article below, by using different examples, proves the hypothesis that unlike the pragmatically oriented speech act, fictional discourse does not have firmly set identity and this is the reason we can derive different discursive schemes from one and the same text. These schemes would have significantly different artistic and social functions. The examples are thus selected as to illustrate diverse aspects of the problem of the identity of fictional speech act. The study of these aspects shows that the said issue is of fundamental importance for literary research.

Дарин Тенев

УНИКАЛЬНОСТЬ И ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ ЛИТЕРАТУРНОГО ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИЯ

Статья ставит вопрос об идентичности литературного произведения. Автор утверждает, что из-за специфического характера литературной потенциальности литературное произведение искусства не имеет сущности. Но как люди могут обсуждать данную работу, если она не имеет сущности? Идентичность пересмотрена как состоящая из определенного набора возможностей, фиксированных именем. Понятие уникальности вводится в противоположность понятию идентичности. Уникальность – это то, что указывает на работу через всю возможную идентичность. Уникальность – трансидентичный индекс.

Магдалена Саганяк

ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ И ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ СУБЪЕКТА В ЭСТЕТИЧЕСКОМ ПЕРЕЖИВАНИИ ИСКУССТВА

В статье рассматривается вопрос о проблеме идентичности и изменения субъекта в эстетическом переживании. Рассуждения, проводимые на стыке философской антропологии, литературоведения и эстетики, приводят нас к постановке тезисов онтологического характера, касающихся природы субъекта как такового. Эстетическое переживание понимается как особый опыт, в который субъект погружается благодаря т.н. эстетическому фрейму, изменяющему качество воспринимаемых перцептивных стимулов, ощущение времени, а также отношение к действительности. Это приводит в итоге к созданию искусственного субъекта, способного стать участником фиктивного мира искусства. В ходе же восприятия искусства субъект сам по себе продолжает существовать и, в результате, происходит его удвоение. Следовательно, эстетическое переживание предстает как акт самокреации и наряду с этим как акт своеобразного удвоения, в котором субъект вынужден сохранить свою идентичность, оставаясь при этом самим собой. Таким образом возникает особая напряженность между двумя аспектами тождественного самому себе субъекта. В описании вышеуказанного, специфического удвоения автор ссылается на избранные классические трактовки, а именно на труды Станислава Оссовского, на структуралистские концепции, а также на исторические теории эстетики, в частности, Канта, Шиллера и прежде всего Шеллинга, обращая внимание на творческую силу субъекта как присущую его природе и при этом не нарушающую его идентичности. В итоге автор приходит к следующему заключению: свойство субъекта создавать искусственную личность, которая участвует в эстетическом переживании и не теряет связи с реальным субъектом, вполне осознающим свои действия, возможно только при условии, что мы примем такую концепцию субъекта, которая объясняет возможность создания разнообразных форм субъектности наряду с сохранением идентичности. Адекватной теорией, позволяющей нам объяснить наблюдаемые на основании разнообраз-

ных исследовательских направлений феномены удвоения, является эссенциалистская концепция субъекта. В ее свете субъект существует как некое бытие, способное создавать различные формы субъектности. Они же являются чем-то отличным от субъекта как такового, который сохраняет свою идентичность, совершая все свои действия выбора и формируя самого себя в эстетическом переживании.

Георги Илиев

РЕКУРСИВНОСТЬ, ПОДОБИЕ И ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ В ТВОРЧЕСТВЕ ХАВЬЕРА МАРИАСА

В тексте рассматриваются измерения фикциональных миров в некоторых постмодернистских произведениях испанского писателя Хавьера Мариаса, функционирующих в контексте современного литературного миротворчества, ориентированного на достижения Марселя Пруста и Генри Джеймса. Нарратологические структуры в романах Мариаса позволяют выделить рекурсивные логические структуры в качестве маркеров фикционального. В настоящем кратком исследовании мы останавливаемся на нескольких повторяющихся дискуссиях между героями на тему национальной идентичности. Наша цель доказать, что они – не только источники идей, но и отрывки, дающие определения скрытым модальностям, спроецированным в мирах романов. Теоретическая основа теста охватывает как современные мнения (Вольфганга Изера и Любомира Долежела) о природе фикционального, так и классические нарратологические исследования (Ролана Барта и Цветана Тодорова). В конце изложения – заметка об отношениях между персонажами и мнения, почерпнутые из литературно-критических произведений немецкого романтика Новалиса.

Мацей Мрозик

ПОВЕСТВОВАНИЕ И ИЗМЕНЕНИЕ

Статья посвящена проблеме изменения в концепциях повествования. В трудах Антония Кемпинского и Эрвина Шрёдингера отмечается существенная роль изменения в биологических процессах. Изменение, будучи всеобщим опытом человечества, является также важным предметом философских размышлений и религиозной мысли (примером может служить Книга Екклесиаста). Повествование же играет в жизни как отдельного человека, так и общества очень важную роль. Среди элементов, часто называемых в определениях повествования, отметим некие, связанные с изменением, а именно: временность, каузальность, событийность. Что касается последнего, то можно рискнуть утверждая, что в дефинициях рассказа „событийность” практически равноценна „изменению”. В концепциях, описывающих повествование и смежные понятия, „изменение” вводится либо эксплицитно (у Аристотеля, Жерара Женетта, Цветана Тодорова), либо посредством метафоры (у Бориса Томашевского) или же через понятие „событие” (у Джеральда Принса, Патрика Колма Хога-на). Идею Женетта о том, что рассказ – это развитие „глагольной формы”, можно дополнить, приравнивая центральное место события в повествовании к центральному месту глагола в предложении (в соответствии с положением Ролана Барта о наличии гомологических соотношений между отдельными уровнями структуры языковых текстов).

Магдалена Щитиорска-Мутор

„ТА ЖЕ СЕРАЯ КУКЛА С ГЛАЗАМИ, СМОТРЯЩИМИ
В СТОРОНУ”. ФОТОГРАФИЯ, ТОЖДЕСТВО И РАЗЛИЧИЕ
В ПОВЕСТИ „ПОСЛЕ СМЕРТИ”(„КЛАРА МИЛИЧ”)
И. С. ТУРГЕНЕВА

В настоящей статье предлагается анализ повести И. С. Тургенева, центральным мотивом которой являются фотография с её

интерпертационным фильтром и проблема статуса изображенного на фотографии субъекта. Обсуждается идея тождества и различия, получившая развитие в теории, философии и эстетике фотографии. Мотив фотографического изображения „той же серой куклы с глазами, смотрящими в сторону“ образует, с одной стороны, оппозиции ‘такой же-иной’, ‘живой-мертвый’, ‘присутствующий-отсутствующий’ (с двойной ссылкой: на повесть „Клара Милич“, а также на идеи Барта, Бельтинга и Фридберга), а с другой – согласно приемам фотографии, деконструирует их резкую бинарность.

Мирына Янакиева

ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ И ИНТЕРПРЕТАЦИЯ ПРИ „НЕМАТЕРИАЛЬНЫХ“ ИСКУССТВАХ: ЛИТЕРАТУРА И МУЗЫКА

Любой объект, подлежащий множеству интерпретаций, обладает проблематической идентичностью. Любая новая его интерпретация является испытанием для его способности оставаться идентичным самому себе и сохранять те свои черты, которые гарантируют его узнаваемость. Главная проблема при определении понятия идентичности художественного произведения связана с трудностью определить природу этих же ее черт и ответить на вопрос какой ее стороне – материальной или смысловой, они принадлежат, не упуская из виду, что разграничение между материей и смыслом в искусстве весьма условно.

Напряжение между возможностью множества интерпретаций и возможностью сохранения неизменной идентичности является особенно типичным для „нематериальных искусств“, таких как литература и музыка. Их определение именно как „нематериальных“ в случае подчеркивает очевидный факт, что и в литературе, и в музыке идентичность произведения не совпадает с его материальной стороной – черными нотными или буквенными знаками на белом листе. Эта их особенность относит оба искусства к тем, которые

Нельсон Гудмен называет аллографическими и отграничивает от автографического типа искусства. В свою очередь Жерар Женетт в своем комментарии теории Гудмена уточняет, что аллографические искусства отличаются тем, что обладают двумя видами черт – основными (*constitutive*) и дополнительными (*contingent*). Второй вид черт зависит полностью от свободы интерпретации.

В настоящей статье эти термины Гудмена и Женетта выбраны в качестве основного инструмента анализа особых отношений между идентичностью и интерпретацией, характеризующих литературные и музыкальные произведения. Подвергается проблематизации также понятие аутентичности в произведениях обоих искусств с использованием в качестве примера современных попыток воссоздания произведений старинной музыки в условиях их первых исполнений.

На основе этого и других примеров автор приходит к заключению о невозможности для теории построить устойчивые критерии определения идентичности литературных и музыкальных произведений. Их социальное существование целиком зависит от интерпретации, которая, в свою очередь, всегда является видом интервенции в автономность произведения. В то же время, даже когда различные интерпретации создают не просто различные, а противоречивые, даже взаимно исключающие друг друга образы данного произведения, она сохраняет свою узнаваемость. Гипотеза в настоящей статье заключается в том, что опорой этой узнаваемости является не материальная сторона произведения, а некий ментальный отпечаток, оставленный произведением при первом прочтении или прослушивании в памяти реципиента.

Galina Georgieva

THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY IN THE MEMOIRS OF VERA MUTAFCHIEVA

The study focuses on the policies of selfhood and the strategies of constructing of the biographical self in the memoirs by one of the key literary and public figures from the Bulgarian intellectual life during the social-

ist era – Vera Mutafchieva (“Occurrences”, 2001). The motivation for the choice of the author has three pillars, around which the analysis is focused and developed. The first is associated with the extremely high readership and public popularity of the author before 1989, however ambiguous her placement within the socialist literary heritage. Resulting more from literary factors, she almost gained the aura of an alternative to socialist realism, while at the same time being revealed as an agent of State Security. Second, the memoirs of Mutafchieva diligently built specific images of a hidden life. She construes herself in the categories of (intellectual, class and ideological) marginality, in narrative operators and figures of the closed, the invisible, the non-partisan. Actually, this form of hidden life, the specific implication in the intellectual process, the morally ambiguous claim of simultaneous influence and subversion of the official and the ideological, draws strength and unwavering grounds from the self-experience of the author as bearer and spokeswoman of a highly expert intellectual knowledge – Mutafchieva has command over the narrow (almost esoteric) scholarly knowledge in the field of Ottoman studies. The third motive for the examination is the powerful figure of the father – as a serious factor in her life time, and in the trajectory of her biography. Repeatedly the image of the father – also a prominent intellectual – is a key figure from which she both distances herself and to which she nevertheless often return. He is the source of authentic knowledge, but he is also the shadow of a representative of the “old” class, cast upon the author as a reason for a long time of suffering. The study comments on the lack of a clear, recognizable moral position in the memoirs, and when it is seemingly available, it emerges within a relativism, bordering both on the public and the private subversion and self-irony.

Калина Захова

ОЖИДАНИЯ, ЖЕЛАНИЯ, ТРЕБОВАНИЯ. ПРИМЕРЫ УСЛОВИЙ ВОСПРИЯТИЯ В СОВРЕМЕННОЙ КУЛЬТУРЕ.

В тексте использованы примеры, почерпнутые из современной культуры (различные типы реакций фанатов во время первен-

ства Европы по футболу в 2012 году в Польше и на Украине; условия чтений; восприятие музыки и т.д.) как основа попытки рассмотреть ту степень, до которой наше восприятие различных культурных аспектов обусловлено определенными невидимыми факторами и предопределено нашими ожиданиями, желаниями или даже требованиями. Более того, текст ставит такие вопросы как: может ли наше восприятие культурных элементов быть целиком обусловленным нашими ожиданиями? Возможна ли зависимость оценки «качества» произведения от предварительно созданных условий восприятия? Возможно ли развить систему, с помощью которой мы бы могли контролировать свое удовольствие и никогда не испытывать разочарования?

Марек Ковальски, Марек Щепаньски

ИДЕНТИФИКАЦИЯ НАУЧНЫХ ТЕКСТОВ

В настоящей статье представлены некоторые случаи применения автоматического сравнительного анализа текстов с точки зрения критерия частотности. Подобный анализ может послужить орудием выявления плагиата в научных диссертациях. Предлагаемая разработка основана на работе М. Щепаньского – M. Szczepański, *Metody porównywania tekstów – analiza częstościowa*, [in:] *Cyberprzestępczość i ochrona informacji*. Tom II, B. Hołyst, J. Pomykała (eds.), Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej w Warszawie, pp. 329-348, Warszawa 2013, и касается главным образом математической модели, а также основ компьютерной системы сравнения текстов и выявления плагиата.

Рая Кунчева

ПОЛЬ ДЕ МАН И МАРИОНЕТКА – ИГРА В РАЗЛИЧИЕ

Эссе Генриха фон Клейста „О марионеточном театре“ интерпретируется по-разному и весьма противоречивым образом литературной критикой XX века. В настоящей статье указаны обе модели толкования марионетки – как символ и как аллегория. Первая относится к доминирующему в 30-ых гг. подходу Герхарда Фрике, а вторая – к деконструкции Поля де Мана. Рассматриваются в тезисном порядке границы и злоупотребления в прочтении Полем де Маном Клейста. С применением машины как аллегории текста и языка стирается сущностное различие между человеком и марионеткой. Текст Поля де Мана о Клейсте является ключевым и в отношении постулированной им „эстетической идеологии“. Радикальная деконструктивистская критика понятий разума и субъекта в западной метафизике стирает сущностные различия между фашистской идеологией и гуманизмом.

**ПОДОБИЕ И РАЗЛИЧИЕ.
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